Universal-MigrationHRlaw-PG-no-6-Publications-PractitionersGuide-2014-eng

114 | PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6
protection of non-refoulement, it can also originate from non-State actors
when the State is unwilling or unable to protect the person at risk.
This flows from the importance of the rights at stake 317 and from the
principles applicable in international refugee law. 318
The Committee against Torture is the only international human rights
body which has distanced itself from this principle, due to the limited
definition of torture provided for by the Convention against Torture,
which excludes the conduct of non-state actors. 319 However, even in this
context, the Committee accepted that in cases of war-torn countries,
where non-State factions have the control of a part of the territory, the
risk of being subject to torture by these non-State actors, who exercise
a quasi-governmental function, can trigger the protection of the principle
of non-refoulement. 320 The Committee construes this exemption
strictly and it must be considered exceptionally applicable to “failed
States”. 321
c) Standard of proof: substantial grounds for belief
To demonstrate that a risk to an individual subject to transfer is “real”,
the standard of proof is that substantial grounds have been shown
for believing 322 that the person risks being subject to a serious violation
of his or her human rights. This must be assessed on grounds
317 Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 110. See also H.L.R. v. France, ECtHR, op.
cit., fn. 43, para. 40; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 1948/04, Judgment
of 11 January 2007, paras. 137, 147; N. v. Finland, ECtHR, Application No. 38885/02,
Judgment of 26 July 2005, paras. 163–165; M.E. v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 50094/10,
Judgment of 6 June 2013, paras. 47–53; Auad v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 49390/10,
Judgment of 11 October 2011, para. 98: “What is relevant in this context is whether the applicant
is able to obtain protection against and seek redress for the acts perpetrated against
him or her”.
318 UNHCR, Agents of Persecution, op. cit., fn. 82, para. 4. See also, UNHCR Handbook,
op. cit., fn. 66, para. 65; Naveed Akram Choudhary v. Canada, CCPR, Communication
No. 1898/2009, Views of 28 October 2013, paras. 9.7–9.8; Concluding Observations on
France, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 82, para. 408; Recommendation 1440 (2000), PACE, op. cit.,
fn. 82, para. 6.
319 G.R.B. v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 83/1997, Views of 15 May 1998, para. 6.5.
See also, M.P.S. v. Australia, CAT, Communication No. 138/1999, Views of 30 April 2002,
para. 7.4; S.V. et al. v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 49/1996, Views of 15 May 2001,
para. 9.5.
320 Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, CAT, Communication No. 120/1998, Views of 25 May 1999,
para. 6.5.
321 H.M.H.I. v. Australia, CAT, Communication No. 177/2001, Views of 1 May 2002, paras. 6.4–6.6.
322 Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 109, 113; Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 309, para. 125; Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 51;
Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 69; Chahal v. the United
Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 74; Soering v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 295, paras. 85–91. See also, Haydin v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 101/1997,
Views of 16 December 1998, para. 6.5; C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, CAT, Communication
No. 279/2005, Views of 22 January 2007, para. 7.3; and A.R.J. v. Australia, CCPR, Communication
No. 692/1996**, Views of 11 August 1997, para. 6.14.