Termination of Tenancies for Tenant Default - Law Commission
Termination of Tenancies for Tenant Default - Law Commission
Termination of Tenancies for Tenant Default - Law Commission
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in the sub-tenant being removed from occupation <strong>of</strong> the premises subject<br />
to the sub-tenancy. Again, the basis <strong>of</strong> this action would be dubious.<br />
(3) The continuing liability <strong>of</strong> the tenant upon the covenants following<br />
unilateral recovery <strong>of</strong> possession is difficult to justify, even if it is <strong>for</strong> a<br />
relatively short period (under the CP’s proposals, the tenancy would<br />
terminate one month after possession was recovered). Further practical<br />
problems would arise, once possession had been taken by the landlord,<br />
in relation to covenants requiring the tenant to remain in occupation and<br />
to continue trading (“keep-open” covenants), covenants to insure where<br />
the relevant policy requires the tenant to occupy the insured premises,<br />
and tenants’ covenants to repair.<br />
(4) The provisional proposals allowed tenants (and qualifying interest<br />
holders) to apply to the court <strong>for</strong> “relief” within one month <strong>of</strong> the date the<br />
landlord recovered possession. Two problems have been recognised.<br />
First, this time limit is very tight, and considerably shorter than the time<br />
limit within which tenants are currently expected to apply following<br />
<strong>for</strong>feiture <strong>of</strong> the tenancy. Secondly, the short time limit would emphasise<br />
the importance <strong>of</strong> identifying the date at which time begins to run. That<br />
would not always be straight<strong>for</strong>ward, and it could cause real difficulties<br />
<strong>for</strong> tenants or sub-tenants who were not immediately aware <strong>of</strong> the<br />
landlord’s actions.<br />
(5) Finally, we do not consider that it is necessary specifically to provide a<br />
<strong>for</strong>m <strong>of</strong> “self-help” to enable landlords to make abandoned premises<br />
secure against the elements, vandalism and similar risks. Under the<br />
current law, a landlord may secure premises in such circumstances, and<br />
if done with the intention <strong>of</strong> protecting the landlord’s reversion this will not<br />
comprise a <strong>for</strong>feiture <strong>of</strong> the tenancy. 42 We are satisfied that this common<br />
law right, which our recommendations do not affect, gives the landlord<br />
sufficient protection in this respect.<br />
A SUMMARY TERMINATION PROCEDURE<br />
7.61 The issues outlined above have caused us to look again at the CP’s provisional<br />
proposals and the reasoning behind them. We have concluded that the CP’s<br />
provisional proposals did not go far enough to re<strong>for</strong>m the current law. Entitling the<br />
landlord physically to recover possession <strong>of</strong> the premises closely resembles the<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> <strong>for</strong>feiture by physical re-entry under the current law and inevitably<br />
replicates many <strong>of</strong> the unsatisfactory aspects <strong>of</strong> that practice. The tenant and any<br />
sub-tenant in possession are at risk <strong>of</strong> serious disruption to their businesses in<br />
circumstances where the landlord’s action may ultimately prove to be unfounded<br />
or be held to be a disproportionate response to the tenant default complained <strong>of</strong>.<br />
7.62 In the past the stated rationales <strong>for</strong> making provision <strong>for</strong> some <strong>for</strong>m <strong>of</strong> statutory<br />
right <strong>of</strong> physical re-entry included providing the landlord with sufficient protection<br />
<strong>of</strong> their rent revenues and enabling the landlord, in appropriate cases, to avoid<br />
the delay and expense which litigation inevitably entails. We still consider these<br />
42 Relvok Properties v Dixon (1972) 25 P & CR 1.<br />
144