Report on the Implementation of the derogation to ... - Trade Websites

Final <strong>Report</strong>
RoO Derogation under the PACP-IEPA
3. Japan’s total purse seine catch in the WCPO in 2010 was 250,427 mt. Around 56,000 mt was
sold to Thailand and could be diverted to PNG. Almost all Japan purse seiners are already
compliant with EU SPS measures.
4. Catch by purse seiners flagged by Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) totalled 56,800 mt in
2010. Of this, 8,000 mt supplies a loining plant in RMI and thus could not be diverted.
However, around 31,000 mt was sold to Thailand. Part of this volume could be diverted to
PNG if an EU-compliant competent authority is established in RMI for the purposes of SPS
and IUU fishing certification, which the government has shown interest in achieving. In
addition, technically, several boats in the RMI fleet could meet EU SPS measures.
5. Philippines distant water fleet catch in PNG waters in 2010 included around 16,000 mt
transhipped to Thailand and possibly 5,000 mt to Vietnam. Proportions of each of these two
volumes could be diverted to PNG processors. It is highly unlikely that the remainder of the
catch will be diverted because it supplies Philippines-based processors which experienced
raw material shortages in 2010 and 2011.
6. Taiwan catch in the WCPO in 2010 331 was transhipped to Thailand (198,000 mt), Philippines
(10,000 mt) Vietnam (7,000 mt) and China (5,000 mt). Proportions of any of these volumes
could possibly be diverted to PNG-based processors.
7. If the renegotiation of the Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries between the Pacific island
countries and the USA fails, any subsequent bilateral arrangements concluded by US vessels
and PNG could incorporate a volume of fish to be landed for PNG-based processors (e.g. the
US fleet transhipped 122,000 mt in 2010 to Thailand).
8. Vanuatu-flag vessels, whose catch has largely been included in previous options and
probably exceeded 120,000 mt in 2010, trade most of their catch to Thailand, as noted, and
a bloc, are very likely sources of raw material.
9. Vessels which are already likely to supply planned PNG processing investments, but
currently tranship a portion of their catch to processors elsewhere, including Thailand and
the Philippines.
In summary, if raw material diversion is spread across these players, the main medium-term impacts
of the derogation will be on processors in Thailand, Philippines, and on lesser scale, Vietnam and
China. There are no likely raw material diversion impacts on EU-based processors or IEPA and GSP+
third countries.
However, an important caveat must be re-emphasised. Each of the potential sources of WCPOcaught
raw material diversion to PNG-based processors entails complex political negotiation. Unless
there is some kind of condition for compulsory offloading to PNG processors as part of access
arrangements (particularly for those distant water fleets that do not have onshore investments),
then it is going to be very difficult to override existing commercial linkages/arrangements for raw
material supply. As noted, a significant percentage of the vessels fishing in PNG are already
compliant with EU SPS/IUU regulations. NFA may need to enforce tougher requirements on raw
material offloading by vessels operating under licences already associated with PNG-based
processing plants. If a plant has surplus catch, perhaps the first right of refusal should be given to
other PNG plants who might be having difficulties sourcing SPS compliant raw materials rather than
selling it elsewhere (e.g. to Thailand or the Philippines).
331 Note in Table 6.16 that some Taiwanese, Vanuatu and Chinese catch is included in the PNG fleet catch.
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