Volume 4 No 1 - Journal for the Study of Antisemitism

2012] IRRATIONAL IRAN 253
Pedatzur cites the work of a professor, Ofira Seliktar of Gratz College
in Philadelphia. Seliktar, who has researched a vast literature of the subject
of Iran’s rationality, notes in an abstract to an article about this issue that:
The realization that Iran may soon develop nuclear weapons has generated
a heated debate about the nation’s ability to manage its arsenal. Part
of the discourse about the nuclear rationality of Third Word dictatorship
and rogue states, the debate has pitted so-called nuclear optimists, analysts
confident that Iran is able to handle such weapons, against nuclear
pessimists, who warn that the regime operates in a manner that deviates
from the principles of rationality that underlay nuclear deterrence, thus
rending the doctrine of mutual assured destruction invalid. This article
examines the reasoning employed by the opposing groups, concluding
that they are essentially articles of faith. Since there is virtually no margin
of error in nuclear matters, political leaders need to be aware that should
the optimist prove wrong, the consequences can be dire.
Seliktar concluded that two thirds of the researchers she studied can be
described as falling into a nuclear optimist category; in other words, two
thirds of the writers on the subject believe that a nuclear Iran will be a
rational Iran.
BETTING OUR LIVES ON A TWO-THIRDS CONSENSUS?
Seliktar’s research of opinions is obviously important and deserving of
further reading, but Pedatzur goes off into an absolute conviction that there
can be no other possibility than the conclusion that Iran will be rational—
forget the one third others in Seliktar’s sample or any of us who have differing
ideas and say otherwise. Pedatzur makes the judgment that there is a
serious risk of Iran’s being irrational into anything from stupid to ridiculous
to crazy to seriously dangerous. Thus, he cites the history of Khomeini, who
had declared that he would never sign a ceasefire in which Iraq is compelled
to sign a truce with Iraq when the bombs began to fall on Tehran,
and convinces himself there is no risk of a megasuicide killing by Iran.
Pedatzur writes, “We should therefore note Israel’s error when it magnifies
the Iranian threat and depicts it as an existential threat. Israel’s deterrent
capability suffices to prevent an Iranian leader from entertaining
thoughts about firing a nuclear warhead at it. The time has come to stop
complaining about the bogeyman of existential threat and desist from jingoistic
social actions that sometimes create a dangerous dynamic of
escalation.”
In contrast to Pedatzur, another American analyst, Louis René Beres, a
political scientist who is a long-term nuclear strategy analyst, warns
strongly against trusting or taking risks with emotional states and leaders: