Universal-MigrationHRlaw-PG-no-6-Publications-PractitionersGuide-2014-eng
Universal-MigrationHRlaw-PG-no-6-Publications-PractitionersGuide-2014-eng
Universal-MigrationHRlaw-PG-no-6-Publications-PractitionersGuide-2014-eng
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MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | 267<br />
straint will amount to forced labour when the eco<strong>no</strong>mic constraint has<br />
been created by the government; or when the government, although <strong>no</strong>t<br />
creating the situation itself, exploits the situation by offering excessively<br />
low levels of remuneration. Even when it has <strong>no</strong>t created the eco<strong>no</strong>mic<br />
constraint itself, the government “might be held responsible for organizing<br />
or exacerbating eco<strong>no</strong>mic constraints if the number of people hired<br />
by the Government at excessively low rates of pay and the quantity of<br />
work done by such employees had a k<strong>no</strong>ck-on effect on the situation of<br />
other people, causing them to lose their <strong>no</strong>rmal jobs and face identical<br />
eco<strong>no</strong>mic constraints.” 1116 Work experience in the context of education<br />
or training is generally considered <strong>no</strong>t to constitute forced labour. 1117<br />
It must also be <strong>no</strong>ted that the prohibition of forced labour is connected<br />
to the right to freely choose one’s occupation. As the European<br />
Committee on Social Rights remarked, the prohibition of forced labour<br />
implies “the freedom of workers to terminate employment”. 1118<br />
Certain specific kinds of compulsory labour exacted by the State are<br />
excluded from the definition of forced and compulsory labour by international<br />
human rights treaties as well as the ILO Forced Labour<br />
Convention. These include:<br />
• any work or service required by compulsory military service laws<br />
for work of a purely military character, and, in countries where<br />
conscientious objection is recognised, any national service required<br />
by law of conscientious objectors;<br />
• any work or service which forms part of the <strong>no</strong>rmal civic obligations<br />
of members of the community as long as it is <strong>no</strong>t applied<br />
discriminatorily and it is proportionally imposed in regard to volume<br />
and frequency of work; 1119<br />
• any work or service that is a consequence of a criminal conviction,<br />
or of detention or conditional release on the order of a court;<br />
1116 Representation (article 24)—1995—Senegal—C105—Report of the Committee set up to<br />
examine the representation made by the Senegal Teachers’ Single and Democratic Trade<br />
Union (SUDES) under article 24 of the ILO Constitution alleging <strong>no</strong>n-observance by Senegal<br />
of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Document No. (ilolex):<br />
161997SEN105 (SUDES v. Senegal, ILO), para. 30.<br />
1117 Colegio de Abogados v. Chile, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1110, para. 28.<br />
1118 FIDH v. Greece, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 1109, para. 17. It found in the impossibility to terminate<br />
employment a violation of Article 1.2 ESC(r), i.e. freedom of choice of employment.<br />
1119 Colegio de Abogados v. Chile, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1110, paras. 33–38. The European Court<br />
of Human Rights adopts the same criteria in Van der Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit.,<br />
fn. 1110, paras. 32–46; Zarb Adami v. Malta, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1108; Schmidt v. Germany,<br />
ECtHR, Application No. 13580/88, Judgment of 18 July 1994. See also, Faure v. Australia,<br />
CCPR, op. cit., fn. 1110, para. 7.5: “to so qualify as a <strong>no</strong>rmal civil obligation, the labour in<br />
question must, at a minimum, <strong>no</strong>t be an exceptional measure; it must <strong>no</strong>t possess a punitive<br />
purpose or effect; and it must be provided for by law in order to serve a legitimate purpose<br />
under the Covenant.”