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FM 5-0, The Operations Process - Federation of American Scientists

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Troop Leading Procedures<br />

Mission<br />

Statement:<br />

COA Statement:<br />

C Co/2-67 IN (L) defends NLT 281700(Z) AUG 2005 to destroy enemy forces<br />

from GL 375652 to GL 389650 to GL 394660 to GL 373665 to prevent the<br />

envelopment <strong>of</strong> A Co, the battalion main effort.<br />

<strong>The</strong> company defends with two platoons (PLTs) forward and one PLT in depth from<br />

PLT battle positions. <strong>The</strong> northern PLT (2 squads) destroys enemy forces to<br />

prevent enemy bypass <strong>of</strong> the main effort PLT on Hill 657. <strong>The</strong> southern PLT (3<br />

squads, 2 Javelins) destroys enemy forces to prevent an organized company attack<br />

against the Co main effort on Hill 657. <strong>The</strong> main effort PLT (3 squads, 2 TOWS)<br />

retains Hill 657 (vic GL378659) to prevent the envelopment <strong>of</strong> Co A (BN main<br />

effort) from the south. <strong>The</strong> anti-armor section (1 squad, 4 Javelins) establishes<br />

ambush positions at the road junction (vic GL 377653) to destroy enemy recon to<br />

deny observation <strong>of</strong> friendly defensive position and to prevent a concentration <strong>of</strong><br />

combat power against the main effort PLT. <strong>The</strong> company mortars establish a<br />

mortar firing point vic GL 377664 to suppress enemy forces to protect the main<br />

effort platoon.<br />

Analyze Courses <strong>of</strong> Action (War Game)<br />

Figure C-4. Sample mission and COA statements<br />

C-48. For each COA, leaders think through the operation from start to finish. <strong>The</strong>y compare each COA<br />

with the enemy’s most probable COA. At the small-unit level, the enemy’s most probable COA is what the<br />

enemy is most likely to do given what friendly forces are doing at that instant. <strong>The</strong> leader visualizes a set <strong>of</strong><br />

actions and reactions. <strong>The</strong> object is to determine what can go wrong and what decision the leader will likely<br />

have to make as a result.<br />

Course <strong>of</strong> Action Comparison and Selection<br />

C-49. Leaders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses <strong>of</strong><br />

each, as noted during the war game. <strong>The</strong>y decide which COA to execute based on this comparison and on<br />

their pr<strong>of</strong>essional judgment. <strong>The</strong>y take into account—<br />

• Mission accomplishment.<br />

• Time available to execute the operation.<br />

• Risks.<br />

• Results from unit reconnaissance.<br />

• Subordinate unit tasks and purposes.<br />

• Casualties incurred.<br />

• Posturing <strong>of</strong> the force for future operations.<br />

INITIATE MOVEMENT<br />

C-50. Leaders conduct any movement directed by higher headquarters or deemed necessary to continue<br />

mission preparation or position the unit for execution. <strong>The</strong>y do this as soon as they have enough<br />

information to do so or the unit is required to move to position itself for a task. This is also essential when<br />

time is short. Movements may be to an assembly area, a battle position, a new AO, or an attack position.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y may include movement <strong>of</strong> reconnaissance elements, guides, or quartering parties.<br />

CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE<br />

C-51. Whenever time and circumstances allow, or as directed by higher headquarters, leaders personally<br />

observe the AO for the mission prior to execution. No amount <strong>of</strong> intelligence preparation <strong>of</strong> the battlefield<br />

can substitute for firsthand assessment <strong>of</strong> METT-TC from within the AO. Unfortunately, many factors can<br />

keep leaders from performing a personal reconnaissance. <strong>The</strong> minimum action necessary is a thorough map<br />

reconnaissance supplemented by imagery and intelligence products. As directed, subordinates or other<br />

26 March 2010 <strong>FM</strong> 5-0 C-9

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