BF-FieldManual-FEB13 -3.pdf - Bertelsmann Foundation

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CASE STUDY: TURKEY’S ENERGY ROLE: A PATH TOWARDSEU MEMBERSHIP?One of the major deciding factors in whether Turkey joins the EU may very well be its role as an emerging energy hub betweenEast and West. While Turkey only produces about 1 billion billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually inside its borders,its strategic location between Europe, the Middle East, and the Caspian region means that it is within reach of nearly 70 percentof the world’s known oil and gas reserves. Such a favorable location leaves Turkey in a prime position to become a major player onworld energy markets.The Erdogan government has sought to leverage this favorable position and transform Turkey into a gas hub for Europe and theregion. Turkey serves as a central transit point for two major gas pipelines (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurumpipelines) with plans to serve as a key connection point for the long-planned Nabucco pipeline that would bring Caspian gas toCentral and Eastern European states. In June 2012, Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reached an agreement on theconstruction of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), a 1,250-mile-long pipeline with the potential to transport between 30 and60 bcm per year from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II gas fields through Turkey and on to Europe beginning in 2018.Turkey’s increasingly vital role in the energy market will have profound ramifications for the region. For Europe, the plans for TANAPrepresent a large step towards the long-sought after Southern Corridor pipeline that will help the EU lessen its dependence onRussian hydrocarbons. For Turkey, TANAP could provide the leverage needed to induce a change of approach by Brussels towardmembership. A Turkish state firmly within the EU and in prime position to ensure Europe’s energy security may be too enticing forBrussels to ignore.the US and Europe should encouragethe AKP to renew efforts at integratingKurdish citizens into Turkish society.Greater cultural rights, bilingualism ineducation and more autonomy in localgovernment are legitimate concerns thatshould be addressed. The governmentcan take advantage of upcoming effortsto reform the constitution by assuringthat Kurdish representatives, such asthe Peace and Democracy Party (BDP),have an active role in the process. TheUS and EU should also emphasize theimportant benefits of a political solutionof the Kurdish question. The release ofKurdish journalists and the relaxing ofrestrictions on freedom of expressionwould have a substantially positiveimpact on Turkey’s allies and the Kurdishcommunity. These actions would go along way towards undercutting supportfor the PKK’s violent tactics and wouldbe seen as a positive gesture that couldaid accession negotiations with the EU.2. Promote confidence-buildingmeasures between Turkey andthe Republic of Cyprus throughnatural-resource cooperation:At a minimum, the next US administrationshould signal its strong support for negotiations andoffer to consult on chapters where it has a distinctinterest in seeing Turkish reforms, particularly thejudiciary and fundamental rights chapter.Europe and the US should use theconclusion of Cyprus’s rotating sixmonthEU presidency in January 2013 tojump-start dialogue between Cyprus andTurkey and promote confidence-buildingmeasures that can address some ofthe longstanding issues affecting therelationship. One potential area ofcooperation, ironically, is an issuethat over the past year has furtheredanimosity between both sides: oiland gas exploration in the easternMediterranean. Since September 2011,the rights to significant gas reservesdiscovered in the Aphrodite gas field offthe southern coast of Cyprus have beendisputed. While Nicosia argues thatthe gas field falls within its ExclusiveEconomic Zone (EEZ), Turkey hasmaintained that Nicosia cannot claimits own EEZ without a comprehensivesettlement and without the involvementof the island’s Turkish Cypriots. 30The abundant resources off its coastcould bring considerable wealth toCyprus but also pose major challenges.Nicosia will find it difficult to provide gasto Europe cheaply and quickly withoutconstructing pipelines that run throughTurkish waters. 31 Recent Turkish saberrattling,meanwhile, will likely scare offdrilling companies. 32 Given the distinctdisadvantages both Ankara and Nicosiaface in developing these resources,cooperation is the most feasible option.The US and EU should thereforeencourage all sides to work togethertowards a comprehensive solution thatallows the Republic of Cyprus to buildpipelines through Turkish waters inexchange for sharing a percentage ofthe income earned from the gas with itsTurkish Cypriot neighbors. 33 The OSCEcould also play a role here, as it has inrecent years developed and implementedeconomic and resource-based confidencebuildingprograms in areas of ethnicconflict, such as Georgia-South Ossetia/6 0Turkey
in millions of USDin millions of USDUS-Turkey Bilateral Trade & Investment Relationship16,00014,00012,00010,0008,0006,0004,0002,00002001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011US exports to TurkeyTurkey exports to USUS FDI in TurkeyTurkey FDI in USEU-Turkey Bilateral Trade & Investment Relationship100,00090,00080,00070,00060,00050,00040,00030,00020,00010,0000Sources: US Census Bureau: Foreign Trade; BEA: Foreign Direct Investment*2008-09 FDI data from Eurostat, International Trade2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011EU exports to TurkeyTurkey exports to EUEU FDI in TurkeyTurkey FDI in EUSources: Eurostat, International Trade; Eurostat, Balance of Payments*2011 EU-Turkey FDI data not yet published as this went to printAbkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria. 34Such a cooperative arrangement could bea first step toward an eventual solution tothe standoff over Cyprus.A Turkish state that isstronger economically,politically anddemocratically wouldaid Ankara’s desire tobe a regional player andserve US interests in theregion more broadly.3. Look for alternativepaths to progress on theTurkish-EU relationship:Solving the Cyprus and Kurdish disputeswould substantially increase Turkey’schances of achieving EU membership. Butwith negotiations currently at an impasseand growing concerns over Turkey’sfuture, the US should encourage Europeto seek alternative paths to achieveprogress on the Turkish-EU relationship.Such a path could be found in the earlysuccesses of the Positive Agenda. Bothsides have already made strides inworking groups focusing on energy andvisa liberalization. 35 At a minimum, thenext US administration should signalits strong support for negotiations andoffer to consult on chapters where ithas a distinct interest in seeing Turkishreforms, particularly the judiciary andfundamental rights chapter. As the UShas previously expressed concern overrule-of-law issues in Turkey, it couldfacilitate judicial exchanges between bothcountries similar to retired US SupremeCourt justice Sandra Day O’Connor’svisit to Turkey in 2011. 36/37 It should alsoencourage the expansion of negotiationsbeyond the selected eight chapters toinclude areas such as foreign, securityand defense policy, where progress couldlead to parallel improvement in EU-NATOcooperation. Perhaps most importantly,the US should draw direct links betweendemocratic consolidation domesticallyand Turkey’s role in the region. A Turkishstate that is stronger economically,politically and democratically would aidTurkey6 1
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Field Manual to EuropeIntroduction
Page 6:
multilateral channels. Europeanshav
Page 9 and 10: JuneBritish presidency of UNSCJune
Page 12 and 13: US-EU Investment vs. Global Nationa
Page 14 and 15: economic conditions in the eurozone
Page 17 and 18: MEMO ONTHE EUROZONE CRISISThe State
Page 19 and 20: attitude toward moral hazard. Withw
Page 21 and 22: Greece: 2010 Bailout BreakdownGreec
Page 23 and 24: the deficit from 4.5 percent to thr
Page 27 and 28: NATO thus faces an uncertain future
Page 29 and 30: 1. Consider NATO’s defensespendin
Page 31 and 32: of-area operations and worldwidepar
Page 33 and 34: concurrent terrorist attack in Beng
Page 35: 2. Strengthen regionalpartnerships
Page 38 and 39: MEMO ONCOUNTERTERRORISM ANDHOMELAND
Page 40 and 41: home affairs (JHA), particularly in
Page 43 and 44: Status of EU Countries in the US Vi
Page 45 and 46: offensive capability centered at NA
Page 47 and 48: socialized, i.e. there is a tacit e
Page 49 and 50: such technology, such as deep packe
Page 51 and 52: MEMO ONENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGEThe S
Page 54 and 55: identifying the agents most qualifi
Page 56 and 57: MEMO ONTURKEYThe State of PlayTurke
Page 58 and 59: as a rising regional and internatio
Page 62 and 63: 22%12%Turkey’s Main Trading Partn
Page 64 and 65: MEMO ONRUSSIAThe State of PlayIn Pr
Page 66 and 67: EU-Russia security apparatus. Themo
Page 68 and 69: greater market access for US busine
Page 70 and 71: MEMO ONCHINAThe State of PlayIn 201
Page 72 and 73: But China’s competitive meridian
Page 74 and 75: in millions of USDUS-China Bilatera
Page 76 and 77: 7 6Acknowledgements
Page 78 and 79: CITATIONSINTRODUCTION1See “Confid
Page 80 and 81: 20Castle, S. (17 September, 2011).
Page 82 and 83: ARAB UPRISING1Koch, C. (summer 2011
Page 84 and 85: COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURIT
Page 86 and 87: 21Healey, J. (January 2012). Beyond
Page 88 and 89: 20Berlemont, I. (25 July, 2012). Fr
Page 90 and 91: 24Putin, V. (6 September, 2012). An
Page 92: Bertelsmann Foundation1101 New York
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