The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue
The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue
The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
IX. A realistic approach to military cooperation in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean<br />
Mark Heller 1<br />
In <strong>the</strong> totality <strong>of</strong> Mediterranean <strong>security</strong> and stability, <strong>the</strong> military or hard <strong>security</strong> dimension is a<br />
factor <strong>of</strong> secondary importance. O<strong>the</strong>r issues, especially economic and social distress and<br />
domestic strife, are more directly relevant to <strong>the</strong> so-called “s<strong>of</strong>t <strong>security</strong>” agenda that comes<br />
closest to defining a common <strong>security</strong> concern <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Euro</strong>-Mediterranean space. <strong>The</strong><br />
components <strong>of</strong> that agenda – drug trafficking and o<strong>the</strong>r sorts <strong>of</strong> organized crime, terrorism,<br />
environmental threats, and constraints on personal rights and freedoms (including freedom <strong>of</strong><br />
movement) – impinge more directly on <strong>the</strong> welfare and individual <strong>security</strong> <strong>of</strong> people around <strong>the</strong><br />
Mediterranean rim. And to <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong> military dimension is relevant, it is not a<br />
Mediterranean-wide concern, since its relevance varies greatly across <strong>the</strong> region. In some areas,<br />
it is practically insignificant. In o<strong>the</strong>rs, it is a very prominent issue. But even in those areas, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Euro</strong>-Mediterranean <strong>dialogue</strong> is not <strong>the</strong> most appropriate vehicle for addressing <strong>the</strong> issue. Given<br />
<strong>the</strong> continuing political-military weight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States in world affairs, <strong>the</strong> most promising<br />
course is to extend <strong>the</strong> <strong>dialogue</strong> laterally and to transform it into a <strong>Euro</strong>-American-Mediterranean<br />
trialogue.<br />
IX.1 Purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>dialogue</strong><br />
Security <strong>dialogue</strong>s can have two agendas. <strong>The</strong> first is institutional. Many existing institutions are<br />
searching for new approaches to <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean, and for purposes <strong>of</strong> this agenda, <strong>dialogue</strong> is<br />
an end in itself. It may not necessarily have a positive impact on real military-<strong>security</strong> dilemmas,<br />
but it enhances <strong>the</strong> visibility and prominence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions involved.<br />
<strong>The</strong> second agenda is functional. Its purpose is to reduce <strong>the</strong> insecurities <strong>of</strong> parties in a<br />
given region, and for purposes <strong>of</strong> this agenda, <strong>dialogue</strong> is a means to an end. With respect to <strong>the</strong><br />
functional agenda, it is possible to pursue <strong>dialogue</strong> at two levels. One is a diffuse consultation<br />
that aims to introduce or reinforce general norms <strong>of</strong> international relations or codes <strong>of</strong> conduct in<br />
a particular region or, indeed, throughout <strong>the</strong> world. Norms produced by such <strong>security</strong> <strong>dialogue</strong>s<br />
usually are at a very high level <strong>of</strong> generality; examples include commitments to resolve disputes<br />
by non-violent means or to refrain from interfering in <strong>the</strong> internal affairs <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are numerous undertakings <strong>of</strong> this sort – perhaps <strong>the</strong> most all embracing is <strong>the</strong> Charter <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> United Nations – and <strong>the</strong>re will doubtless be many more, particularly in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> global<br />
arms control.<br />
<strong>The</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r level is much more focused. It seeks to produce specific reassurances against<br />
specific insecurities and particularly, in <strong>the</strong> military dimension, against fear <strong>of</strong> military attack.<br />
This type <strong>of</strong> in<strong>security</strong> is ultimately a function <strong>of</strong> politics, that is, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political relations<br />
between various countries, ra<strong>the</strong>r than about force structures or operational codes or balances (or<br />
imbalances) <strong>of</strong> power. That is why countries with considerable capabilities (and imbalances),<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> United States and Canada or France and Germany, do not need reassurances,<br />
confidence- and <strong>security</strong>-building measures (CSBMs) or third-party involvement, to deal with<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir insecurities vis-à-vis each o<strong>the</strong>r, while countries such as Greece and Turkey or Armenia and<br />
1 Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv.<br />
33