The future of the Euro-Mediterannean security dialogue

XIX. The Euro-Mediterranean Charter and security in the Mediterranean
Ambassador Pedro López-Aguirrebengoa 1
The Mediterranean region remains faced with important political, economic, ecological, social and
cultural challenges that have to be taken up as common challenges for Europe and its partners in the
region. Its characteristics of geographic unity but political diversity and complexity call for the
development of a shared vision and a coordinated and sensitive response to address the problems
and create an area of common interests. Given the outstanding strategic importance of the
Mediterranean, we should look at it sensu lato, i.e., taking into account its interacting periphery.
The strategic goal is to help ensure that the Mediterranean region becomes a focus of peace,
security, stability and prosperity for the benefit of all its inhabitants and its neighbouring areas, by
efforts aiming at the establishment and development of good-neighbourly relations, prosperity and
the elimination of poverty, as well as the protection and promotion of human rights, consolidation of
democracy, good governance, the rule of law, cultural and religious tolerance, and the consolidation
of civil society.
The European Union is elaborating a ‘common strategy’ for the Mediterranean, which will
surely reinforce its Mediterranean policy and commitment. Personally, I hope it will be approved by
the Lisbon Council. This ‘common strategy’ is to be based on the two specific priorities established
by the Vienna Council Conclusions (11-12 December 1998) and confirmed at the Cologne European
Council (3-4 June 1999): the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and the Middle
East Peace Process (MEPP). Both are differentiated but closely linked processes, and their link’s
rationale was already established in the Barcelona Declaration: the EMP does not intend to replace
the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of peace, stability and development of
the region, but it will contribute to their success.
With regard to this principle, three main ideas can be pointed out. Firstly, the Barcelona
process was actually conceived as a post pacem process, at a moment when the end of the MEPP
seemed to be within short reach. Secondly, the Barcelona process wanted to contribute, by creating a
positive synergy, to the reduction and resolution of the tensions and conflicts in the region, but did
not intend to substitute itself to the existing peace processes. Thirdly, it was assumed that the
globality of the EMP scheme was of such an importance to all parties that it would be placed
somehow above the more specific existing initiatives.
The Barcelona process is global, self-building, with an incremental approach, and
interactive in its three Chapters. But the overall Euro-Mediterranean process depends - if the
partnership is to develop the principles and objectives of the Barcelona Declaration - on its ability to
help to create the appropriate conditions for the solution of existing regional conflicts that limit
further regional and subregional cooperation; its ability to prevent future tensions, crisis and new
conflicts from erupting, and to manage them, if needed be; and its role in post-conflict rehabilitation
and peace building.
The Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Malta (1997) was for this reason
an opportunity for reflection. An awareness began to develop on both sides of the Mediterranean of
the dangers inherent in converting the Barcelona process into a permanent hostage of the MEPP.
Without ignoring the inevitable connection, EMP’s comprehensiveness and scope should place it at
a different level, in order to enable the shared principles and goals formulated in the Barcelona
1 Coordinator of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid.
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