in millions of USDUS-China Bilateral Trade & Investment Relationship450,000400,000350,000300,000250,000200,000150,000100,00050,0000EU-China Bilateral Trade & Investment Relationship400,000350,000300,0002001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011US imports from ChinaChinese imports from USUS FDI in ChinaChinese FDI in USSources: US Census Bureau: Foreign Trade; BEA: Foreign Direct Investmentnegotiations for an indication of theconditions a post-Lisbon EU will requireand what sort of investment relationshipthe Chinese will accept. China alreadyhas BITs with 26 of the 27 EU memberstates, and the market for Chinese FDIin Europe is already relatively open.A pan-European BIT could tidy up thelegal climate for Chinese investors inEurope and perhaps extend to coverlarge individual investors.Second, while most Chinese FDI iseconomically beneficial and politicallyneutral, the US and EU shouldconsult on its nature in sensitive andstrategic sectors. 13 The two sides couldundertake a frank and open dialogueon the procedures and decision-makingapproval of the Committee on ForeignInvestment in the US (CFIUS) and otherbodies regulating inbound FDI into theUS. Openness has been the guidinglight in European investment strategy,with only three countries having limitson investment for national security instrategic sectors. The eurozone crisis andprivatization conditions championed bythe lending troika have augmented thepotential role of Chinese investment inEurope. For instance, the Chinese seempoised to enter into global bankingprimarily through M&A with undervaluedEuropean banks. Investments insensitive national security areas mightrequire consideration in light of the US’son-the-ground role in NATO.in millions of USD250,000200,000150,000100,00050,000Third, the trans-Atlantic partners shouldconsider the potential implications ofasymmetric market access and disclosurerequirements in China. This has alreadybegun and should be broadened. The twoshould jointly encourage China to clarifythe opaque management structure ofChinese state-owned enterprises, someof which are seeking to expand theiractivities in the US and EU.02001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011EU imports from ChinaEU exports to ChinaEU FDI in ChinaChinese FDI in EUSources: Eurostat, International Trade; Eurostat, Balance of Payments*2011 EU-China FDI data was not yet published as this went to printThis dialogue should include a jointassessment on conditions for an openand reciprocal procurement marketin China, a potential jewel for US andEuropean industries but one to whichaccess is limited and subject to heavypolitical intervention. Access itself has7 4China
pitfalls, given the sometimes cavalierChinese attitude toward ownershipand licensing of intellectual property(for example in renewables technologyand automobile parts). China hasdemonstrated its willingness to use itsprocurement market—and market accessmore broadly—as a political weaponand retaliatory tool. In this vein, the USand Europe should compare access andcompetiveness asymmetries in their ownprocurement markets.b) Narrow US-EU focus on realistarguments for enhanced multilateralismon governance and enforcement: Inrecent years, China has become a moreassertive political actor in multilateralsettings, particularly the UN SecurityCouncil. It played a key role in blockingaction on Syria, changing from itstraditional track of hiding behindRussia in veto decisions or expressingdisapproval through abstention. Rather,it has jointly pursued a veto strategy withMoscow, demonstrating a willingness tospeak or even play a spoiler role. Beijing’sincreased assertiveness, matched in itsregional relationships, is rooted in partin the principle of non-interference,which plays an important role in Chineseunderstanding of global governanceand is reflected other emerging powers,both democratic and non-democratic.Another factor is the specter of domesticinstability, including slower economicgrowth, a protracted and fragile politicaltransition and the potential aftershocksof the Arab uprising. 14Institutions of global governance lackthe degree of legitimacy in China thatthey have in Europe and, to a lesserextent, in the US. They are seen throughthe realist lens of power relationships asthe mechanisms for achieving desiredends. But there are cases in which Chinasees its long-term national interests bestserved by compliance with multilateralrules and norms, even going so far as tocontribute to the maintenance of publicgoods it sees as necessary for stableinternational commerce. The willingnessof China to adhere to WTO rulings is onecase, and its willingness to cooperatewith the US and Europe on counterpiracy is another.Germany, China’s no. 1 trade partner in the EU,had the only trade surplus with China of any countryin Europe in 2011—$12.97 billion.In those areas and others, the USand Europe should work together toexpand the realist case for multilateralcooperation with China. This shouldfocus first on the readjustment of globalimbalances, the area in which the G20has been stymied since 2010. The abilityto frame the economic crisis in terms ofunsustainable global current accountimbalances will depend on China’sacknowledgement of the problem inglobal forums. 15There is also a realist case for Beijing’sgrowing openness to binding emissionstargets and other initiatives aimed atincreasing the use of renewables. AsChina continues on its massive campaignto develop global competitive advantagein solar and wind, its use of the UN’sClean Development Mechanism, thegreater pragmatism shown at the climateconferences in Cancun and particularlyDurban can begin to integrate China intoan active stakeholder role on climatechange policy.3. Explore the potential of aUS-German dialogue on China:The Sino-German bilateral relationship isby far the most dynamic between Europeand Asia. Germany is perceived by theChinese as the political keystone toEurope, and its SME niche manufacturingcompetitiveness has been a boon in theChinese market, which seeks to emulateit. Germany, China’s no. 1 trade partnerin the EU, had the only trade surpluswith China of any country in Europe in2011—at $12.97 billion. 16 But prominentGerman politicians from the Bundestag,particularly from Chancellor AngelaMerkel’s CDU, have been vociferouscritics of China’s human rights record,highlighting systemic abuses in Tibetand Xinjiang, media restrictions and therising issue of Internet freedom.Both Germany and the US have complexpolitical and economic relationshipswith China, defined by dense tradebetween the two and convergence on IPRprotection, investment and procurementas well as concerns related to humanrights, the rule of law, civil societydevelopment, environmental conditionsand the role of the media.Given the overlap of interests, the twoshould consider launching a US-GermanDialogue to discuss and coordinateChina policy. Such a dialogue shouldcover six areas in which both sideshave signaled policy interest: trade,IP and investment; global economicgovernance; environment and climatechange; energy and natural resources;human rights; and media and Internetfreedom. Such a dialogue could be animportant element in establishing jointUS-German positions both on a bilateralbasis and in multilateral forums such asthe WTO and the G20.China7 5
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multilateral channels. Europeanshav
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JuneBritish presidency of UNSCJune
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US-EU Investment vs. Global Nationa
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economic conditions in the eurozone
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MEMO ONTHE EUROZONE CRISISThe State
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attitude toward moral hazard. Withw
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Greece: 2010 Bailout BreakdownGreec
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- Page 78 and 79: CITATIONSINTRODUCTION1See “Confid
- Page 80 and 81: 20Castle, S. (17 September, 2011).
- Page 82 and 83: ARAB UPRISING1Koch, C. (summer 2011
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- Page 86 and 87: 21Healey, J. (January 2012). Beyond
- Page 88 and 89: 20Berlemont, I. (25 July, 2012). Fr
- Page 90 and 91: 24Putin, V. (6 September, 2012). An
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