that should be reviewed periodically within short intervals. I also think that <strong>the</strong> Charter will create several forums, each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m with its programme <strong>of</strong> action to be progressively implemented and periodically reviewed. 28
VIII. EUROMARFOR and <strong>security</strong> cooperation in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean Admiral Francisco Rapallo 1 I would like to thank <strong>the</strong> Institute for <strong>the</strong> invitation to attend this meeting and for giving me <strong>the</strong> opportunity to address you. At <strong>the</strong> same time, I would like to convey to you best wishes from my three colleagues, <strong>the</strong> Commanders in Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Fleets <strong>of</strong> France, Italy and Portugal, member nations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EUROMARFOR initiative. Let me begin with <strong>the</strong> main points about EUROMARFOR. VIII.1 Background <strong>The</strong> history <strong>of</strong> EUROMARFOR begins in <strong>the</strong> WEU Ministerial Council <strong>of</strong> June 1992 that took place in Petersberg. In that Council, <strong>the</strong> WEU member nations agreed in principle to identify forces to be made available to WEU, in order to contribute to <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Euro</strong>pean Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Following <strong>the</strong> Petersberg Declaration, four countries, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain agreed with <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> a maritime Force based in two concepts: • Firstly, to provide WEU members with a basic multinational naval structure; and • Secondly, to participate, in agreement with <strong>the</strong> Petersberg Declaration, in <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> multinational initiatives for peace and <strong>security</strong>. <strong>The</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> that concept was a reality in May 1995 at Lisbon with <strong>the</strong> signature <strong>of</strong> EUROMARFOR Constitutive Document. Three months later, in October 1995, <strong>the</strong> Commander in Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish Fleet was appointed as <strong>the</strong> first Commander <strong>of</strong> EUROMARFOR. In my view, this is an appropriate moment to link <strong>the</strong> signature <strong>of</strong> EUROMARFOR Constitutive Document and <strong>the</strong> Barcelona Conference, that took place <strong>the</strong> same year, in 1995, because both events express a concern about <strong>the</strong> stability and <strong>security</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean region. In that sense, it is possible to say that <strong>the</strong> EUROMARFOR concept is in line with <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Barcelona Declaration. In this context, it is important to emphasise that EUROMARFOR is, by statute, open to o<strong>the</strong>r WEU members, which can be fully integrated without any difficulty, and has started a process <strong>of</strong> transparency-building with Mediterranean partners. VIII.2 Mission and tasks Based on <strong>the</strong> Petersberg Declaration, <strong>the</strong> missions that can be assigned to <strong>the</strong> Force are <strong>the</strong> following: • humanitarian and evacuation operations, • peace-keeping operations, and 1 Commander-in-Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish Fleet, Commander <strong>of</strong> EUROMARFOR, Rota, Spain. 29
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cette coopération est nécessaire