The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of Aristotledoing evil actions, the latter by spending their time in drinkingand such-like; because the particular acts of working formcorresponding characters, as is shown by those who are practisingfor any contest or particular course of action, for suchmen persevere in the acts of working.As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits areproduced from separate acts of working, we reply, such ignoranceis a mark of excessive stupidity.Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the manwho acts unjustly or dissolutely does not wish to attain thehabits of these vices: for if a man wittingly does those thingswhereby he must become unjust he is to all intents and purposesunjust voluntarily; but he cannot with a wish cease tobe unjust and become just. For, to take the analogous case,the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a supposablecase he is voluntarily ill because he has produced hissickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians.There was a time then when he might have helpedbeing ill, but now he has let himself go he cannot any longer;just as he who has let a stone out of his hand cannot recall it,and yet it rested with him to aim and throw it, because theorigination was in his power. Just so the unjust man, and hewho has lost all self-control, might originally have helpedbeing what they are, and so they are voluntarily what theyare; but now that they are become so they no longer have thepower of being otherwise.And not only are mental diseases voluntary, but the bodilyare so in some men, whom we accordingly blame: for suchas are naturally deformed no one blames, only such as are soby reason of want of exercise, and neglect: and so too ofweakness and maiming: no one would think of upbraiding,but would rather compassionate, a man who is blind by nature,or from disease, or from an accident; but every onewould blame him who was so from excess of wine, or anyother kind of intemperance. It seems, then, that in respect ofbodily diseases, those which depend on ourselves are censured,those which do not are not censured; and if so, thenin the case of the mental disorders, those which are censuredmust depend upon ourselves.[Sidenote: III4b] But suppose a man to say, “that (by ourown admission) all men aim at that which conveys to theirminds an impression of good, and that men have no control68