The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of Aristotleunchastened-ness) we apply also to the faults of children,there being a certain resemblance between the cases: to whichthe name is primarily applied, and to which secondarily orderivatively, is not relevant to the present subject, but it isevident that the later in point of time must get the namefrom the earlier. And the metaphor seems to be a very goodone; for whatever grasps after base things, and is liable togreat increase, ought to be chastened; and to this descriptiondesire and the child answer most truly, in that children alsolive under the direction of desire and the grasping after whatis pleasant is most prominently seen in these.Unless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to thegoverning principle it will become very great: for in the foolthe grasping after what is pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating;and every acting out of the desire increases thekindred habit, and if the desires are great and violent in degreethey even expel Reason entirely; therefore they ought tobe moderate and few, and in no respect to be opposed toReason. Now when the appetite is in such a state we denominateit obedient and chastened.In short, as the child ought to live with constant regard tothe orders of its educator, so should the appetitive principlewith regard to those of Reason.So then in the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, the appetitiveprinciple must be accordant with Reason: for what isright is the mark at which both principles aim: that is to say,the man of perfected self-mastery desires what he ought inright manner and at right times, which is exactly what Reasondirects. Let this be taken for our account of PerfectedSelf-Mastery.82