BF-FieldManual-FEB13 -3.pdf - Bertelsmann Foundation

the crisis—this debt is primarily from thenorthern core rather than the south.European Perception of the US Pivot to AsiaThe size of the US, EU and Chineseeconomies and their systemicimportance to global security has ledsome prominent analysts, particularly inEurope, to call for a G3 caucus within theG20. They believe it could cut through thecacophony of the larger group to makeglobal governance more effective. Thestructural allure of the G3 constellationis undeniable—for the next 30 years thethree powers will jockey for the top spotsin the global economy.StrategicPivotGermanyUnited KingdomEuropean CommissionSupportivePolandEconomicPivotBut while the push for greater trilateralcollaboration is clear, most evidencesuggests that the strategic triangle hasnot yet reached maturity. China and theUS appear disinclined to establish a G2or G3 format that would elevate theirstatus above other members of the G20,potentially sharpening their differences.And the EU itself is not yet a coherentactor that could operate at such a level.An analysis of EU-statements on Chinaover the last decade demonstratesboth a conspicuously low number ofdefined common interests with theMiddle Kingdom and an overwhelmingpreponderance of economic issues, inparticular a “trade bias”. 2 One exampleis the successful settlement of the US-EU-Mexico dispute in the WTO againstChina’s export restrictions on rawmaterials. Many see this as a model forsimilar cooperation between the US,EU and Japan to settle the dispute overrare earths, a panel ruling on which isexpected in early 2013. 3The EU has sought to expand beyond thetrade-centric nature of its engagementwith China in recent years. TheNovember 2012 Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) in Laos confirmed this trend. InJuly 2012, the EU and US released a jointdocument calling for a shared strategicvision for the Asia-Pacific region andproviding insight into how the twopowers are looking to coordinate in Asia.The EU has supported the role of ASEANin regional territorial conflict resolutionand that could be built upon, particularlyat the member state level. 4PolandCzech RepublicEuropean PerspectivesEuropean engagement in China has twokey characteristics: it is predominantlydriven by bilateral relations withindividual member states, and it isoverwhelmingly economic in nature.The eurozone crisis and its aftermathhave exacerbated this trend. The EU’swinnowed soft power on the continentcould prompt a mad dash by variouscountries to build stronger bilateralrelations with China at the expenseof fellow European member states.These bilateral ties will be one of theprimary forces in the centrifugal driftof Europe as each state strives to setits own terms of engagement with theMiddle Kingdom.Germany’s economic growth isincreasingly tethered to that of China,even as the latter is a direct competitor toAmbivalentUnited KingdomGermanyEuropean Commissionother economies in Europe, particularlyin the south. With a $160.1 billionbilateral trade relationship, China is setto surpass France as Germany’s largesttrading partner by 2014. 5 Once willing toyield to the EU to shape Europe’s Chinapolicy, Germany has now demonstratedthat it is willing to pursue an overtlybilateral relationship. As the world’slargest trade surplus countries, withsimilar export-led growth models,high-skilled labor competitiveness, andtechnological leadership, Germany andChina have cooperated on questionsrelated to global economic imbalances,debt-targeting and, in the G20, mostnotably in debates over demand-drivengrowth in 2009 and current accountbalances around the 2010 Seoul Summit.Subsequently, think tank and ministerialdialogues on Berlin-Beijing cooperationhave mushroomed.China7 1