The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of AristotleBOOK IIAgain, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we getthe faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards;an illustration of which is afforded by the case ofWELL: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual andMoral: now the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen orsubsequently, from teaching (for the most part that is), and heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we hadneeds therefore experience and time; whereas the Moral comes them and so exercised them, but did not have them becausewe had exercised them. But the Virtues we get byfrom custom, and so the Greek term denoting it is but aslight deflection from the term denoting custom in that language.case of other things, as the arts for instance; for what wefirst performing single acts of working, which, again, is theFrom this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues have to make when we have learned how, these we learncomes to be in us merely by nature: because of such things as how to make by making: men come to be builders, for instance,by building; harp-players, by playing on the harp:exist by nature, none can be changed by custom: a stone, forinstance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; bycustom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfectedaccustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could in self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave.file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything And to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takeswhose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in place in communities: because the law-givers make the individualmembers good men by habituation, and this is theanother. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature,nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature intention certainly of every law-giver, and all who do notwith a capacity for receiving themu and are perfected in them effect it well fail of their intent; and herein consists the differencebetween a good Constitution and a through custom.bad.42