The Ethics of Aristotle - Penn State Hazleton

The Ethics of Aristotlediscreditable), and vice versâ.But if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what iscreditable or the contrary, and these respectively constitutethe being good or bad, then the being good or vicious charactersis in our power.As for the well-known saying, “No man voluntarily iswicked or involuntarily happy,” it is partly true, partly false;for no man is happy against his will, of course, but wickednessis voluntary. Or must we dispute the statements latelymade, and not say that Man is the originator or generator ofhis actions as much as of his children?But if this is matter of plain manifest fact, and we cannotrefer our actions to any other originations beside those inour own power, those things must be in our own power, andso voluntary, the originations of which are in ourselves.Moreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positionsboth privately by individuals, and by law-givers too, in thatthey chastise and punish those who do wrong (unless theydo so on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance which is notself-caused), while they honour those who act rightly, underthe notion of being likely to encourage the latter and restrainthe former. But such things as are not in our own power,i.e. not voluntary, no one thinks of encouraging us to do,knowing it to be of no avail for one to have been persuadednot to be hot (for instance), or feel pain, or be hungry, andso forth, because we shall have those sensations all the same.And what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastisefor the very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to beself-caused; to the drunken, for instance, penalties are double,because the origination in such case lies in a man’s own self:for he might have helped getting drunk, and this is the causeof his ignorance.[Sidenote: III4a] Again, those also who are ignorant oflegal regulations which they are bound to know, and whichare not hard to know, they chastise; and similarly in all othercases where neglect is thought to be the cause of the ignorance,under the notion that it was in their power to preventtheir ignorance, because they might have paid attention.But perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannotattend to such things: still men are themselves the causes ofhaving become such characters by living carelessly, and alsoof being unjust or destitute of self-control, the former by67