FINLAND & PALESTINE Proceedings of a Joint Workshop

Despite these significant differences, the Finnish case may
nevertheless be of some relevance to the debate within Israel.
The creation of a common nationality that manages to encompass
both ethnic groups by transforming them into linguistic
groups has been a key to the success of the Finnish model.
Even though such a development is not a realistic in Israel in
the short run, some elements may, however, be applied to it.
The Finnish case is an instance of a majority that has been exceptionally
ready to take the minority's interests into account.
One factor explaining this policy is Finland's (especially earlier)
strong volition to be a member of the community of Nordic
countries where Scandinavian languages are a norm, a Finno­
Ugric Finnish being in the clear minority in the region. 28 One
could strongly argue that a flourishing and satisfied Palestinian
minority within Israel would facilitate Israel's integration into
the mainly Arabic-speaking Middle East. The second class position
of the Palestinians in Israel and also the denial of the "Jewish
Arab" identity category for oriental Jews have definitely
made the integration even more complicated than it would
have been otherwise. 29
It should be noted that a number of elements present in the
vision documents are in some form applied in Finland vis-a-vis
the Swedish-speaking minority. Most importantly, Finland is
bilingual by law, and the study of a minority language is compulsory
for all citizens. This is very different from the Israeli
reality reflected by the words of Zvi Zameret, Director General
of Yad Ben-Zvi, who wrote in a Haaretz OP-ed: "If we [Le. the
Israeli Jews] accede to the demand of bilingualism, we will
wipe out the fundamental basis of our unity.,,30 The official sta­
28 Earlier such a pronounced willingness to identify with other Nordic coun­
tries was also linked to the security policy.
29 For the "Jewish Arab" identity, see Shenhav 2006.
30Zameret 2007
101