01 Meditation Panel Preface.indd - United Nations Day of Vesak 2013

Buddhist Philosophy and
Meditation Practice
the agitation (kobha) of vitarka and vicra.” 102 This calls to mind Aj ahn Brahm’s understanding of
vitakka-vicra as the “wobble” of the rst jhna. As an advocate of a deeply absorbed style of jhna,
Brahm does not attribute the instability of the rst jhna to discursiveness, but rather to the conative
qualities of vitakka and vicra, to “involuntary control” in the form of an automatic movement
towards (vitakka) and holding onto (vicra) the bliss of pti and sukha. 103 Given that Vasubandhu
denes vitarka and vicra as volitional as well as discursive, he might agree that the rst dhyna is
disturbed by these volitional aspects of vitarka and vicra (as well as their discursiveness), but does
not directly connect attachment to prti or sukha to the activities vitarka and vicra. 104
Prīti and Sukha
Most of the debates between Vasubandhu and his Vaibhika interlocutors over the dhyna-s
are about their ontology rather than their phenomenology. The one exception might be their debate
over prti and sukha. This debate concerns whether sukha is a bodily or mental sensation and indirectly,
whether the ve sensory consciousnesses are active in the dhyna-s. This same debate (although
typically with respect to pti rather than sukha and auditory consciousness) is one of more decisive
debates amongst modern practitioners. After all, a meditative state that is entirely cut off from
the senses, such that there is no sound or awareness of the body (or taste or smell or sight), 105 would
seem to be a very distinctive state, easy to distinguish from a state in which the sensory consciousnesses
were engaged. Moreover, because it is impossible to observe the body with no sensory awareness
of it, this would seem to decide whether vipassan in the form of rst foundation of mindfulness
is possible in jhna. Thus, modern advocates of vipassan styles of jhna typically understand
the jhna-s to involve bodily awareness and tend to interpret pti and/or sukha as referring to bodily
sensations. By contrast, advocates of more absorptive styles of jhna tend to take the absence of
bodily awareness and sound as denitional of jhna.
Given that it would seem impossible to practice the rst foundation of mindfulness without
any bodily awareness, it is somewhat surprising to nd that Vasubandhu’s Vaibhika interlocutor
insists that the ve sensory consciousnesses are cut off in the dhyna-s. His commitment to this
position results in a rather elaborate hermeneutic strategy where he interprets sukha in the rst two
dhyna-s as tranquility (prasrabdhi) and prti as mental happiness (saumanasya). 106 But because
there cannot be two feelings (vedan) in the same moment of consciousness according to
the Abhidharma, the he claims that sukha is part of the saskra-skandha in the rst two dhyna-s, but
is vedan in the third dhyna, where it refers to the ease (sukha) of the mental body (manaskya). 107
102
AKBh: viii.9c; str p. 893. The Vaibhika describe adhytmasamprasda as condence (raddh) resulting from
the conviction that the meditative state can be left behind.
103
Shankman, pp. 172-3.
104
He would also not attribute this only to vitarka an vicra. According the AKBh, any dhyna which takes its own
existence (bhava) as an object of enjoyment (asvdna) is deled (klita) by thirst (t). Any of the four dhyna-s
(and immaterial attainments) can be deled, pure (ubha, raddhaka) or untainted (ansrava). The one exception is that
Bhavgra cannot be ansrava owing to the weakness of perception there.
105
No one seems to argue about these senses. It should also be noted that visual awareness wouldn’t be much of an issue
since most modern Theravda jhna practice is with eyes closed.
106
AKBh viii.9b.
107
This is the explanation according to the Vibhstra, Samyuktbhidharmahdaya and Dharmaskandha. See Kuan,
Tse-Fu, “Clarication on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyna/Jhna Meditation” Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33: 297.
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