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96 JOURNAL OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB INTELLIGENCE, VOL. 2, NO. 2, MAY 2010Investigation of Blackhole Attack on AODV inMANETAnu BalaUniversity Institute of Engg. & Tech Deptt, Panjab University, Chandigarh,IndiaEmail: anubala22@gmail.comRaj Kumari and Jagpreet SinghUniversity Institute of Engg. & Tech Deptt, Panjab University, Chandigarh,IndiaGuru Teg Bahadur Khalsa Institute of Engineering and Technology, Malout, IndiaEmail:rajkumari_bhatia5@yahoo.com and drjagz@gmail.comAbstract—Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) consists of acollection of wireless mobile hosts without the requiredintervention of any existing infrastructure or centralizedaccess point such as base station. The dynamic topology ofMANET allows nodes to join and leave the network at anypoint of time. Wireless MANET is particularly vulnerabledue to its fundamental characteristics such as open medium,dynamic topology, distributed cooperation and constrainedcapability. In this paper we simulate the blackhole attackwhich is one of the possible attacks on AODV routingprotocol in mobile ad hoc networks by the help of networksimulator (NS-2). The simulation results show the packetloss, throughput, and end-to-end delay with blackhole andwithout blackhole on AODV in MANET. We analyzed thatthe packet loss increases in the network with a blackholenode. We also observed that the throughput and end-to-enddelay decreases in the network with a blackhole node.Index Terms—introduction, AODV routing protocol,blackhole attack in AODV, simulation environment andresults, conclusion, acknowledgement, referencesI. INTRODUCTIONWireless networks use some sort of radio frequenciesin air to transmit and receive data instead of using somephysical cables. Wireless networks are formed by routersand hosts. Ad-hoc networks are wireless networks wherenodes communicate with each other using multi-hoplinks. Networks that support mobile wireless ad hocarchitecture are typically called mobile ad hoc networks(MANET). A mobile ad hoc network is formed bymobile hosts. There is no stationary infrastructure or basestation for communication. So the functioning of Ad-hocnetworks is dependent on the trust and co-operationbetween nodes. Ref. [1] Nodes help each other inconveying information about the topology of the networkand share the responsibility of managing the network.Ref. [2] Each mobile node acts as a host whenrequesting/providing information from/to other nodes inthe network, and acts as router when discovering andmaintaining routes for other nodes in the network.Ref. [3] Based on the routing information updatemechanism, routing protocols in ad hoc wirelessnetworks can be classified into three broad categories:Proactive (or table-driven) protocols, Reactive (or ondemand)protocols, and Hybrid routing protocols. Theseare further divided into sub categories. Ref. [3] These arevulnerable to routing attacks. Routing attacks in ad hocwireless networks can also be classified into five broadcategories: Attacks using Impersonation, Modification,Fabrication, Replay, and Denial of Service (DoS). In thispaper, we focus on blackhole attack that belongs tocategory of fabrication attacks.Ref. [4] There are three main routing protocolsproposed for MANET: Ad hoc On-demand DistanceVector (AODV) routing, Dynamic Source Routing(DSDV), and Destination Sequence Distance Vectorrouting protocols. AODV and DSR belong to on-demandrouting protocols and DSDV is a table-driven routingprotocol. These protocols are vulnerable to differentsecurity attacks. In this paper, we use AODV routingprotocol because the AODV protocol is vulnerable to theblackhole attack. So we have simulated the behavior ofblackhole attack on AODV in MANET.II.AODV ROUTING PROTOCOLRef. [5] Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector(AODV) is a reactive routing protocol in which thenetwork generates routes at the start of communication.Ref. [7] The Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector(AODV) routing protocol described in builds on theDSDV algorithm. AODV is an improvement on DSDVbecause it typically minimizes the number of requiredbroadcasts by creating routes on a demand basis, asopposed to maintaining a complete list of routes as in theDSDV algorithm. Ref. [7] The authors of AODV classifyit as a pure on-demand route acquisition system, sincenodes that are not on a selected path do not maintainrouting information or participate in routing tableexchanges.AODV builds routes using a route request / route replyquery cycle. When a source node desires a route to adestination for which it does not already have a route, itbroadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet across thenetwork. Nodes receiving this packet update theirinformation for the source node and set up backwardspointers to the source node in the route tables. In additionto the source node's IP address, current sequence number,and broadcast ID, the RREQ also contains the mostrecent sequence number for the destination of which the© 2010 ACADEMY PUBLISHERdoi:10.4304/jetwi.2.2.96-100
JOURNAL OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB INTELLIGENCE, VOL. 2, NO. 2, MAY 2010 97source node is aware. A node receiving the RREQ maysend a route reply (RREP) if it is either the destination orif it has a route to the destination with correspondingsequence number greater than or equal to that containedin the RREQ. If this is the case, it unicasts a RREP backto the source. Otherwise, it rebroadcasts the RREQ.Nodes keep track of the RREQ's source IP address andbroadcast ID. If they receive a RREQ which they havealready processed, they discard the RREQ and do notforward it. As the RREP propagates back to the source,nodes set up forward pointers to the destination. Once thesource node receives the RREP, it may begin to forwarddata packets to the destination. If the source later receivesa RREP containing a greater sequence number orcontains the same sequence number with a smaller hopcount, it may update its routing information for thatdestination and begin using the better route. As long asthe route remains active, it will continue to bemaintained. If a link break occurs while the route isactive, the node upstream of the break propagates a routeerror (RERR) message to the source node to inform it ofthe now unreachable destination(s). After receiving theRERR, if the source node still desires the route, it canreinitiate route discovery.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Insection II, we discuss the AODV routing protocol indetail. Section III describes the characteristics of theblackhole attack on AODV. Section IV provides thesimulation environment and results. Finally we concludein section V.III.BLACKHOLE ATTACK in AODVRef. [5] In a blackhole attack, a malicious node canimpersonates a destination node by sending a spoofedroute packet to a source node that initiates a routediscovery. Ref. [2] A blackhole has two properties:1. The node exploits the ad hoc routing protocol,such as AODV, to advertise itself as having a valid routeto a destination, even though the route is spurious, withthe intention of intercepting packets.2. The node consumes the intercepted packets.In an ad hoc network that uses the AODV protocol, ablackhole node absorbs the network traffic and drops allpackets. To explain the blackhole attack we add amalicious node that exhibits blackhole behavior in theFig. 1.node N8 in Fig. 1, and initiates the route discoveryprocess. We assumed node N4 is a malicious node withno fresh enough route to destination node N8. However,node N4 claims that it has the route to the destinationwhenever it receives RREQ packets, and sends theresponse to source node N1. The destination node andany other normal intermediate nodes that have the freshroute to the destination may also give a reply. If the replyfrom a normal node reaches the source node of theRREQ. First, everything works well; but the reply frommalicious node N4 could reach the source node first, ifthe malicious node is nearer to the source node.Moreover, a malicious node does not need to check itsrouting table when sending a false message; its responseis more likely to reach the source node first. This makesthe source node think that the route discovery process iscomplete, ignore all other reply messages, and begin tosend data packets. As a result, all the packets through themalicious node are simply consumed or lost. Themalicious node could be said to form a black hole in thenetwork. In this way the malicious node can easilymisroute a lot of network traffic to itself, and could causean attack to the network with very little efforts on its part.IV.SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT and RESULTIn this section we present a set of simulationexperiments to evaluate the effect of blackhole attack onAODV protocol in MANET. First I have explainedblackhole attack in detail via simulation in NS-2.We havegenerated a small size network with7 nodes in a flat gridof 670m x 670m including blackhole node. We havegenerated a connection between nodes 1 and node 2. Wehave also introduced some movements in our scenario.Duration of the scenario is 60 seconds. Node 1 is thesource node, node 2 is the destination node and node 6 isthe blackhole node. Fig. 2 shows the data flow from node1 to node 2 via intermediate nodes 3 and 4. For someseconds, the link breaks and all data that is send fromnode 1 get lost as shown in Fig.3. Now Fig. 4 shows thatnode 1 again sends the RREQ to all nodes to find route.Nodes further rebroadcast the request if they are not thedestination nodes. Node 6,that is blackhole node, claimsthat it has the route to destination whenever it receivesRREQ packets and sends the response to source node 1.All other nodes that have the fresh route also send areply. But the reply from node 6 reaches the source nodefirst. Node 1 accepts it and ignores all other replymessages and begins to send data packets to node vianode 3, 4, 5 and Node 6 being a blackhole node absorbsall the packets and traffic as shown in Fig. 5.Secondly, to calculate network performance, wesimulate blackhole node behavior in AODV in largenumber of nodes and connections with the help ofNetwork Simulator 2 Ref. [6]. We set the parameters forour simulation as shown in Table 1.Figure 1: Blackhole attack in AODVIn Fig. 1, we assume that node N4 is the maliciousnode. Suppose node N1 wants to send data packets to© 2010 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
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