BF-FieldManual-FEB13 -3.pdf - Bertelsmann Foundation

But China’s competitive meridian withEurope is slowly moving northward.Whereas for most of the past decade,China’s direct competition was withthe light industry of the south (textilesin Italy and Greece), movement intoautomobiles, brand developmentin computers and machinery, andgreen technology posit China directlyagainst Germany. In some ways, this issimilar to the movement of US-Chinamanufacturing competition from lightindustry to heavy industry and services.This trend is expected to continue.European engagementin China has two keycharacteristics: it ispredominantly driven bybilateral relations withindividual member states,and it is overwhelminglyeconomic in nature.France, which was the driver of theSino-European relationship at itszenith, has somewhat lost its footingwith China in recent years, beginningwith the diplomatic battle in 2008 overPresident Nicolas Sarkozy’s willingnessto informally meet with the Dalai Lama,which led to the cancellation of theEU-China Summit. This continued withSarkozy’s high-profile and unsuccessfulattempt to galvanize Chinese financialsupport for EFSF bonds in fall 2011. SinceFrance’s most recent elections, relationswith China have largely remained static.François Hollande’s government has yetto articulate a strategic relationship,a fact that perplexes senior Europeanofficials, particularly from Germany.The US pivot to Asia rates high on theagenda of European policymakers. Thereis concern among some Europeansthat they will be neglected as the USshifts focus. The small and mediumsizedCentral and Eastern Europeancountries, whose exposure to potentialsecurity risks from Russia is moreimmediate, are more alarmed by therealigned emphasis on Asia and willrequire the greatest assurance fromWashington. Yet these governmentsrealize the budget constraints on the USmilitary and, unwilling to increase theirown defense budgets, recognize that toomuch pressure on Washington will beunseemly and unlikely to change policy. 6There are others that welcome greaterUS engagement in the Asia Pacific. It isin Europe’s, and particularly Germany’s,interest that the strategic pivot to Asiago ahead. As Europe’s largest tradepartner with Asia, Germany can free-rideon US military presence in the region tostabilize sea trade routes and other globalcommons. The British share this viewand expect to be the quiet beneficiariesof US force posture readjustment. Thatsaid, the UK, Germany and the EuropeanCommission are more ambivalentabout the potential consequences ofthe Asia pivot’s economic aspects. TheEuropeans are aware however that theUS expects them to play a bigger rolein their immediate neighborhood as aresult of the pivot.The EU retains a grander vision forits China relationship. 57 percent ofEuropean foreign policy elites arenot satisfied with the EU’s role in theAsia Pacific, and 96 percent believe itshould be doing more. 7 Accordingly it isbeginning to play catch-up to memberstates on China and the Asia Pacificregion more broadly. The publicationof the June 2012 Guidelines on the EU’sForeign and Security Policy in East Asiaand recent high-profile dialogues onsecurity and economic issues indicatesan expansion of thought on the topic. 8But there is no policy area today inwhich Europe and China see each otheras main strategic partners. Negotiationson a Partnership and CooperationAgreement (PCA), to codify a newstrategic relationship between the EUand China, have slowed to a standstillsince 2007. The European ExternalAction Service (EEAS) still sees Chinaas one of six global strategic partners,as was identified in the 2003 EuropeanSecurity Strategy (ESS). But it has notreleased an updated communicationon China in six years, a conspicuousindication that Brussels’ China policy,once seen as promising, remainssomewhat underdeveloped.Recommendations for 2013The US and Europe have numerousareas in which cooperation on Chinaand the Asia-Pacific more broadly areripe for development in 2013. Theseare primarily in, but not limited to, theeconomic sphere, based on the manyareas where economic and strategicthinking intersect. The US must maintaina modular approach to Europe in itsapproach to cooperation on China. Boththe EU and individual member states,at varying levels, have unique assetsand political considerations that canadvance US interests in the region.1. Aim for policy alignment atall levels on regional strategicgeopolitical issues:Europe will not represent a traditionalsecurity power in its own right in EastAsia. Limited expeditionary capabilitiesand bases, weak security alliancenetworks and anemic domestic politicalinterest are among the reasons thatEuropeans will have a lesser role inmajor security questions. As such,Europe remains a limited player insecurity on the Pacific Rim and has notshown aspirations to change this.However, the US and EU can worktogether for strategic clarity on jointinterests in the region. The joint US-EU ASEAN Regional Forum statementis a positive start. In it, both powerssupported multilateral moves to resolvelongstanding territorial disputes. Thiswas a turning point, representing awillingness to forge common positions.But it was countered in numeroussubsequent communiqués, includingthe Sino-German communiqué in Beijing(August 2012) and the EU-China SummitCommuniqué in Brussels (September2012), which, in territorial disputes werenot mentioned. 9 Still, the EU has openlyrecognized the importance of regionalsecurity architecture and the key US rolein it. 10 The EU has expressed interest inacceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amnityand Cooperation (TAC) and enhancedcooperation in the Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) process. Greater politicalrepresentation in the regional securityarchitecture, while modest, should be7 2China