12.07.2015 Views

The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Ethics</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Aristotle</strong>Nor do they appear to be right who say it is lust or anger,or wish, or opinion <strong>of</strong> a certain kind; because, in the firstplace, Moral Choice is not shared by the irrational animalswhile Lust and Anger are. Next; the man who fails <strong>of</strong> selfcontrolacts from Lust but not from Moral Choice; the man<strong>of</strong> self-control, on the contrary, from Moral Choice, not fromLust. Again: whereas Lust is frequently opposed to MoralChoice, Lust is not to Lust.Lastly: the object-matter <strong>of</strong> Lust is the pleasant and the painful,but <strong>of</strong> Moral Choice neither the one nor the other. Stillless can it be Anger, because actions done from Anger arethought generally to be least <strong>of</strong> all consequent on Moral Choice.Nor is it Wish either, though appearing closely connectedwith it; because, in the first place, Moral Choice has not forits objects impossibilities, and if a man were to say he chosethem he would be thought to be a fool; but Wish may haveimpossible things for its objects, immortality for instance.Wish again may be exercised on things in the accomplishment<strong>of</strong> which one’s self could have nothing to do, as thesuccess <strong>of</strong> any particular actor or athlete; but no man choosesthings <strong>of</strong> this nature, only such as he believes he may himselfbe instrumental in procuring.Further: Wish has for its object the End rather, but MoralChoice the means to the End; for instance, we wish to behealthy but we choose the means which will make us so; orhappiness again we wish for, and commonly say so, but tosay we choose is not an appropriate term, because, in short,the province <strong>of</strong> Moral Choice seems to be those things whichare in our own power.Neither can it be Opinion; for Opinion is thought to beunlimited in its range <strong>of</strong> objects, and to be exercised as wellupon things eternal and impossible as on those which are inour own power: again, Opinion is logically divided into trueand false, not into good and bad as Moral Choice is.However, nobody perhaps maintains its identity with Opinionsimply; but it is not the same with opinion <strong>of</strong> any kind,because by choosing good and bad things we are constituted<strong>of</strong> a certain character, but by having opinions on them we arenot.Again, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opinewhat a thing is, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but wedo not opine to take or avoid.62

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!