CHAPTER 3THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF TRUST FUND SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENTsingle-donor funds entails administrative inefficiencies, as noted by aEuropean Commission evaluation <strong>of</strong> its use <strong>of</strong> trust funds: “Setting upsingle-donor <strong>World</strong> Bank trust funds specific to Commission funding,sometimes necessary for compliance with EC regulations, <strong>of</strong>tenresulted in delays and disappointing results.” 14When donorswantcollectiveoversight andaccountability,a trustfundedpartnership<strong>of</strong>fers asuitablestructure, butmanypartnershipshave beenfound to havegovernanceshortcomings.Box 3.9 Relevance and Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Global and Regional Partnership Programs (GRPPs)The Bank is involved in 70 GRPPs that are supported by Bank-managed, multidonor trustfunds. Unlike o<strong>the</strong>r trust-funded programs, GRPPs have a governing body with directresponsibility for strategic direction and oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> programs as laid out in aprogram charter or o<strong>the</strong>r constitutive document. GRPP donors and o<strong>the</strong>r stakeholdersusually collaborate in <strong>the</strong> initiation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program to reach consensus on <strong>the</strong> program’sobjectives, strategies, and activities. Partnerships generally aim to fur<strong>the</strong>r global orregional public goods, and <strong>the</strong>y cover <strong>the</strong> same range <strong>of</strong> activities as o<strong>the</strong>r trust-fundedprograms: financing investments, providing technical assistance, and generating globalknowledge (see table 1, appendix I).IEG’s reviews <strong>of</strong> 17 GRPPs (<strong>of</strong> which 9 were supported by trust funds) have found <strong>the</strong>seprograms’ objectives highly relevant to mobilizing resources and developing specializedexpertise to address specific development issues. Many programs, though, have haddesign weaknesses such as (a) a diffuse strategic focus and selectivity; (b) lack <strong>of</strong> a clearlyarticulated <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> change and results chain relating <strong>the</strong> program’s activities to <strong>the</strong>expected benefits; (c) inappropriate levels <strong>of</strong> (global, regional, or national) activity; and(d) inadequate governance structure.Most programs have achieved <strong>the</strong>ir expected outputs, whe<strong>the</strong>r country-level investments,technical assistance, or knowledge products. Some—such as <strong>the</strong> Cities Alliance, <strong>the</strong>Consultative Group to Assist <strong>the</strong> Poor, and <strong>the</strong> Extractive Industries TransparencyInitiative—have become recognized leaders in <strong>the</strong>ir fields. But few programs havegenerated systematic evidence about achievements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir objectives at <strong>the</strong> outcomelevel, owing to generally poor monitoring and evaluation.Source: IEG (forthcoming b).3.57 <strong>Trust</strong>-funded global and regional partnership programs. Some,but not all, multicountry/multidonor trust funds finance <strong>the</strong> activities<strong>of</strong> global or regional partnership programs. These partnershipprograms, as described in box 3.9, have governance structuresthrough which authority and accountability is shared by <strong>the</strong> Bank ando<strong>the</strong>r partners for <strong>the</strong> oversight and strategic direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> financialresources that <strong>the</strong> partners dedicate to <strong>the</strong> global, regional, orcountry-level activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> programs. So, when donors desire suchcollective oversight and accountability for a trust-funded program, apartnership program <strong>of</strong>fers a suitable structure. In its in-depthreviews <strong>of</strong> partnership programs, IEG has, however, found a range <strong>of</strong>shortcomings with respect to <strong>the</strong> legitimacy, accountability, efficiency,and transparency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> governance and management <strong>of</strong> GRPPs—shortcomings that need to be addressed for <strong>the</strong> benefits <strong>of</strong> sharedgovernance to outweigh <strong>the</strong> considerable administrative costs. 1546
CHAPTER 3THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF TRUST FUND SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENTBox 3.10 Recipients’ Balance Sheet on <strong>Trust</strong> <strong>Fund</strong>sRecipient <strong>of</strong>ficials say <strong>the</strong>y have derived benefits from <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> trust funds whentrust funds:• Provided coordinated grant financing• Supplied funds when <strong>the</strong>y can’t borrow from <strong>the</strong> MDBs or when bilateraldonors are reluctant to “go it alone”• Reduced transaction costs and piecemeal funding by pooling bilateral aid• Were accompanied by <strong>the</strong> <strong>World</strong> Bank’s convening power and technicalexpertise• Were a more flexible resource to tap for just-in-time assistance than Bankproject or program funding.Recipients also state that trust funds—especially global funds that operate inmultiple countries—have tended to create obstacles to <strong>the</strong>ir own program planningand implementation that <strong>the</strong>y do not typically encounter with aid provided through<strong>the</strong> Bank. They have found trust funds to be particularly obstructive when <strong>the</strong>y:• Require redundant plans and reports• Impose eligibility criteria—such as outcome targets or implementationmodalities—ill-suited to country conditions• Provide funds unpredictably—in some cases obliging recipients to front-loadimplementation or scale back plans• Do not coordinate fund activities well with related operations• Entail implementation arrangements determined by <strong>the</strong> trust fund, notcountry systems• Are not transparent.On balance, recipients consider trust funds as second best to direct budget or sectorprogram support and preferable to small and piecemeal project support. <strong>An</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ysee <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> trust funds as needing to be more consistent with aid effectivenesspractices <strong>of</strong> country ownership and country-led aid coordination.Source: Interviews with recipient <strong>of</strong>ficials conducted for this evaluation.Recipient Views <strong>of</strong> Their Experiences with <strong>Trust</strong> <strong>Fund</strong>s3.58 From <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> recipients, <strong>the</strong> shortfalls in <strong>the</strong> goodaid practice <strong>of</strong> trust funds limit <strong>the</strong> overall value added <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se fundsas vehicles for <strong>the</strong> delivery <strong>of</strong> aid. The benefits and costs as seen byrecipients are summarized in box 3.10.Summary3.59 While <strong>the</strong>re is no clear evidence that trust funds havemobilized additional resources at <strong>the</strong> global level, <strong>the</strong>y add value as adistinct aid vehicle by providing coordinated financing and grantresources for particular countries and targeted issues. The valueadded <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se gap-filling functions is especially evident in trust fund47