“You'll Be Fired if You Refuse” - Human Rights Watch

Kateka also stressed that the understaffed unit received inadequate funds to fulfill its
mandate, saying that provision of the department’s “full funding is… erratic.” 225 Annex III
provides a complete breakdown of the approved and received funding for the Mines Safety
Department from 2008 to 2010. The figures highlight the funding shortfalls. First, the
government consistently provides far less funding than is approved for the department, with
3.952 billion Kwacha (US$832,000) approved for 2008 and 2.875 billion provided ($599,000);
2.534 billion approved ($528,000) for 2009 and 1.500 billion provided ($312,000); and 2.029
billion approved ($422,000) for 2010 and 1.102 billion provided ($230,000). 226
Second, as seen in those figures, the overall amount of financial support for the MSD has
decreased considerably from 2008 through 2010. For 2010, a budget of 450 million
Kwacha—less than $100,000—was provided for all of the department’s inspections (see
Annex III), not only for the copper industry, but also for the country’s nickel, emerald, coal,
and other mining activities. Not surprisingly, the decrease in funding has led to a sharp
decrease in the inspections that the MSD undertakes each year. In 2008, MSD made 613
inspection visits to underground mines, including the country’s copper mines; in 2009,
MSD visited “large mines” 476 times; in 2010, just 297 times. 227
Funding is so poor, according to Kateka, that the mining companies themselves often have
to help fund the inspections:
When there’s a [mine] fatality, the family will want compensation, but an
inspector’s report is required for compensation. So sometimes the mine
has to pay the bill to ensure the inspector can actually come to the mine
and draw up a report, for example pay for fuel in the [inspector’s] car. 228
When asked whether inspectors performed proactive inspections—arriving unannounced
to determine whether companies met regulations—Kateka dismissed it as completely
infeasible, given their staffing and budget. 229 The result is that the MSD appears to
respond only to reported accidents and scheduled checks, failing to observe and punish
lax safety standards in a way that could minimize the number of accidents.
225 Ibid.
226 Mines Safety Department (MSD), 2008 Annual Report, February 2009, pp. 2-3 (on file with author); MSD, 2009 Annual
Report, January 2010, p. 2-3 (on file with author); MSD, 2010 Annual Report, February 2011, pp. 2-3 (on file with author).
227 MSD, 2008 Annual Report, February 2009, p. 4; MSD, 2009 Annual Report, January 2010, p. 4; MSD, 2010 Annual Report,
February 2011, p. 4. MSD appears to have merely changed terminology from “underground” to “large” between 2008 and
2009, as the other categories (e.g., “surface, small mines, or quarries” and “explosive factories”) remained the same.
228 Human Rights Watch interviews with Bright Kateka, Deputy Chief Inspector, Mines Safety Department, Kitwe, July 28, 2011.
229 Ibid.
71 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2011