BF-FieldManual-FEB13 -3.pdf - Bertelsmann Foundation

Yet despite these close connections, therelationship between German ChancellorAngela Merkel and Erdogan is lukewarmat best. Erdogan has repeatedlycriticized Berlin for poor treatment of theTurkish minority and angered Germanofficials by calling for ethnic Turks to“integrate, but not assimilate” intoGerman society. 22 For her part, Merkelhas continued to resist calls for Turkishmembership in the EU, preferring a“privileged partnership” status forAnkara. The future of this position mayhinge on next year’s national elections,as Germany’s Social Democratic Party(SPD) has been far more bullish than theCDU on EU membership for Turkey.Ankara’s uneven relationship withEurope’s major players has naturallytranslated into equally complex tieswith the EU. Beyond its large traderelationship, EU-Turkey engagementscontinue to revolve largely around themembership process. As of 2012, onlyone of the 35 chapters of the acquiscommunautaire has been successfullynegotiated (science and technology).Only 12 other chapters have beenopened, and their closure and theopening of the remaining 21 chaptershave been blocked by Cyprus, France,Germany and the European Councilas a whole. Resolution of the Cyprusquestion remains a key precondition,but little movement has taken placesince the failed 2004 peace plan ledby Kofi Annan. Cyprus has vetoed sixchapters, while the Council has frozen anadditional eight because Turkey refusedto open its ports to Cypriot shippingas required by the EU-Turkey CustomsUnion agreement. 23Yet the lack of movement on EUmembership has also raised alarmsamong Turkey’s supporters that theEU is “losing Turkey”, especially as itsforeign policy becomes increasinglyindependent of Brussels and publicsupport for membership declines.During a bilateral visit to Berlin inOctober 2012, Erdogan went so far as tosay that the EU would lose his countrypermanently if Turkey wasn’t made amember by 2023, the 100th anniversaryof the Turkish state. 24 Eleven EU foreignministers signed an op-ed in late 2011calling for the EU to make a renewedpush toward membership for Turkey. 25The European Commission has alsosought to inject new momentum bypushing the “Positive Agenda”, a seriesof working groups that will seek to speedup Ankara’s compliance with the acquison 8 chapters. 26 While not replacingthe accession process, the PositiveAgenda is viewed as a complementarytool to increase Ankara’s ability toclose chapters should objections by EUmember states ever be lifted.Relations between NATO and Turkeyhave remained stable, if ambiguous. Thestalled EU membership negotiations andthe Cyprus question stand in the way ofa deeper NATO-EU strategic relationshipand fuller implementation of the BerlinPlus Agreement. Nonetheless, Turkey forthe most part has adopted a commonline with the EU’s NATO members onkey flashpoints, particularly missiledefense and the ongoing Syrian conflict.Ankara has sought alliance solidarityagainst potential attacks by Syrianforces, requesting the placement ofPatriot missile batteries on its territoryand considering invoking Article 5 iftensions with Damascus escalated anyfurther. European NATO states haveexpressed solidarity with Turkey, withGerman Defense Minister Thomas deMaiziere suggesting that the deploymentof Patriot missiles would be done “withGerman soldiers”. 27 However, Europeancapitals, particularly Berlin, still remainconcerned over a potential Turkish-Syria war that could engulf the alliance,and have quietly pressured Ankarato limit the size and scope of NATOmilitary requests. 28Recommendations for 2013As the situation in Syria continuesto unravel and as post-revolutionaryconditions in other states (particularlyEgypt) remain unclear, Turkey willremain an important actor in the regionand a key partner for the next U.S.administration. Yet maximizing thebenefits of this partnership will requirea foreign policy strategy that addressesthe complex and in many cases interconnectedissues that hamper closerYet the lack of movementon EU membership hasalso raised alarms amongTurkey’s supporters thatthe EU is “losing Turkey”,especially as its foreignpolicy becomes increasinglyindependent of Brusselsand public support formembership declines.partnership with the US and greateracculturation with its European allies.1. Encourage Turkey torenew efforts to solve the“Kurdish question”:The next US administration, andits European counterparts, shouldencourage the AKP government tocontinue down the path of inclusion andopenness towards its Kurdish minority.The Erdogan government initially brokefrom its predecessors by recognizing thatthe Kurdish question requires a politicalsolution rather than a military one, andinitiated a number of overtures towardsthe Kurdish community, including mostrecently the 2009 “Kurdish Opening”,which granted unofficial amnesty to asmall number of PKK militants. Despitethese small concessions, however,progress has mostly been fleeting. Publicopposition led little weight to be thrownbehind the Kurdish Opening, and theSyrian war has complicated the conflict,prompting Erdogan to largely abandonpolitical options in favor of a militarysolution once again. This approachalso raises concerns over Turkey’s hardwondemocratic consolidations. Thegovernment has grown increasinglyauthoritarian as it attempts to dealwith the problem, suppressing freedomof expression and jailing journalistscovering Kurdish issues deemedoffensive to the government. 29The US recognizes the PKK as aterrorist organization and shouldcontinue to provide military andintelligence assistance to Turkey asPKK attacks escalate. Nonetheless,Turkey5 9