Oðüà b'G äÃÃãdGh ƪæâd ±hô¶dG - Al Bayan Magazine
Oðüà b'G äÃÃãdGh ƪæâd ±hô¶dG - Al Bayan Magazine
Oðüà b'G äÃÃãdGh ƪæâd ±hô¶dG - Al Bayan Magazine
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مال ومصارف<br />
In fact, globalisation is exercising a high toll on the middle classes of all<br />
advanced economies, as median incomes fall and a growing number of<br />
young adults are forced to continue studying to stand a chance to keep up<br />
with the living standards of prior generations.<br />
When linking the second and third “talking points”, I see a tragedy within<br />
the tragedy: massively diverging youth employment rates between<br />
Europe’s core and her periphery risk actually aggravating the continent’s<br />
lack of a stronger common cultural identity. Indeed, if the “Old Continent” is<br />
to foster a stronger pan- European identity, would it not be wise to start with<br />
the younger generations?<br />
* Fourth talking point: what is today’s Europe’s biggest policy failure?<br />
- It is probably not useful to get into the endless debate about austerity. I<br />
broadly agree with the need for fiscal discipline across all member-states.<br />
I certainly agree with the principles of federalism and subsidiarity, strongly<br />
felt in many core and northern countries. In fact, persistent divergence in<br />
intra-euro youth unemployment is to a large extent not (only) the consequence<br />
of austerity. It is directly fostered by the enduring and massive credit<br />
crunch in periphery economies. So when assessing the fourth “talking<br />
point”, I observe that we are not merely talking about a policy failure, i.e.<br />
the de facto sterilisation of monetary policy in the periphery. Rather, we are<br />
talking about a true market failure, i.e. the non-existence of a single<br />
European credit market.<br />
Today investors discriminate across European banks not on the basis of<br />
their track record and quality of management, as would be the case in any<br />
normal single credit market, but depending on whether they belong or not<br />
to a fiscally stressed country. This not only hampers the recovery in the<br />
periphery, it also results in a massive inefficiency for Europe as a whole. In<br />
fact, the history of the last years shows that there is no positive relation<br />
between the quality of (the management of) a bank and the fiscal conditions<br />
of its country.<br />
So I would like to better understand why core countries are tittering with<br />
banking union, and instead proposing bilateral (through for instance the<br />
German development bank KFW) or multilateral (through the European<br />
Investment Bank) loan programmes to help small- and medium sized companies<br />
in periphery economies to hire people. By doing so, are they not<br />
adding to centralised overhead? Would Spanish and Italian banks not be<br />
better equipped to judge the creditworthiness of enterprises that operate in<br />
their own territory? Would a commonly funded bank resolution scheme – in<br />
addition to a common supervisor – not be both cheaper and provide the<br />
underpinnings for increased efficiency through a genuinely single<br />
European credit market. Or would, maybe, such set-up expose core countries’<br />
own banks to too much external control?<br />
* Fifth talking point: is Europe now less powerful in the international<br />
arena?<br />
- I think that it is way too early to provide an answer to the fifth “talking point”.<br />
One could actually argue that the crisis has forced European countries to unite<br />
on important monetary and financial matters. As such it might have strengthened,<br />
rather than weakened, Europe’s position. Then again, whilst I personally<br />
do not believe that we are today facing massive currency wars, if central bank<br />
liquidity injections can be interpreted as covert currency wars, Europe has certainly<br />
been the less bellicose amongst all advanced economies. I am much<br />
more concerned about (currency wars combined with) trade wars. History, in<br />
fact, shows that it was the combination of competitive devaluations and prohibitive<br />
trade measures that led to the global economic slump of the 30s. In fact,<br />
unlike central bank liquidity injection, trade wars only trigger negative priceeffects,<br />
and no positive income-effects.<br />
After the Doha failure, hopes for further multilateral trade liberalisation have<br />
faded. It is the advanced economies that are now pursuing more regional trade<br />
liberalisation, be it through bilateral deals (such as the Japan-EU trade agreement)<br />
or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) , be it<br />
through multipolar deals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). I hope<br />
that these regional efforts will not be at the expense of trade with the emerging<br />
world that is not part to it. They confirm to me, however, that Europe’s role on<br />
the international scene is anything but over. And I am very curious to know if,<br />
within the context of these agreements, the United States will resolve to authorise<br />
exports of gas and oil. That would<br />
be logical. It would also be a real boon for Europe, but less so for energyexporting<br />
emerging markets.<br />
البيان الاقتصادية - العد - ٥٠٠ تموز (يوليو) ٢٠١٣<br />
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