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NIST 800-44 Version 2 Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers

NIST 800-44 Version 2 Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers

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GUIDELINES ON SECURING PUBLIC WEB SERVERS<br />

• Source and destinati<strong>on</strong> IP addresses<br />

• Source and destinati<strong>on</strong> port numbers<br />

• Network protocol<br />

For network events, capture packet header informati<strong>on</strong> to assist with the analysis and forensics<br />

process<br />

Update with new attack signatures frequently (e.g., <strong>on</strong> a daily to weekly basis, typically after testing<br />

the updates).<br />

In additi<strong>on</strong>, it is critical that network-based IDPSs and their underlying OSs are hardened because<br />

network-based IDPSs are often a target of attackers. In particular, the network-based IDPSs should not<br />

resp<strong>on</strong>d to any type of system interrogati<strong>on</strong> through their m<strong>on</strong>itoring interfaces. If remote management is<br />

desired, it should be c<strong>on</strong>ducted through an out-of-band means (e.g., separate isolated network). Although<br />

sometimes difficult to administer and interpret, IDPSs are a critical early warning system that can provide<br />

the <strong>Web</strong> server administrator with the necessary informati<strong>on</strong> to defend the <strong>Web</strong> server from attack<br />

[<str<strong>on</strong>g>NIST</str<strong>on</strong>g>07].<br />

8.2.3 Network Switches<br />

Network switches are devices that provide c<strong>on</strong>nectivity between two or more hosts located <strong>on</strong> the same<br />

network segment. They are similar to hubs in that they allow communicati<strong>on</strong>s between hosts, but, unlike<br />

hubs, the switches have more “intelligence” and send communicati<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>on</strong>ly those hosts to which the<br />

communicati<strong>on</strong>s are addressed. The benefit of this from a security standpoint is that when switches are<br />

employed <strong>on</strong> a network, it is much more difficult to eavesdrop <strong>on</strong> communicati<strong>on</strong>s between other hosts <strong>on</strong><br />

the network segment. This is extremely important when a <strong>Web</strong> server is <strong>on</strong> a network segment that is<br />

used by other hosts. For example, if a hub is used and a host <strong>on</strong> the DMZ is compromised, an attacker<br />

may be able to eavesdrop <strong>on</strong> the communicati<strong>on</strong>s of other hosts <strong>on</strong> the DMZ, possibly leading to the<br />

compromise of those hosts or the informati<strong>on</strong> they communicate across the network. For example, e-mail<br />

servers in their default c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>s receive unencrypted passwords; a compromise of the <strong>Web</strong> server<br />

would lead to the exposure of e-mail passwords by sniffing them from the compromised <strong>Web</strong> server.<br />

Many switches include specific security settings that further enhance the security of the network by<br />

making it difficult for a malicious entity to “defeat” the switch. Some examples include the ability to<br />

minimize the risk of Address Resoluti<strong>on</strong> Protocol (ARP) spoofing and ARP pois<strong>on</strong>ing attacks. 71 If a<br />

switch has these security capabilities, they should be enabled (see appropriate manufacturer<br />

documentati<strong>on</strong>).<br />

Switches can have a negative impact <strong>on</strong> network-based IDPSs (see Secti<strong>on</strong> 8.2.2). Most network<br />

switches allow network administrators to c<strong>on</strong>figure a specific port <strong>on</strong> the switch, known as a span port, so<br />

that it replicates all the switch’s traffic to the port used by the IDPS. This allows a network-based IDPS<br />

to see all traffic <strong>on</strong> a particular network segment. However, under high loads, the switch might have to<br />

stop sending traffic to the span port, causing the IDPS to be unable to m<strong>on</strong>itor network activity. Also,<br />

other devices use span ports, and there are typically very few span ports <strong>on</strong> a switch; therefore, it might<br />

not be possible to c<strong>on</strong>nect an IDPS to a particular switch because its span ports are all in use.<br />

71<br />

ARP pois<strong>on</strong>ing occurs when an attacker successfully updates the ARP cache <strong>on</strong> a target host with a forged ARP entry. This<br />

is generally used to redirect network traffic for malicious purposes.<br />

8-11

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