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History of Zambia’s Copper Industry Copper mining began in the British colony of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, in 1928 and immediately dominated the country’s economy. 14 The stretch along the Zambian and Congolese border became known as the Copperbelt for the enormous deposits located there. More than 80 years later, the Copperbelt remains the “backbone of the Zambian economy,” contributing to nearly 75 percent of the country’s exports and two-thirds of the central government revenue during years of strong copper prices. 15 At Zambia’s independence in 1964, copper mining was controlled by two private companies: the UK (and later Roan) Selection Trust and the British-South African owned Anglo American Corporation. With high copper prices in the 1960s and early 1970s, Zambia grew to a middle-income country, with one of Africa’s highest Gross Domestic Products. 16 Zambia’s first president, Kenneth Kaunda, was quickly concerned with the little money that the companies invested in the country’s long-term growth, however. The government sought higher taxes and the companies demurred; in 1969, following a constitutional referendum, Kaunda responded by nationalizing the industry. 17 The two copper mining companies were reorganized and became Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines Limited (RCM). 18 In 1982, NCCM and RCM merged to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). Prior even to nationalization, the copper mining companies were expected to provide housing, foodstuffs, and health care for employees. After nationalization, the amenities grew further as companies “operated ‘a cradle to grave’ welfare policy” in which they offered free education for miners’ children and subsidized housing, food, electricity, water, transport, and family burial arrangements. 19 Services were provided to entire mining communities, with companies maintaining roads, street lights, and trash collection and offering social and sporting clubs as well as skills training for women and youth. The mining units also maintained town hospitals, often where no government hospital existed. The mining divisions, and ZCCM as a whole, essentially replaced the government in providing social services. The powerful union, the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), was influential in obtaining many of these benefits. 20 14 Alastair Frasier and John Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls?: Winners & losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s Copper Mines, 2007, p. 7. 15 Charles Bweendo Muchimba, The Zambian Mining Industry: A Status Report Ten Years After Privatization, 2010, pp. 3, 5; Frasier and Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls, p. 7. 16 Frasier and Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls, p. 7. 17 Ibid (“All rights of ownership of minerals as well as exclusive prospecting and mining licenses reverted to the state… [and] [t]he mining companies were forced to give 51% of shares in all existing mines to the State.”). See also Muchimba, The Zambian Mining Industry, p. 5. 18 They both operated under the parastatal Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). 19 Frasier and Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls, pp. 7-8. 20 For discussion of social services, see Ibid., pp. 7-8; Muchimba, The Zambian Mining Industry, pp. 14-16. 17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2011
The crash of copper prices in the mid- and late 1970s led to a downward spiral of Zambia’s economy. By 1994, Zambia had become one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita income down 50 percent from 1974. 21 The copper industry’s revenues could no longer meet the costs of salaries and benefits. Production also collapsed, from 750,000 metric tons in 1973 to just over 250,000 tons in 2000. 22 By the 1980s, Zambia faced massive debts. With pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Zambia entered into structural adjustment programs that sought a reduction in government expenditures and the privatization of certain state assets. 23 Trade unions, including MUZ, supported the privatization—as by this time new investment was deemed crucial to revitalize the industry. 24 The copper mines, as the most valuable country asset, were central to privatization. After an extended fight between the government, union, and financial institutions over whether the mines would be sold to a single investor or broken up and sold separately, the latter course was taken. 25 Sales began in 1997 (see text box for current owners of main mining assets). Copper Mining Operations in Zambia Company Private Investors Nationality of Investor Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) Vedanta Resources (79%) Indian Mopani Copper Mines Glencore International (74%), First Quantum Minerals (16%) Swiss, Canadian Kansanshi Mining First Quantum Minerals (79%) Canadian Chambishi Metals Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (90%) Kazakhstani, British Lumwana Copper Mine Barrick Gold Corporation (100%) 26 Canadian Chibuluma Mines Metorexgroup (85 %) South African China Luanshya Mine, NFCA (Chambishi Copper Mine), Chambishi Copper Smelter, Sino Metals China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC) (85 %) Chinese 21 Ibid., p. 8. 22 Ibid., p. 8. See also Muchimba, The Zambian Mining Industry, p. 5. 23 For a broader discussion of the structural adjustment programs in Zambia, including both positive and critical evaluations, see World Bank, Zambia: Country Assistance Evaluation, Report No. 25075, 2002; Oliver Campbell-White & Anita Bhatia, Privatisation in Africa, IBRD, Washington, D.C., 1998; J. Craig, “Evaluating privatisation in Zambia: a tale of two processes,” Review of African Political Economy, 2000, pp. 355-66. 24 Frasier and Lungu, p. 9. 25 Ibid., pp. 10-13. 26 Barrick Gold purchased the previous owner of the Lumwana mine, Equinox Minerals, in April 2011, after competing in the bid with China Minmetals Corporation—another Chinese parastatal. BBC News, “Barrick Gold beats Minmetals to buy Equinox Minerals,” April 25, 2011. In late May 2011, Zambia approved Barrick’s takeover of the Lumwana mine. Anthony Mukwita, “Zambia Approves Barrick Gold’s Take Over of Equinox’s Lumwana Copper Mine,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2011. “YOU’LL BE FIRED IF YOU REFUSE” 18
Page 1 and 2: Zambia “You’ll Be Fired if You
Page 3 and 4: Copyright © 2011 Human Rights Watc
Page 5 and 6: Company Safety Officers without Aut
Page 8 and 9: Summary Over the past decade, China
Page 10 and 11: Chinese-run Copper Mining Companies
Page 12 and 13: uling in MUZ’s favor on the estab
Page 14 and 15: Recommendations To the Government o
Page 16 and 17: Reward managers and safety inspecto
Page 18 and 19: them as having spoken to Human Righ
Page 20 and 21: I. Background China’s role in Afr
Page 22 and 23: [The Chinese government] supports c
Page 26 and 27: Copper prices rose steadily from 20
Page 28 and 29: for CNMC in 2003—13 years after t
Page 30 and 31: policeman. Although the police inve
Page 32 and 33: underground mining has more than do
Page 34 and 35: After Mwanawasa died in August 2008
Page 36 and 37: quickly requested that the company
Page 38 and 39: of us in planning has our own compu
Page 40 and 41: Economic, Social, and Cultural Righ
Page 42 and 43: problems. In some areas, they shoul
Page 44 and 45: A national-level official at the Mi
Page 46 and 47: Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Page 48 and 49: Miners told Human Rights Watch that
Page 50 and 51: While Sino Metals appears to be the
Page 52 and 53: Casual Workers at Sino Metals: No P
Page 54 and 55: speak further, refuted that anyone
Page 56 and 57: Godwin Beene, permanent secretary i
Page 58 and 59: They have a safety officer in place
Page 60 and 61: frequent, that two to three a week
Page 62 and 63: empowered to refuse to continue wor
Page 64 and 65: injured in a 2009 accident, contras
Page 66 and 67: unsafe, don’t do it.’ If the mi
Page 68 and 69: Best Safety Practices in Zambia’s
Page 70 and 71: Deliberate Failure to Report Accide
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Problem of Subcontractors at Konkol
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are also corruption issues, a serio
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Kateka also stressed that the under
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Physical Abuse by Chinese Superviso
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III. Hours and Overtime Across Zamb
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Overtime is supposed to be four hou
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“Let me tell you, for people who
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almost never paid, even when they w
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Even when it is not an emergency si
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IV. Anti-Union Activities If you do
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Sino Metals still does not allow us
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that once such a committee is estab
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Intimidating Union Representatives
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A union representative at Sino Meta
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exercising or for the anticipated e
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V. Conclusion This report seeks to
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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 350 Fifth Avenue
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hour shifts, though generally only
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收件人 : 人权观察非
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acknowledged by various parties. In
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the wearing of PPE (including those
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common practice in the mining indus
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egistering with the company. Howeve
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Annex II: Copper Price, 2001-2011 1
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2009 Financial Summary for the MSD
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Annex IV: Wages in Chinese and Othe
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Prior to 2008, the differences in s
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Annex V: Salary Breakdown at Sino M
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H UMAN R I G H TS WATCH 350 Fifth A
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