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Page Forty-«ix THE NAVY F«bru»ry/M«rch/Aprll, 1972
Address to the 44th annual Summer School of the University of Western
Australia, by the Minister for the Navy. Dr the Honourable Malcolm G
Mackay. B A . B D M P — 28 January 1972
Australia's
Defence Outlook
One of the prime requirements for
any planner for national defence
would seem to be a crystal ball. While
every attempt is made to minimise
the area of its use. both by the
collection of intelligence and the
development of our own knowledge
and capability, nevertheless there is
still a large ingredient of the
unknown.
My first presupposition is this. As
this century draws to a close, the
world will be more and more
dominated by three super-powers,
viz. the U.S.A.. the U.S.S.R. and
China. Each will be equipped with a
multiplicity of super-weapons, and
will be able to unleash massive
destruction. At the same time the
technical capability of each for
combating such an attack from
another power will also increase
enormously. Space too will become
increasingly important as an area of
exploitation for military purposes.
Following these three superpowers
there is a second line of
major powers, which include the
Europe of the future (if they can
solve their internal difficulties to the
point of presenting a united front).
Japan and India — and pcssibly one
or two other groupings of powers. It
is only in the next area of still
smaller powers that I would place
Australia — and any discussion of
her defence requirements must take
cognisance of this perspective.
Australia alone could not withstand
a determined onslaught by a superpower.
and any system of defence
against such a threat entails a
guarantee of support from at least
one other such power. Hence, in this
region of the ultimate sanctions of
force in the world of tomorrow, the
first line of Australian defence is
clearly political.
February/March/April. 1972
The Honourable Malcolm G. Mackay. BJL. B.D..
Ph.D., M.P., Minister for tha Navy.
AGGRESSION-BY-PROXY:
However, while the super-powers
themselves may find that, for some
considerable time, the checks and
balances of deterrence are so
persuasive that they do not move
directly, in terms of military action,
there is nevertheless the developing
strategy of aggression-by-proxy, i.e.
of lesser powers undertaking
military adventures under the aegis
of a super-power. In a sense this is a
brinksmanship type of conquest
such as we have seen carried out in
Cuba, in Central Europe and on the
fringe of Asia. The vital question
here for a defence planner is one of
"how far will the proxy go without
involving the super-powers
directly?" The struggle in Indo-China
is a classic instance of this strategy.
It does not nf»d Breshnev to tell us
that there are smaller powers which
lie within the specific zones of
influence and concern of each of the
THE NAVY
great powers. Other states however
lie in a grey area, and it is with regard
to the future of these states
especially that much of the world's
political energy will be directed in
the period under review.
POLITICS AND DEFENCE:
I have stated that, in terms of
major defence decisions, politics is
the determining factor. We should
never forget that politics is primarily
a matter of power and sectional
advantage. Applied to the international
scene it is useful to list
those sanctions or incentives which
are most effective in terms of
political involvement.
The most important consideration
is strategic or military value, as this
bears directly on the self-defence
and therefore the primary need of
the super-power. For this reason
certain states, with little else to offer,
may nevertheless be held dearly as a
valuable asset in the defence
strategy of a greater power. By the
same token the nuisance value" of a
state or lesser power must also be
taken into account, such as if the
military capacity of that state is
sufficient to make it a factor to-bereckoned-with
in disturbing or
embarrassing the strategic situation.
Another factor bearing directly on
the outcome of political consideration
is the quantum of economic and
industrial capacity of a country, i.e.
the value of any lesser state, in
economic terms, to a superpower.
A nation's resources and
overseas investments are clearly
large considerations vitally affecting
any major political decisions
regarding its defence arrangements.
This is an area where Australia must
be particularly sensitive to her own
national interest, as it may well
prove that it is in this region as much
as in any military one that her
chances for significant support from
her future allies may lie. The price
and the benefit of such actions must
continually be weighed and
evaluated of course.
Only after these matters have been
mentioned would I place what I call
Public Relations values, under which
Psge Forty-seven