CONTENTS - ouroboros ponderosa

hei "lli of dewl ) . I .. . .
:' .
.
()[':I( dN\ .' NII Mh\NINf . (II \V\V I
. ' " {II lI1en , .111 (he .!lHlgeflll"1I1 (If Ilillnll I\.,.:IIIH" ::
1 he aS pIr,IlH)fiS and Innoccnc ' f l '
cruelly destroyed by th I
· c () t lese revolulltlllary artisls w,',,'
e war. n its attcrmath th · I "tt
protests of Georg Grosz and Ott D' b..
ment, as with the surrealist ni tmr
example of the same rcsult . Ef . t J
others-without exception i;
, l. 11 n l'xWessi""isl
cspoke the shock and disillusi""
es of Dal!. LIterature is annlhl'1
1 0 , oyce, Pound, Yeats and so m'"IY
The authoritarian welfa: e st P ro P h ts of dccay and death.
e a state of atfalfS in Germany
which was far from secure. Th l
inception by the prewar ycars
.
d"
I marck, several dccadcs from ils
urg scandal, In two years of trial"
aftcr 1907, aired intrigue bl' k '1
p
. g 0 SIOk. BaIlIn, the Hamburg
' ac mal and rottenness 10 the K ' .. "
1m me late clfclc, causing state resti e t ' .
capitalist spoke to th
, e governmen t 10 1908 of "th
crisis," hoping that a tax dec ' h
.
"
alser s
e groWing domeslic
March 1909 was the war alter : se m i g t help defusc it." Already in
military Cabinet consI'dcred an Iv t e pro l
Posed, as Lyncker, chief of the
, . ex erna conllict d . bl "
nation out of "internal difticulf ,,74
P
nncc von Bulow recalled "a general dis runtl "
. ICS.
summarIzed in this way' "If in B' . k'
eSIra e to move the
. g ement, whIch he
with the Empire,' it was ' now a c::a/ day pople talked of 'disgust
disgust which gained ground eve ' d O ,,
was this high-placed opinion al i a \ , More .
;gust With the govcrnment'-a
speclflcally portentous
I heard from Dusseldorf ( hat So K r m f IS memOirs: "At the end of 1 91 2
industrialists ... had declared that i l ; t ;
Germany will have landed in war or revoln'6
In late 1913 and early 1914 the arr
one of the biggest Rhcinish
another three years
against civilians in Alsace onstitu o an ge , tures of Geman officers
aroused in Carol PI"
grcat o;tcry went an: k WO d
Iy, a 293-54 no-confidence re:l:i v t .
occasion of waning governme t
people seemcd "to b I
To J h FI
t, t e Zabern InCidents," and
, general indignation."" Indeed, a
ed, Ibelt omewhat impotent­
. ames Gerard saw thIS as an
n power, and wrote that the German
e a most rcady to demilitarize themselves , , "
o n ynn, the Zabcrn huhbub I
deepening of a domestic s lit which
country. As he viewed it ETh
.
reSIstance to arbitrary tendenc'e' ,,79 I h'.
mere y contnbuted to the
. ' .
had already VIrtually paralyzed the
, ere was a spmt-and a gro . .
wmg one-of
t IS context the naval mdiscipline
aboard the S.S. Vaterland at uav
revealing. Therc the bold
forced an immediate and ' spon d
recalling the revolt in the Bra '1'
A
10 the spflng of 1914 IS SImilarly
taneous aChon Of
.
the 1,300 crewmen
uncon llional acceptance of th . d
Zl Ian navy of late 1910
rthur Rosenberg described the polI'tI'cal
,
.
elf emands,
and social tension of
.
(;cl"lIIany ;IS "typical of a prerevolutionary period," concluding that
wilhoul war in 1'114, "Ihe conniet "etween the Imperial government and
Ihe majmity of the German nation would have continued to intensity to
a point at which a revolutionary situation would have been created,""'
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on the eve of war complained of the
absence of nationalist fortitude in the land, lamenting this as a "decline
of values," and a "spiritual degeneration," Complaining further of what
he saw as the ruling classes' "solicitude for every current of public
opinion," he defined his war policy to Riezler as a necessary "leap into
the dark and the heaviest duty.""
At the same time, it is rather clear that this rising crisis, requiring tI
war to stem it, was not at all the doing of the left. Of the Socia.
Democrats and their millions of adherents a hollowness was manifest.
D.A. Smart wrote of the "widely felt stagnation in the party"" in 1913;
Spengler, in the introduction to his Decline of the West, saw both the
approaching world war and a "great crisis .. .in Socialism." Far from
inconceivable, then, is the notion that the rulers fearcd a breakdown of
their dependable official adversaries, not the party or unions themselves,
especially given the signs of uncontrolled movement.
Industrial anger, in the shipyards, for example, was on the upswing and
was most often directly combatted by the unions. The alienation of trade
union membership, which was to characterize the latter part of the war,
was strongly developing: local groups were breaking away from the
central confederation in textilcs, paint and metals"
The Social Democratic Party, a function of thc trade unions, was a
loyal handmaiden of the state; its support of government tax bills made
possible the military alternative, guaranteeing a harvcst of proletarian
cynicism. In 1 914, Austin Harrison put it another way: "All kinds of men,
German bankers, for example, often voted for the Socialists."" The
workers' penchant for "sudden, unorganized" strikes, which has puzzled
many commentators, underlined the contradiction and its threat.
During July, various Party leaders met with Bethmann-Hollweg,
enabling him to reassure the Pruss ian Ministry of State on July 30 as to
the left's abject loyalty: "There would be no talk of a general strike or of
sabotage."" Utilizing the socialist tradition of defending war by advanced
powers against less developed ones as progressive, "opposition" and
government were in agreement on anti-czarism as the effective puhlic
banner.
While making plans for preserving the Party machinery, Social
Democracy voted unanimously for war credits on August 4, with an
accompanying statement which stressed imperialism as inevitably