Prosecutions 2005 (PDF 3269kb) - WorkSafe Victoria

HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTIONS
BLUE CIRCLE SOUTHERN CEMENT LTD
Date of offence: 12 July 2003
Date of prosecution:
Magistrate:
Plea:
3 October 2005 at Geelong Magistrates’ Court
His Honour Magistrate von Einem
Guilty
On 12 July 2003 two men employed by Blue Circle Southern Cement Ltd (employee ‘A’ and employee
‘B’) in Waurn Ponds, suffered second degree burns when they came in contact with very hot (around
850 degrees celsius) process material (meal) used in the manufacturing of cement. ‘Meal’ is finely
ground limestone mixed with a small amount of sand.
In the days prior to the incident, the plant had experienced ongoing operational problems, mainly
due to the under performance of the bypass electrostatic precipitator, the function of which was
to remove dust from the airstream and reduce chloride levels generated in the manufacturing
process. The defendant was unable to rectify these problems prior to the incident. There had also
been difficulties with the by-pass system, resulting in high chloride levels. High chloride levels can
increase the risk of blockages because it creates ‘sticky meal’. The kiln was operating at reduced
capacity of 70% to reduce the risk of chloride build up. An excess of chloride produces a sticky
compound which builds up in parts of the plant can lead to blockages in the plant in which the
cement is manufactured.
The employees started their shift at 7pm on the night of 11 July 2003. At about 8pm there was a
cyclone 4 blockage radiation alarm. The central control room operator was of the view that this was
a false alarm as all temperatures and pressures appeared normal throughout the system and that
there were no blockages at that time. However, according to the production shift team leader, at
around the same time a stage 4 chloride test was undertaken which showed the chloride levels at
1.8%. His belief was that the desired level was less than 1.5%.
In the early hours of 12 June 2003 (around midnight), employee ‘A’ cleaned the stage 4 suction
points situated near the bottom of the cyclone. Within minutes of putting his equipment away he
received a call from the central control room operator, informing him that the cyclone 4-radiation
alarm was on again. Employee ‘A’ went to the control room and with the central control room
operator watched temperature and pressure trends within the system for a few minutes. As
they were monitoring the situation, a cyclone 4 suction alarm was initiated indicating there was
inadequate airflow through the cyclone. The control room operator asked employee ‘A’ to go to
the bottom of cyclone 4 and check out the situation. Employee ‘A’’ put on his safety equipment and
went to the second floor of the plant and checked suction port ‘A’ which indicated a zero reading.
Employee ‘A’ believed that this was a sign that there was a blockage somewhere in cyclone 4
and then looked into the sample port, which was the location where chloride levels were usually
checked, and observed that there was no suction. Employee ‘A’ radioed the control room operator
to advise that there was a real blockage. Employee ‘A’ used the two-way radio to ask employee ‘B’
to come and help him. The shift supervisor also came to assist both employees.
Eventually, the shift supervisor instructed the control room operator to shut the feed off and stop
the kiln. About 15 to 20 minutes had elapsed between the time the suction alarm went off and the
shutting down of the kiln. The meal remained at a very high temperature despite the shutting down
of the kiln.
Both employee ‘A’ and employee ‘B’ together with the shift supervisor were attempting to clear the
blockage by checking various portholes. Employees ‘A’ and ‘B’ proceeded to hatch cover ’7’, located
30-60cms below the mezzanine level (above the first floor). The shift supervisor remained on the
first floor. According to employee ‘B’ he had opened this hatch once before to clear a build up of
meal and he had never been told that this hatch was not to be used nor were there any warnings
signs to that effect. This hatch was not locked but had two large wing nuts and bolts holding it
PROSECUTIONS 2005
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