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OÉ°üàb'G äÉÑãdGh ƒªæ∏d ±hô¶dG - Al Bayan Magazine

OÉ°üàb'G äÉÑãdGh ƒªæ∏d ±hô¶dG - Al Bayan Magazine

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مال ومصارف<br />

In fact, globalisation is exercising a high toll on the middle classes of all<br />

advanced economies, as median incomes fall and a growing number of<br />

young adults are forced to continue studying to stand a chance to keep up<br />

with the living standards of prior generations.<br />

When linking the second and third “talking points”, I see a tragedy within<br />

the tragedy: massively diverging youth employment rates between<br />

Europe’s core and her periphery risk actually aggravating the continent’s<br />

lack of a stronger common cultural identity. Indeed, if the “Old Continent” is<br />

to foster a stronger pan- European identity, would it not be wise to start with<br />

the younger generations?<br />

* Fourth talking point: what is today’s Europe’s biggest policy failure?<br />

- It is probably not useful to get into the endless debate about austerity. I<br />

broadly agree with the need for fiscal discipline across all member-states.<br />

I certainly agree with the principles of federalism and subsidiarity, strongly<br />

felt in many core and northern countries. In fact, persistent divergence in<br />

intra-euro youth unemployment is to a large extent not (only) the consequence<br />

of austerity. It is directly fostered by the enduring and massive credit<br />

crunch in periphery economies. So when assessing the fourth “talking<br />

point”, I observe that we are not merely talking about a policy failure, i.e.<br />

the de facto sterilisation of monetary policy in the periphery. Rather, we are<br />

talking about a true market failure, i.e. the non-existence of a single<br />

European credit market.<br />

Today investors discriminate across European banks not on the basis of<br />

their track record and quality of management, as would be the case in any<br />

normal single credit market, but depending on whether they belong or not<br />

to a fiscally stressed country. This not only hampers the recovery in the<br />

periphery, it also results in a massive inefficiency for Europe as a whole. In<br />

fact, the history of the last years shows that there is no positive relation<br />

between the quality of (the management of) a bank and the fiscal conditions<br />

of its country.<br />

So I would like to better understand why core countries are tittering with<br />

banking union, and instead proposing bilateral (through for instance the<br />

German development bank KFW) or multilateral (through the European<br />

Investment Bank) loan programmes to help small- and medium sized companies<br />

in periphery economies to hire people. By doing so, are they not<br />

adding to centralised overhead? Would Spanish and Italian banks not be<br />

better equipped to judge the creditworthiness of enterprises that operate in<br />

their own territory? Would a commonly funded bank resolution scheme – in<br />

addition to a common supervisor – not be both cheaper and provide the<br />

underpinnings for increased efficiency through a genuinely single<br />

European credit market. Or would, maybe, such set-up expose core countries’<br />

own banks to too much external control?<br />

* Fifth talking point: is Europe now less powerful in the international<br />

arena?<br />

- I think that it is way too early to provide an answer to the fifth “talking point”.<br />

One could actually argue that the crisis has forced European countries to unite<br />

on important monetary and financial matters. As such it might have strengthened,<br />

rather than weakened, Europe’s position. Then again, whilst I personally<br />

do not believe that we are today facing massive currency wars, if central bank<br />

liquidity injections can be interpreted as covert currency wars, Europe has certainly<br />

been the less bellicose amongst all advanced economies. I am much<br />

more concerned about (currency wars combined with) trade wars. History, in<br />

fact, shows that it was the combination of competitive devaluations and prohibitive<br />

trade measures that led to the global economic slump of the 30s. In fact,<br />

unlike central bank liquidity injection, trade wars only trigger negative priceeffects,<br />

and no positive income-effects.<br />

After the Doha failure, hopes for further multilateral trade liberalisation have<br />

faded. It is the advanced economies that are now pursuing more regional trade<br />

liberalisation, be it through bilateral deals (such as the Japan-EU trade agreement)<br />

or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) , be it<br />

through multipolar deals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). I hope<br />

that these regional efforts will not be at the expense of trade with the emerging<br />

world that is not part to it. They confirm to me, however, that Europe’s role on<br />

the international scene is anything but over. And I am very curious to know if,<br />

within the context of these agreements, the United States will resolve to authorise<br />

exports of gas and oil. That would<br />

be logical. It would also be a real boon for Europe, but less so for energyexporting<br />

emerging markets.<br />

البيان الاقتصادية - العد - ٥٠٠ تموز ‏(يوليو)‏ ٢٠١٣<br />

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