report on programme manipulation - Independent Inquiry Committee

INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME
REPORT ON PROGRAMME MANIPULATION
CHAPTER TWO
OIL TRANSACTIONS AND ILLICIT PAYMENTS
many years, was primarily responsible for determining which French individuals would be
allocated oil and served as their main Iraqi contact. Mr. Aziz has specifically stated that he
recommended that some of the French beneficiaries receive allocations because of their activities
on behalf of Iraqi issues. Mr. Rashid went further, and stated that at times there was a direct
correlation between an increase in oil allocations and the extent of a beneficiary’s anti-sanctions
activities. As described in this section, many of those individuals selected by the Government of
Iraq to receive oil allocations actively expressed views or participated in activities connected with
Iraq, including anti-sanctions activities. 73
On one occasion, in order to obtain more oil, one beneficiary—a former French diplomat Serge
Boidevaix—emphasized to Iraqi officials a position taken by the French government that was
supportive of Iraq:
We were happy to see the decision of the Security Council to increase the total
amount for exports to $8.3 billion, and as you may know, on the French side we
proposed an increase without limits or restrictions. As I mentioned in my last
letter, we would be grateful for an increase to our current allocation of 5 million
barrels, and could lift Basrah anytime in October or November if you had
additional volumes to allocate. 74
B. JEAN-BERNARD MÉRIMÉE
While serving as a Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the rank
of Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Bernard Mérimée began receiving oil allocations that would
ultimately total approximately six million barrels from the Government of Iraq. While still in the
position of Special Advisor, Mr. Mérimée arranged to sell two million barrels of oil that were
allocated to him in Phase X. He received $165,725 in commissions from the oil sale. Surcharges
were assessed on the oil contract and paid by the contracting company. 75
73 Amer Rashid interview (Oct. 9 and Oct. 29, 2004); Tariq Aziz interviews (Mar. 1 and Aug. 16, 2005);
Iraq officials interviews (one official stating that Mr. Aziz was not naïve about the political influence of
certain individuals, that he welcomed meeting with politicians, including French politicians, and knew what
they could do).
74 Serge Boidevaix letter to Saddam Z. Hassan (Oct. 5, 1999) (translated from Arabic). In the same letter,
Mr. Boidevaix referred to earlier discussions with the Mr. Rashid about having Iraqi oil sector technicians
trained in refineries “in France and perhaps Italy” at Vitol’s expense and proposed having the company
assist “with the restoration of equipment at Saddam Hussein Children’s Hospital.” Ibid.
75 Tariq Aziz interview (Mar. 1, 2005); Iraq official interview; Committee oil beneficiary table, contract
nos. M/10/96, M/11/82, M/13/76; SOMO sales contract, no. M/10/96 (Oct. 6, 2001) (contracting with
Fenar Petroleum Limited).
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