European Military Spending by Sub-Region800in billions of USD (constant, 2010)70060050040030020010001988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Central Europe Eastern Europe Western EuropeSource: SIPRIThe size of the regular army is set tofall from 104,000 troops to 90,000 by2015, and to 82,000–84,000 by 2020. Inaddition to these agreed cuts, the UKwill find itself without a carrier strikecapability until 2020. 19While the UK’s main challenge withregard to NATO revolves around theimpact of British austerity measures onthe operational capacity of its military,Germany is plagued more by questionsof leadership and purpose. 20 For mostof the history of the alliance, during theCold War and the enlargement phaseof the 1990s, Germany was a loyal andenthusiastic supporter of NATO. Butthat has given way to ambivalence in thepast decade as NATO’s strategy evolvedtoward more out-of-area operations.Fear of overstretch and an insufficientthreat perception partially explainGermany’s reluctance to get involvedin campaigns outside of Europe. 21Last year, Berlin chose to stay on thesidelines of the intervention in Libyaand withdrew its crews from NATO’sAirborne Warning and Control System(AWACS) aircraft in the Mediterranean, 22much to the dismay of its main NATOpartners. The backlash over Libya has atleast convinced some German officialsthat Berlin’s security policy has a realcredibility problem. 23 A recent initiativeby a number of European foreignministers, including Guido Westerwelle,is trying to address this by advocatingdeeper European military integration,to face the challenges of austerity andturn Europe into a stronger partner forthe US. 24It remains to be seen to what extent newFrench President François Hollande willdepart from his predecessor, NicolasSarkozy, when it comes to NATO policy.Under Sarkozy, France seeminglyfollowed a more Atlanticist path. In 2009,the country ended its 43-year exile fromNATO’s integrated military structure.In addition, Sarkozy maintained hiscountry’s presence in Afghanistanand took on a leadership role in theLibyan campaign. But Hollande and hisforeign minister, Laurent Fabius, wereopposed to France’s return to NATO’sintegrated military structure, and duringthe presidential campaign they pledgedto withdraw the troops stationed inAfghanistan by the end of 2012. 25 Sinceassuming office, however, Hollande hasacted pragmatically. During the Chicagosummit in May 2012, he accepted anumber of compromises as gestures tohis country’s allies: he agreed to delay theAfghan withdrawal and toned down hiscriticism of the alliance’s missile defensesystem. It seems unlikely that Hollandewill go back on Sarkozy’s decision toreturn France to NATO’s integratedstructures, but he is intent on injectingnew life into European defense projects.Recommendations for 2013NATO’s road ahead, as it prepares towind down its presence in Afghanistan,will unquestionably be arduous. TheAlliance will need to re-define itspurpose and maintain its ability to facea plethora of threats in a context markedby austerity and fiscal restraint. Butthis challenge – maintaining NATO’seffectiveness with fewer resources – canbecome a great opportunity for Europeand the US to push through needed andcomprehensive reforms of the Alliance.Through close cooperation, Europe andthe US can develop a NATO with a moreefficient organization and improveddefense culture, which preserves itsrelevance by tackling new threats, andwhich remains engaged with partners ona global scale.2 8Post-Afghanistan NATO
1. Consider NATO’s defensespending target formember states a useful,but not dominant, guideline:Undoubtedly, member states mustcontinue investing in hard power andcapabilities so NATO can remain aneffective organization. But the fixationon the defense spending target of twopercent of GDP has ultimately proved tobe counterproductive, and will remainso in coming years. The two-percent goalis simply not a realistic target at present.According to the latest figures, asidefrom the US, only Greece and the UKcurrently reach it—and that might provetemporary considering the UK’s planneddefense cuts and Greece’s serious debtcrisis. 26 With the rest of Europe alsofacing significant economic challenges,the NATO member states are unlikelyto meet the two-percent target anytimesoon, even if Western economies recoverdramatically.Looking ahead, and remaining mindful ofthe constraints of the current economiccontext, the US government should avoidpublicly berating its European allies overtheir failures to match spending targets.Lecturing cannot change the facts ofausterity and will only cause more illwill. A more restrained attitude would atleast improve atmospherics. Moreover,excessive focus on burden-sharingpromotes the view that Europe’s defensedifficulties are only a matter of spendinglevels. The fact is that Europe does notalways spend wisely, does not investenough in R&D and struggles to properlydeploy its existing assets. Finally, thepreoccupation with hard power alsodownplays the important contributionsand resources the Europeans dedicateto the larger field of security, includingdonor aid, civilian missions andhomeland security. 272. Pursue the comprehensivereforms that will be requiredto make smart defense aneffective tool:Smart defense—essentially specializationand pooling and sharing of assets—has become a major buzzword in recent120100806040200USTurkeyIs NATO Still Essential for Security?BulgariaFranceGermanyItalytimes as NATO aims to do “more withless” in light of austerity. There are 24multinational burden sharing projectsin motion that fall under the smartdefense banner, including programs forthe sharing of specialized munitions, thepooling of maritime patrol aircraft, andmedical support. The European DefenseAgency (EDA) has also made a numberof proposals for pooling and sharingof military capabilities. These are allimportant steps, but smart defense andpooling and sharing are tools ratherthan ends in themselves. Additionalreforms will be needed to ensure thatsmart defense is truly effective.First, the US should support the EU inmaking the European Defense EquipmentMarket more efficient. It is weakened bya procurement process in which statesmainly reward their national industries,and is highly fragmented—there aretoo many producers in comparisonto the larger US defense market,reducing the prospects of economiesof scale and scope. Encouraging marketconsolidation through industry mergers,creating EU common R&D programs,and fostering a single European marketfor nonstrategic equipment would beimportant moves in the right direction. 28Second, the US should push the EU tofully implement existing measures thataim to integrate the defense market. Twoimportant directives passed in 2008-09NetherlandsDon’t Know No Longer Essential Still EssentialPolandSource: GMF Transatlantic Trends 2012PortugalRomaniaSlovakiaSpainUKaimed to combat inefficient regulationsgoverning it: Directive 2009/81/ECstipulated that, from August 2011 onwardEU governments must allow for opencompetition in military procurement,unless there are legitimate securityconcerns; and Directive 2009/43/ECmakes it easier to export defense-relatedproducts among EU member states. Inorder to make these two directives fullyeffective, member states need to avoidan excessively cautious approach whendefining which equipment is sensitiveenough to be excluded from competition,and they should establish a commonlist of military equipment, which wouldbenefit from general licenses acrossthe EU. 29Third, from an operational standpoint,NATO member states will need to closelycoordinate and to prepare contingencyplans for these shared assets. RecentNATO operations, such as in Libya,proved divisive and, as mentioned,a number of states remained on thesidelines. “Access contracts” wouldensure that members can still accessshared equipment for operations evenwhen one of the involved parties prefersto opt out. Finally, the US should supportthe creation of a permanent EuropeanMilitary Operations Headquarters(OHQ) and encourage the UK to lift itsopposition to that project. Creatinga permanent OHQ could significantlyimprove Europe’s ability to providePost-Afghanistan NATO2 9
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CITATIONSINTRODUCTION1See “Confid
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20Castle, S. (17 September, 2011).
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ARAB UPRISING1Koch, C. (summer 2011
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21Healey, J. (January 2012). Beyond
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20Berlemont, I. (25 July, 2012). Fr
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24Putin, V. (6 September, 2012). An
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Bertelsmann Foundation1101 New York