with the highest (net) economic value. Since the services rendered by most biological resources haveno markets, demonstration alone may show that the uncaptured market value <strong>of</strong> conservation is higherthan the value <strong>of</strong> the land use that involves loss <strong>of</strong> biological resources. A relevant context for‘demonstration only’ would, for example, be a land use planning regulation that automaticallyallocated land to its highest economic value. Even then, the example is fairy fanciful because land useplanning does not work this way. Few, if any attempts are made to value conservation services ineconomic terms in planning applications.Hence the second capture phase is needed. In this stage mechanisms are devised wherebysome or all <strong>of</strong> the demonstrated economic value can be turned into real resource flows which benefitthe agents who would otherwise adopt a land use that threatens biodiversity. Any number <strong>of</strong> suchcapture mechanisms exist, ranging from entry pricing, to donations, to debt-for-nature swaps, carbon<strong>of</strong>fsets, and so on [<strong>OECD</strong> (1996)].Many people think that we either should not place monetary values on biological resourcesand diversity, or that that we need not do so. Arguments against valuation are addressed in Pearce(1999) and are not discussed further here. More recently, Heal (1999) has suggested that:“<strong>Valuation</strong> is neither necessary nor sufficient for conservation. We conserve much that we donot value, and do not conserve much that we value,” and“Incentives are critical for conservation: valuation is not necessary for establishing the correctincentives.”The second statement is technically correct. Incentives are critical and we could introduceincentives without going through the valuation stage <strong>of</strong> the demonstration-capture paradigm. Thestatement echoes the Baumol-Oates least-cost theorem for pollution charges, where we do not need toknow the value <strong>of</strong> pollution to adopt cost-minimising incentives [Baumol and Oates (1988)].Unfortunately, the pressures to reduce biodiversity are so large that the chances that we will introduceincentives without demonstrating the economic value <strong>of</strong> biodiversity are much less than if we doengage in valuation. One reason for this is that valuation does not just tell us the economic value <strong>of</strong> aresource, it also tells us something about the demand curve for biological resources, i.e. how peoplewill respond to prices charged for the use <strong>of</strong> those resources. This principle is no different forbiodiversity than it is for, say, water, another resource where, until recently, scarcity value was notrecognised.Heal’s first statement also requires qualification. The factors giving rise to biodiversity lossare dominated by land use change. Thus whether biodiversity gets conserved or not depends verymuch on the competing values for land (or water, or coastal resources etc). Swanson (1994) has arguedconvincingly that it is the opportunity cost <strong>of</strong> conservation that drives the decisions relating tobiodiversity. Homo sapiens continues to compete for land with the panda, the elephant, naturalwetlands, and so on. In principle, we can <strong>of</strong> course simply say that the value <strong>of</strong> land in conservationexceeds the opportunity cost <strong>of</strong> conservation, and that is how protected area status has largely comeabout. No one sought to ascribe economic values to the conserved land in order to do this. But it isprecisely because <strong>of</strong> this process <strong>of</strong> declaring value by diktat that protected areas are under threat. Putanother way, simply declaring an area is protected does not guarantee it will be protected. Few‘protected areas’ in the developing world are protected in any true sense <strong>of</strong> the word, and the story isalso not a good one in many rich countries, as the fate <strong>of</strong> Britain’s Special Sites <strong>of</strong> Scientific Interesttestifies. The issue is whether by demonstrating the economic value <strong>of</strong> conservation, we can do anybetter than the diktat approach. I suggest that, while valuation also can <strong>of</strong>fer no guarantee <strong>of</strong>protection, it is preferable to not valuing the resource, and that the combination <strong>of</strong> valuation andincentives (capture) is better than no-valuation and no incentives.29
Additionally, valuation does not just tell us that something is valuable. We learn so muchmore from the process <strong>of</strong> valuation, especially if we adopt stated preference techniques. We learnwhat people care about, what their motives are for conservation, what their reactions would be todifferent management objectives. It is worth noting that in most stated preference techniques, thequestion about willingness to pay is only a tiny part <strong>of</strong> the full questionnaire. But even if we did notlearn these things, the valuation itself would still be immensely important. Suppose people express alow conservation value for an area, but we go ahead and protect it nonetheless. This is a recipe fordestruction because we know from the valuation exercise that people do not value the area highly.They will put the pressure on to convert it to some other use, and that is exactly what is happening inmany, many so-called protected areas. So, why are we successful in protecting some areas, in a more,or less, complete fashion? One clue lies in the opportunity cost <strong>of</strong> those areas – they are <strong>of</strong>ten remoteor have limited alternative use value. Simply put, the opportunity cost <strong>of</strong> conservation for successfully‘protected’ areas is <strong>of</strong>ten very low, and may even be zero.Where Heal (1999) is absolutely right is in reminding us that economic valuation is all aboutmarginal or discrete change in the availability <strong>of</strong> environmental resources. It is categorically not aboutvaluing the existence <strong>of</strong> all biological resources. The economic value <strong>of</strong> an ecosystem can, inprinciple, be measured by the present value <strong>of</strong> the future flow <strong>of</strong> services from the ecosystem, andnoting that all ecological services are economic services as well. But one cannot go from there toestimate the value <strong>of</strong> the Earth’s total stock <strong>of</strong> biological resources using economic values. Just such amonumental mistake is made in the much publicised paper by Costanza et al. (1997). For a detailedcritique see Pearce (1998).The main reasons for advocating economic valuation <strong>of</strong> biodiversity and biological resourcesare so that we can facilitate cost-benefit analysis, green accounting, and proper pricing <strong>of</strong> biologicalresources.Cost-benefit analysisIn cost-benefit analysis (CBA), costs and benefits are measured, as far as possible, inmonetary terms. CBA can be applied to investment projects and to policies. An investment projectmight be something like a conservation programme. Since CBA has traditionally be defined in terms<strong>of</strong> what the gains and losses are to society, project-oriented CBA tends to be confined to public sectorprojects. The idea <strong>of</strong> using CBA to evaluate policy is more recent. In principle, the techniques andconsiderations are exactly the same. Policies have costs and benefits. The basic rule is not to sanctionanything where the costs exceed the benefits. If benefits exceed costs then the project or policy ispotentially worthwhile, but may still not be the best choice. This is because there may be somealternative where the ratio <strong>of</strong> benefits to costs is even higher. To say benefits exceed costs is thereforeto adopt only a ‘screening rule’. Typically, we aim to choose the option that maximises the differencebetween benefits and costs. Values for biological resources are increasingly being incorporated incost-benefit evaluations <strong>of</strong> projects and policies, but values for diversity tend not to be.Green accountingMonetised costs and benefits can be used in a more expanded measure <strong>of</strong> gross nationalproduct (GNP). The basic aim is to take GNP and observe that it is made up <strong>of</strong> output, which is trulyadditional, and output which is needed to cover the depreciation <strong>of</strong> the capital base <strong>of</strong> the economy.This is usually summarised by saying that GNP = NNP + depreciation on man-made assets, whereNNP is ‘net national product’. It is intuitively obvious that it is NNP, not GNP, which comes closest tomeasuring the goods and services that are potentially available for individuals to consume. Deducting30
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- Page 43 and 44: practice, the overlap between these
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- Page 55 and 56: ReferencesBann, C., and M. Clemens
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- Page 67 and 68: error in valuing respiratory sympto
- Page 69 and 70: ReferencesArrow, K.J., R. Solow, E.
- Page 71 and 72: OECD (1995). The Economic Appraisal
- Page 73 and 74: CHAPTER 5:by José Manuel LIMA E SA
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A discrete choice approach to quest
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Table 5.2 Model-based point estimat
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is potentially very large for multi
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P3 is already in the mix is 2.51, s
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PART 391
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measures of value. An appendix to t
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features (such as parks, beaches or
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included in cost-benefit analysis o
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A Discussion of Past Efforts to Dev
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Satellite AccountsIn addition to th
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which many people argue are associa
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approach to competing uses of water
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Figure 6.2 Trade-Off AnalysisEnviro
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However, the farmers need not bear
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Appendix 1: Theory and Application
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iwhere C is the income adjustment n
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complete. If there are more than on
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Horowitz, Joel. L. and Jordan. J. L
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CHAPTER 7:by Dennis M. KING and Lis
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Box 7.1 Definition of terms related
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Box 7.2 Categories of Ecosystem Ser
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Box 7.4 Dollar-based ecosystem valu
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Non-monetary indicators of ecosyste
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Figure 7.1 Effects of Wetland Locat
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description, and that the usefulnes
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2) Service capacity sub-indexIndica
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wetlands, for example, results in F
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(1) Functional CapacityIndexFigure
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constituents of runoff can be predi
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Service(on or off site)Recreational
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Table 7.3 Service Risk Sub-index De
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Measuring Service Preference Weight
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Table 7.4 Illustration of Paired Co
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PART 4151
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Ecological foundations for biodiver
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Phenotic diversity is a measure bas
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Operationalisation of the biotic-ri
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ten attributes that could score a m
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The choice of the scale relates to
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Nature measurement methodIn 1995, t
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Table 8.4 Value orientations and en
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Table 8.5 Identification of monetar
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Table 8.6 Valuation studiesSingle s
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in waterway systems for nine impact
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to other contexts, conditions, loca
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ReferencesAkcakaya, H.R. (1994).
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de Groot, R.S. (1994). “Environme
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Mace, G. M. & S. N. Stuart. (1994).
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Turner, R.K., Perrings, C. and Folk
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John A. DixonJohn A. Dixon is Lead
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Robert O’NeillDr. O’Neill recei
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Steven StewartSteven Stewart is Ass
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