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01 Meditation Panel Preface.indd - United Nations Day of Vesak 2013

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Conference<br />

It’s hard to tell if these views are really so different from each other or just the result <strong>of</strong> different<br />

emphases. Whereas Thanissaro aims to explain the difference between a deeply absorptive jhna<br />

and one with enough intentional space to engage in vipassan, Gunaratana is trying to emphasize<br />

the difference between ordinary discursive activity or low level mindfulness and deeply<br />

concentrated vipassan. Based on what little he says in the AKBh, it seems that Vasubandhu might<br />

agree with Thanissaro that vitarka and vicra involve an almost preverbal level <strong>of</strong> surveillance, but<br />

he would not say that vipayan requires this. After all, the ideal state in which to practice vipayan<br />

is the fourth dhyna, which is far removed from the activity <strong>of</strong> vitarka or vicra. Looking at<br />

the development formula <strong>of</strong> the dhyna factors, it is evident that it is the mindfulness (smti) and clear<br />

comprehension (samprajñna) <strong>of</strong> the third dhyna and the puried mindfulness (srti-pariuddhi)<br />

<strong>of</strong> the fourth dhyna that support vipayan. One might argue that even puried mindfulness<br />

might require some implicit form conceptualization, but it is not clear whether the Vasubandhu <strong>of</strong><br />

the AKBh would agree. 99<br />

In order to avoid attributing discursiveness to jhna, vitakka and vicra get redened in<br />

the Theravda Abhidhamma, as the application <strong>of</strong> the mind (cetaso abhiniropana) to the object. 100<br />

The Visuddhimagga explains that while vitakka continually strikes at the object, vicra is sustained<br />

engagement with the object. 1<strong>01</strong> The relationship between the two is then illustrated by a series<br />

<strong>of</strong> metaphors that seem to suggest two slightly different conceptions <strong>of</strong> the relationship between<br />

vitakka and vicra. They are explained, on the one hand, in terms <strong>of</strong> the striking and sustained<br />

ringing <strong>of</strong> a bell or a bee seeking and then buzzing around a ower, and on the other, as the one hand<br />

that holds a dish while the other wipes it. These metaphors are rather different in that the former<br />

suggest a temporal progression from one mental activity to another and the latter, simultaneous<br />

activities. The latter gives some notion <strong>of</strong> how vitakka and vicra might be distinctive factors in<br />

the same moment <strong>of</strong> consciousness, but the former two seem more like what Vasubandhu has in<br />

mind in the Pañcaskandha.<br />

In the modern jhna debate, advocates <strong>of</strong> deeply absorbed jhna-s tend to argue that all<br />

the jhna-s including the rst do not involve any discursiveness or volition whatsoever and so tend<br />

to favor something along the lines <strong>of</strong> the Visuddhimagga denition <strong>of</strong> vitakka and vicra as mental<br />

application. Others claim that the jhna-s, especially the rst but even the higher jhna-s might<br />

involve some low-level discursiveness “in the background,” but that this does not interfere with<br />

concentration. Naturally, they are inclined to interpret vitakka and vicra as implying a subtle<br />

discursiveness, a kind <strong>of</strong> discursiveness that may play a useful role in initially taking up and<br />

engaging with the object, but is no longer necessary once the mind is rmly engaged. Opinions<br />

differ as to whether such a low level discursiveness is conducive to vipassan. Some interpreters<br />

simply regard this kind <strong>of</strong> discursiveness as a potential distraction or minor imperfection in<br />

concentration, but Thanissaro seems to take it to be an asset to vipassan. I have already suggested<br />

that Vasubandhu is not likely to agree with this. In fact, Vasubandhu clearly sees vitarka or vicra as<br />

a potential problem. He denes the second dhyna factor <strong>of</strong> inner tranquility (adhytmasaprsada),<br />

as “the calm owing (prantavhita) <strong>of</strong> the mental series (santati) that results from the absence <strong>of</strong><br />

99<br />

At AKBh ii.24 (Pradhan p. 54) mindfulness is simply dened as non-forgetting (sampramoa) <strong>of</strong> the object.<br />

100<br />

See Cousins 1992; Gunaratana 1985, pp. 49-59. Cousins 1992 (p. 139) <strong>of</strong>fers an interesting explanation <strong>of</strong><br />

the meaning <strong>of</strong> vitakka in relation to an eidetic rather than discursive paradigm for thought, which helps account for<br />

a closer relationship between the sutta emphasis on vitakka as thought or thinking and the Abhidhamma emphasis on<br />

vitakka as application<br />

1<strong>01</strong><br />

PTS ed. p. 142.<br />

274

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