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NIST 800-44 Version 2 Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers

NIST 800-44 Version 2 Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers

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GUIDELINES ON SECURING PUBLIC WEB SERVERS<br />

8. Implementing a Secure Network Infrastructure<br />

The network infrastructure that supports the <strong>Web</strong> server plays a critical role in the security of the <strong>Web</strong><br />

server. In most c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>s, the network infrastructure is the first line of defense between the Internet<br />

and a public <strong>Web</strong> server. Network design al<strong>on</strong>e, however, cannot protect a <strong>Web</strong> server. The frequency,<br />

sophisticati<strong>on</strong>, and variety of attacks perpetrated today lend support to the idea that <strong>Web</strong> security must be<br />

implemented through layered and diverse protecti<strong>on</strong> mechanisms (defense-in-depth). This secti<strong>on</strong><br />

discusses those network comp<strong>on</strong>ents that can support and protect <strong>Web</strong> servers to further enhance their<br />

overall security. Although security issues are paramount, network infrastructure c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s are<br />

influenced by many factors other than security, including cost, performance, and reliability.<br />

8.1 Network Compositi<strong>on</strong> and Structure<br />

Firewalls and routers are devices or systems that c<strong>on</strong>trol the flow of network traffic between networks.<br />

They can protect <strong>Web</strong> servers from vulnerabilities inherent in the TCP/IP suite and help reduce the<br />

security issues associated with insecure applicati<strong>on</strong>s and OSs. However, an organizati<strong>on</strong> has many<br />

choices when determining a network envir<strong>on</strong>ment for a <strong>Web</strong> server, and security may not be the principal<br />

factor in deciding am<strong>on</strong>g those opti<strong>on</strong>s. Network compositi<strong>on</strong> and structure are the first and in many<br />

respects the most critical decisi<strong>on</strong>s that affect <strong>Web</strong> server security because they determine what network<br />

infrastructure elements protect the <strong>Web</strong> server. For example, if the <strong>Web</strong> server is located before the<br />

organizati<strong>on</strong>’s main firewall, then the firewall cannot be used to c<strong>on</strong>trol traffic to and from the <strong>Web</strong><br />

server. Network compositi<strong>on</strong> and structure also determine what other porti<strong>on</strong>s of the network are<br />

vulnerable if the <strong>Web</strong> server is compromised. For example, an externally accessible <strong>Web</strong> server located<br />

<strong>on</strong> the internal producti<strong>on</strong> network subjects the internal network to attack if the <strong>Web</strong> server is<br />

compromised. Also, an organizati<strong>on</strong> may choose not to have the <strong>Web</strong> server located <strong>on</strong> its network at all<br />

and to outsource the hosting to a third party.<br />

8.1.1<br />

Inadvisable Network Layout<br />

Some organizati<strong>on</strong>s choose to locate their public <strong>Web</strong> servers <strong>on</strong> their internal producti<strong>on</strong> networks. That<br />

is, their <strong>Web</strong> servers reside <strong>on</strong> the same network as the internal users and servers. The principal weakness<br />

of this layout is that it exposes internal network comp<strong>on</strong>ents to additi<strong>on</strong>al risks. <strong>Web</strong> servers are often<br />

targets of attackers. If attackers manage to compromise a <strong>Web</strong> server, they will have access to the<br />

internal network and will be able to more easily compromise internal hosts. Therefore, this layout is not<br />

recommended.<br />

Another network layout that is not generally recommended is placing the <strong>Web</strong> server before an<br />

organizati<strong>on</strong>’s firewall or router that provides IP filtering. In this structure, the network provides little, if<br />

any, protecti<strong>on</strong> for the <strong>Web</strong> server. Because the <strong>Web</strong> server itself has to maintain security, it provides a<br />

single point of failure. To be even somewhat secure in this locati<strong>on</strong>, the <strong>Web</strong> server OS and applicati<strong>on</strong><br />

have to be extremely well-hardened, with all unnecessary and insecure services disabled and all necessary<br />

security patches applied. To maintain the security of the setup, the <strong>Web</strong> server administrator must stay up<br />

to date <strong>on</strong> vulnerabilities and related patches. Another limitati<strong>on</strong> of this structure is that providing any<br />

sort of secure remote administrati<strong>on</strong> or c<strong>on</strong>tent update capability is difficult.<br />

8.1.2<br />

Demilitarized Z<strong>on</strong>e<br />

A demilitarized z<strong>on</strong>e (DMZ) describes a host or network segment inserted as a “neutral z<strong>on</strong>e” between an<br />

organizati<strong>on</strong>’s private network and the Internet. It prevents outside users of the <strong>Web</strong> server from gaining<br />

direct access to an organizati<strong>on</strong>’s internal network (intranet). A DMZ mitigates the risks of locating a<br />

<strong>Web</strong> server <strong>on</strong> an internal network or exposing it directly to the Internet. It is a compromise soluti<strong>on</strong> that<br />

8-1

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