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CHAPTER 2. THE PUBLIC SPHERE 36
This conceptualization of reciprocity subsumes three views of discourse expected
to be produced in the idealized public sphere: practical, complex and what can be
termed “reflective.” Practical discourse is discussion among equals about the general
interest that transcends private interests and values (McCarthy 1992, McCarthy
1978). McCarthy suggests that Habermas has come to rely on “the variegated
multiplicity of spontaneously formed publics engaged in informal discussions
of issues of public interest” to form the “core of the democratic public sphere,”
(McCarthy 1992, McCarthy 1978, 78) given the unlikelihood of reforming statesponsored
institutions to reflect democratic values. An important challenge to
Habermas’s conception of practical discourse is made by McCarthy, calling into
question the necessity of a desire for rational consensus as a “presupposition of
argumentative discourse.” Habermas suggests that “rationally motivated agreement”
is possible only in the cases of “strategically motivated compromise of
interests” and “argumentatively achieved consensus on validity.” McCarthy, however,
sketches out two additional scenarios in which political debate might “provide
an alternative to open or latent coercion as a means of social coordination.”
The first scenario, in which individuals have disagreements about the common
good, participants disagree on what is in the general interest, rather than the competing
particular interests. McCarthy suggests this is the case “in the multitude of
situations where the preservation of traditional values conflicts with economic expansion.”
For example, in a discussion about the granting of a new liquor license
to an applicant, the underlying discussion may be less about the qualifications
of the specific applicant and more about the character of the neighborhood, the
morality of alcohol consumption and other questions concerned with the common
good. In such cases, while Habermas would maintain that participants in political
discussion would have to suppose that, in principle, it would be possible to convince
or be convinced by good reason, McCarthy proposes that participants would
merely have to realize that, should the lack of consensus on the common good become
clear, rational argument would nevertheless make a significant contribution
to the ultimate conclusion reached:
Rationally motivated agreement as a moral-political alternative to coercion
may well involve elements of conciliation, compromise, consent, accommodation,
and the like. Argument, including argument about what is in the
general interest, can play a role in shaping any and all of them. And thus the
expectation that they will figure in the outcome of political debate, as well
as consensus in Habermas’s strict sense, can itself give sense to participants’
argumentative practices. The only supposition that seems necessary for the