The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue
The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue
The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue
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Finally, <strong>the</strong> point about new members in NATO’s Mediterranean <strong>dialogue</strong> should also be<br />
raised. Algeria is a candidate that is ready to be included. Possibly, if <strong>the</strong> peace process moves<br />
forward, o<strong>the</strong>r countries like Syria might be added, and even Libya. I think that in <strong>the</strong> end,<br />
NATO’s <strong>dialogue</strong> is going to move closer to a PfP-like framework. This is not to say that exactly<br />
<strong>the</strong> same PFP-type pattern will be applied in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean, but it will be a broader frame,<br />
that will allow us to conduct exercises, training or o<strong>the</strong>r activities (including some current,<br />
bilateral activities) in <strong>the</strong> “spirit” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean initiative.<br />
At first glance, this evolution might indicate that a ra<strong>the</strong>r simple division <strong>of</strong> labour may be<br />
developed. <strong>The</strong> EU would carry out <strong>the</strong> social, economic and political engagement, and NATO<br />
would do defence. But, obviously it is not as simple as that. <strong>The</strong>re are some o<strong>the</strong>r aspects that we<br />
have to consider.<br />
First, whatever <strong>the</strong> comparative advantages, it will not be possible to differentiate <strong>the</strong><br />
respective roles in such a clear-cut manner. And second, larger externalities will influence <strong>the</strong><br />
balance between EU and NATO roles in <strong>the</strong> region. On <strong>the</strong> one hand, <strong>the</strong>re will be influences<br />
from whatever wider <strong>dialogue</strong> is established between NATO and <strong>the</strong> EU on s<strong>of</strong>t and hard <strong>security</strong><br />
issues – and questions like <strong>the</strong> seriousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>Euro</strong>pean engagement in defense initiatives,<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r NATO is going to be a more global actor, etc. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Middle-East peace process could have a determining effect on all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various Mediterranean<br />
initiatives.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> process move forward, Sou<strong>the</strong>rn attitudes could be transformed and new demands<br />
for monitoring and confidence-building measures will appear. <strong>The</strong> role <strong>of</strong> a renewed ACRS<br />
(multilateral arms control and regional <strong>security</strong> negotiations) process may also be important,<br />
because it will have to fit among <strong>the</strong> different multilateral <strong>dialogue</strong>s that are already present. And<br />
in spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> great economic and political role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU, it cannot be <strong>the</strong> sole facilitator or<br />
guarantor in <strong>the</strong> <strong>security</strong> realm. Mediterranean countries will have choices to make in different<br />
spheres between an EU frame and a NATO or US-related frame for relations – as is <strong>the</strong> case now<br />
for Algeria – and for certain issues <strong>the</strong>y may not choose <strong>the</strong> EU. Or <strong>the</strong>y will desire a more<br />
diverse, transatlantic connection. In <strong>the</strong> end, we should be less concerned about architecture, and<br />
more concerned about maintaining a convergence <strong>of</strong> objectives among <strong>the</strong> different <strong>dialogue</strong>s,<br />
and among key actors in Mediterranean affairs.<br />
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