SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL-SCALE GOLD ... - WWF

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Under these circumstances, miners are not inclined to experiment with unfamiliar technology, no matter how promising it might be. The only way to encourage experimentation is to have a long-term presence in the field under which credit and continuous technical assistance is provided to miners. However, the assistance schemes will not have the desired impact unless a much better organization of the mining regions and zones in the interior is achieved and an organization of miners is established that has the infrastructure to provide technical assistance. Five levels of enterprise organization are reviewed, and some economic indicators are used to give an impression of the financial potential of small-scale miners to improve their mining technology. The strength and the weaknesses of the various systems are indicated. Examples of excellent organizational efforts have been noted, while in other locations almost no organization is in place. Without authoritative and functional organization of mining regions and zones, it will not be possible to introduce and adequately manage assistance schemes, and to monitor and control compliance with new regulations that will be drafted and voted into law. It is suggested that existing organizational schemes set up by private sector enterprises should be studied thoroughly. The concession management enterprises have found many useful and practical solutions to the many problems encountered in the sub-sector. The government may consider incorporating these tools in new laws and regulations promulgated for the purpose of reforming and structuring the sub-sector. The involvement of the private sector in the regulation of mining regions and zones is also an option that warrants careful considerations. Several concession management enterprises have a proven track record in this area. The organization of miners is another key element in the reform and regulation of the sub-sector. The Brazilian miners have organized themselves into COGASUR, and this organization has contributed significantly to the well-being of its members. What is missing is an organization of the Suriname concession holders and equipment owners, including Maroon miners. Without such an organization, it will be difficult to reform the sub-sector and regulate the mining regions and zones. It will also be difficult to provide effective assistance on a regular and structured basis to foster better and/or improved techniques and practices, and to reduce the negative impacts. It is suggested that a project be developed to survey the mining regions and zones and to consult concession and equipment owners as well as miners about setting up such an organization. It is critical that this effort not be seen as a trick by the government to register miners and to collect taxes. The primary focus should be on assistance, to improve practices and serve the well-being and the interest of the members, but not the State. Of course, efforts to reform the sub-sector and introduce controls will be much easier and effective with such an organization in place. Basically this should be a private sector initiative supported by the Chamber of Commerce and by other business and industry organizations. 54
Table 7. Differences in organizational structures in the various zones Owner operated zones Concession sub-letting Customary zone Occupied zone Level of control High; concession owner regulates concession area and mine units based on national and customary mining laws, and personal preferences Management style Mine unit ownership Registration of mine units Pro-active with a presence of a mine manager. Infrastructure is developed and maintained. Most equipment owned by concession holder, some leasing of equipment Inventory of all mining equipment, registration of laborers, and service providers. From high to low; some concession owner have a presence in the mine and exercise control. Others are absentee permit holders, and exercise little or no control. Functions as a “landlord,” collects statistics and fees. In low control mines no permanent management presence and fee collection is intermittent. Unit owners with agreement of permit holder to work on the concession Range between high degree of administration to a low degree or absence Medium; mixture of tribal and customary mining laws Chiefs and clan elders manage the area on the basis of customary tribal laws. Unit owners, for the most part Maroon Low; self organized, following customary mining laws. Compliance with the customary „miner‟s law‟ is haphazard and theft of gold and violence is common. Unit management is good, but the overall management of the mining zone is not regulated or structured, creating an unpredictable working environment. Unit owners without concession or access to a concession Informal, oral consent No administration of the mining zone Concession fees Not applicable, permit holder 10% to legal concession holder 5-10% to tribal land rights Nothing or fee extracted by works on his own concession holder powerful individual Taxes and Equipment owner/permit holder Concession holder pays tax and Individual miners pay royalty at Individual miners pay royalty at royalties to pays corporate tax, and royalty; royalty; Individual miners pay sales point if gold is sold to sales point if gold is sold to government Individual miners pay royalty if royalty if gold is sold to legal legal dealers. legal dealers. gold is sold to legal dealer dealers Safety Relatively high; authoritarian Ranging from high to low, Medium, safe-guarded through Low; no regulatory authority. control. Manager hires heavily depending on the level control clan relations. Individual Individual mine operators either armed guards exercised by the concession operators may carry weapons, carry weapons or hire armed holder usually hunting rifles, or hire armed guards. guards. Authority and Concession holder and Concession holder and By chiefs and/or clan elders. Self-organized; right of the sanctions overseers mediate and enforce overseers mediate and enforce Authorities are involved in strongest. An individual with regulations. Authorities are regulations. Authorities are serious offenses. social standing or power of involved in serious offenses. involved in serious offenses. arms may interfere 55
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SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL-SCA
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4.6 Concession holders and miners 4
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACT Amazone C
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PREFACE The Suriname gold sector ha
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The World Wildlif
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Furthermore, the proposed Inter Dep
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The consultants ap
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Chapter I INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 ou
Page 17 and 18: government with their experience in
Page 19 and 20: Zoning of mining areas. The third i
Page 21 and 22: known. The risk of water- and air-b
Page 23 and 24: 1.5 Root causes Why is it so diffic
Page 25 and 26: Box 1: The administrative presence
Page 27 and 28: NW-SE greenstone belt between the G
Page 29 and 30: of inappropriate equipment soon tra
Page 31 and 32: other goods imported from Paramarib
Page 33 and 34: their property to a foreign explora
Page 35 and 36: second informal system to the exist
Page 37 and 38: Hydraulic mining was outlawed in Ca
Page 39 and 40: Chapter III SOCIAL DIMENSIONS In th
Page 41 and 42: 3.2 The second gold rush Until the
Page 43 and 44: 3.3. Life in the mines Life in the
Page 45 and 46: In contrast to the Brazilian migran
Page 47 and 48: spouse, and jeopardizes their acces
Page 49 and 50: Chapter IV MINING CLASSIFICATION AN
Page 51 and 52: of its original rock structure and
Page 53 and 54: concentrate is panned with mercury.
Page 55 and 56: 6. conjunction with another excavat
Page 57 and 58: 4.3 The classification scheme of No
Page 59 and 60: capital invest in such an enterpris
Page 61 and 62: Most workers are paid a percentage
Page 63 and 64: least earn some income from mining
Page 65 and 66: Fixed costs Operator (150 gr. p. m.
Page 67: Finally, the concession holder who
Page 71 and 72: government‟s policy to phase out
Page 73 and 74: Institutional: It provides guidance
Page 75 and 76: The rights of Indigenous, Maroon an
Page 77 and 78: institutions will be involved, both
Page 79 and 80: nature, mode of occurrence and quan
Page 81 and 82: into several categories, basically
Page 83 and 84: classification of sub-sectors in th
Page 85 and 86: over a period of five or more years
Page 87 and 88: To this day, however, little progre
Page 89 and 90: To issue licenses to small-scale mi
Page 91 and 92: NB is part of the Forestry Departme
Page 93 and 94: This development was anticipated by
Page 95 and 96: in the interior on a regular basis.
Page 97 and 98: community at the best of their abil
Page 99 and 100: Help guide law drafters and law mak
Page 101 and 102: and social laws. An intricate syste
Page 103 and 104: Table 11. Economic importance of pl
Page 105 and 106: and likely underestimates the real
Page 107 and 108: 7.1 Summary of the findings Chapter
Page 109 and 110: the legalization of the activity th
Page 111 and 112: Uncontrolled sub-sector No funds to
Page 113 and 114: development leading to a practical
Page 115 and 116: Hierarchical zoning of SSGM The pro
Page 117 and 118: 13.2 Langatete Zone 13.3 Cottica Zo
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critical, as use of their infrastru
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evised proposal to reflect the outc
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13 De Vletter, D.R., and A.L 1998 t
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32 Maatschap van Geologen en Mijnbo
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51 World Bank 1998 Environmental As
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