The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of AristotleBut of these matters let us speak at some other time. Nowthere is plainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced,on the plea that the theory I have attacked is not byits advocates applied to all good: but those goods only arespoken of as being under one [Greek: idea], which are pursued,and with which men rest content simply for their ownsakes: whereas those things which have a tendency to produceor preserve them in any way, or to hinder their contraries,are called good because of these other goods, and afteranother fashion. It is manifest then that the goods may be socalled in two senses, the one class for their own sakes, theother because of these.Very well then, let us separate the independent goods fromthe instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as underone [Greek: idea]. But the question next arises, whatkind of goods are we to call independent? All such as arepursued even when separated from other goods, as, for instance,being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and honours(for these, though we do pursue them with some further endin view, one would still place among the independent goods)?or does it come in fact to this, that we can call nothing independentgood except the [Greek: idea], and so the concreteof it will be nought?If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, thenwe shall require that the account of the goodness be the sameclearly in all, just as that of the whiteness is in snow andwhite lead. But how stands the fact? Why of honour andwisdom and pleasure the accounts are distinct and differentin so far as they are good. The Chief Good then is not somethingcommon, and after one [Greek: idea].But then, how does the name come to be common (for itis not seemingly a case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are differentindividual things called good by virtue of being fromone source, or all conducing to one end, or rather by way ofanalogy, for that intellect is to the soul as sight to the body,and so on? However, perhaps we ought to leave these questionsnow, for an accurate investigation of them is more properlythe business of a different philosophy. And likewise respectingthe [Greek: idea]: for even if there is some one goodpredicated in common of all things that are good, or separableand capable of existing independently, manifestly it cannotbe the object of human action or attainable by Man; but27