CONTENTS - ouroboros ponderosa

PI,' I ) l,c ,\Nl/I JI 1 . \ , ,,· Vc l/ I . /\t •. \IN';1 \\/( 11.: .... "
. \111 )1' \S " 11 1 1 I'
I)ou)..' ' Fns " t or s,IH " - I ('1 Jryslcr had made 'I c(t' .- I . . " I Il ,\ IIllstake
III ' " af'lxasilll' h II,l'
_ _
> ,
workCls" alld thl' , M'll'k " ;\ VCIlU!; W'! I K( t
. .
)lI was dtectlvdy suppressed wht'li ••
a crowd of "UAW local unl'c)n 0 1:1" Icers and " ,
. . , .
ndseb,tll bats and clulls gath ' .
commItteemen, armed wi tll
.
" ere d outsIde of the p I an t gates to 'urge' t1w
wor k 'crs to return.'m
,r.
October, 1973 brought th
C '"
slgmng
. . of a new three-year contr:lct
.
between Ford and the UAW.
But
wIth the SI'g .
e 'd
.
nmg appeared fresh '.".
. .
V ence that workers intend I t0 IOVO ' I ve themselves 1 ' n d eClSlons . conccrn- .'
mg . t helr ' work lives' "Des 't th
their jobs at seven Ford ' e e agreement, about 7,700 workers left .
I .ili
p an t s w hen
the strike deadr me was reachcd ..
.
so . me b ecause they were unh a p py WIt h the secrecy surrounding the ne "
agreement.""
With these brief remarks on ave ry small
number of actions by workers '
let us try to arrive at . sam e un derstandmg
of the overall te f
American . wage-earners since the mid-1960s :
t
SIdney Lens found that the numb I'
:971 was extremely high, and that on r stnkes during 196R, 1969, and f.
h
)3 showed comparable totals J
4 y e years 1937, 1944-45 and 1952-
'
' M are , 111terestmg IS thc growing tendency \
of strikers to reject the l b
contracts in which the Fee; )l1 'i
racts negotiated for them. In those
e lalIon and Conciliation Service took
a hand (the only ones f'or w h Ie h there
are t a t" IStICS . ) , contract rejections
rose from 8.7% of the cases in 1964 t 0 lO . % S 111 1965, to 11% in 1966, to
an amazing 14.2% in 1967 lev Ii.
annually." And the ratI'o of ' e 111g off S111ce then to about 12%0
.
war k stoppag es occurnng during the period
f
.\ ..
mper a f
when a contract was in effect ha S h anged, WhICh IS especially significant
when it is remcmbered that
Bureau of Labor Statistics fi ues co tracts specifically forbid strikes.
r eveal that whIle about one-third of all
stoppages in 1968 occurre; un d er eXlstmg aoreeme '" n t, s, " an alarming
numb cr, ,,]{j ( almost two-fifths of them) ' 1972 .
wcre III effect J7 [n 1973 A
111 took place while contracts
. ronowltz provided a goo d summary: "The
.
can f Igration of strikes sinec 1967 is un
.
Amencan workers The b
precedented III the history of
num er of stnkes as a h I
. . '
an d f"'1 _ w oe, as well as rank-
1 e rCJectlons of propos e d umon ' settlements WI 'th employers, and
. . .
WI 'ldc_at actions ' has exceeded th a t I
era ",' And as Sennett and Cobb
. any s l m dar period in the modern
WIt111g 111 1971, made clear, the period
' .
has involved "the most turbul en t rejectIon of org amze d umon . authority
among young workcrs
.
""
The 1970 GM strike was mentioned as
.
a sham struggle in safely relea .
an example of the usefulness of
natIOn-wide telephone worker':I .g enup
employee resentment. The
t s eo July, 1971 is another example
and the effects of the rising I'd 1 e a antI-u1110n hostility can also be see
\
1',I I, t\lI N I , tll 11·1,'1'.:\1
III II. f{vi'Tl illl'. ;1 Hell SySll'l1I ulTn ul a .\0':';, wa.l· iuneas\" "wr IhilT
",'ars. 111l' ('(lllllllllnicali(l1l Workers' u11io11 calleLl a strike, puhlicly
aliIlOUIlci111'. that Ihe (lnly point at issue was that "we need 31 to 32 per
(TII1."'" as ullion p resident Joseph Bcirne put it. After a six-day walkout,
I Ill' I % was granted, as was a new Bel! policy requiring all employees to
i(lin the union and remain in good standing as a condition of employ­
llIent. But while the CW A was granted the standard "union-shop" status,
" rather necessary step for the fulfillment of its role as a discipline agent
01 the work force, thousands of telephone workers refused to return to
Iheir jobs, in some cases staying out for weeks in defiance of CWA
llrders.
The calling of the 90-day wage-price freeze on August 15 was in large
part a response to the climate of worker unruliness and independence,
typified by the defiant phone workers. Aside from related economic
considerations, the freeze and the ensuing controls were adopted because
the unions needed government help in restraining the workers. Sham
strikes clearly lose their effectiveness if employees refuse to play their
assigned roles remaining, for example, on strike on their own .
George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, had been calling wage-price
freeze sinee J 96941 and in the weeks prior to August 15 had held a
number of very private meetings with President Nixon." Though he was
compelled to publicly decry the freeze as "completely unfair to the
worker" and "a bonanza to big business," he did not even call for an
excess profits tax; he did come out strongly for a permanent wage-price
control board and labor's place on it, however.
11 seems clear that business leaders understood the need for govern-
ment assistance. In September, a Fortune article proclaimed that "A
system of wage-price review boards is the best hope for breaking the
cost-push momentum that individual unions and employers have been
powerless to resist."" As workers try to make partial compensation for
their lack of autonomy on thc job by demanding better wages and
benefits, the only approved concessions, they create obviouS economic
pressure, especially in an inflationary period. Arthur M. Louis, in
November's Forl1lne, realized that the heat had been on labor officials
for some time. Speaking of the "rebcllious rank and file" of longshore­
men, miners, and steelworkers, he said, "Long before President Nixon
announced his wage-price freeze, many labor leaders were calling for
stabilization, if only to get themselves off the hook.""
A Fortulte editorial of January (1972) predicted that by the fall, a
national "wave of wildcat strikes" might well occur and the labor
members of the tripartite control board would resign." In fact, Meany