Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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1964 <strong>the</strong> Soviet ambassador to Bonn, Andrei Smirnov, began talks withChancellor Ludwig Erhard. Polish policymakers were not informed about <strong>the</strong>details of <strong>the</strong>se visits. Piotr Kostikov, who in <strong>the</strong> late 1960s became <strong>the</strong> head of<strong>the</strong> Polish Section in <strong>the</strong> CPSU CC Department for Relations with SocialistCountries, wrote that Gomułka instinctively felt <strong>the</strong> danger that Khrushchev,influenced by <strong>the</strong> pro-German lobby within <strong>the</strong> Soviet leadership, had tried toimplement a “dishonest” plan. 6 The evidence so far does not prove that <strong>the</strong>re everwas such a scheme, but certainly for some members of <strong>the</strong> Polish Politburo it wasclear that great powers interest varied differed from <strong>the</strong>ir own.In October 1963 Gomułka began to be disappointed with proposed Sovietconditions for a non-proliferation treaty. He was particularly troubled by <strong>the</strong> factthat it did not include a ban on <strong>the</strong> creation of multilateral nuclear forces withinNATO, which could potentially allow <strong>the</strong> FRG to possess nuclear arms. Afterconsultations with <strong>the</strong> Politburo, Gomułka wrote a letter to Khrushchev in whichhe informed <strong>the</strong> Soviets that Pol<strong>and</strong> would not agree to <strong>the</strong>ir proposal. 7 Fur<strong>the</strong>rdiscussions on a non-proliferation treaty revealed numerous differences in attitudewithin <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact. 8 Pol<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n presented its new plan, <strong>the</strong> so-called“Gomułka Plan” for a nuclear freeze.The “Rapallo policy,” which Warsaw viewed as an attempt by Moscow <strong>and</strong>Bonn to cooperate more closely, caused anxiety but also motivated <strong>the</strong> Polishregime to launch a more active policy towards <strong>the</strong> FRG <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Westerncountries. It is worth mentioning that Pol<strong>and</strong> never wanted <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact’sGerman policy to be dictated exclusively by Moscow, or belong to EastGermany’s special privileges, <strong>and</strong> actively demonstrated this point.6 P. Kostikow, B. Roliński, Widziane z Kremla. Moskwa – Warszawa. Gra o Polskę, BGW, Warszawa1992, p.17. W. Jarząbek, “Ulbricht Doktrin” oder “Gomułka Doktrine” ?..., p. 87 f.7 Letter of W. Gomułka to N. Khrushchev, 8 October 1963, in: Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego . PRL– ZSRR 1956 – 1970, ed. A. Paczkowski, Aneks, Londyn 1998, p.170.8 D. Selvage, The Warsaw Pact <strong>and</strong> nuclear nonproliferation, 1963 – 1965, The Cold War InternationalHistory Project Working Paper, 32/ 2001.5
Against <strong>the</strong> background of Polish diplomatic action in <strong>the</strong> years 1956–1964,Adam Rapacki’s statement at <strong>the</strong> General Assembly of <strong>the</strong> United Nations inDecember 1964 could be seen as a logical continuation. He stated that “<strong>the</strong>re isprobably a right time to consider <strong>the</strong> questions of European security in all <strong>the</strong>iraspects. The possibility of convening a conference of all European states should beconsidered, of course with <strong>the</strong> participation of <strong>the</strong> USSR <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States toexamine <strong>the</strong>se questions.” 9 Soviet historians have argued that Rapacki’sannouncement was coordinated with o<strong>the</strong>r member-states of <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact. 10However, Polish archival sources do not provide any evidence for this <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>and</strong>some eye-witnesses reject it as well. 11 In <strong>the</strong> 1950s, <strong>the</strong> Soviets presented <strong>the</strong> ideaof a conference on security, <strong>and</strong> many Western historians have treated this as <strong>the</strong>birth of a conference idea. While <strong>the</strong>re are some connections to <strong>the</strong> ideas of 1954–1955, Rapacki’s statement was more directly relevant to contemporaneousperceptions of Polish national security. At <strong>the</strong> 20 th Session of <strong>the</strong> UN GeneralAssembly in 1965, <strong>the</strong> Poles revisited <strong>the</strong> idea of a conference. The proposedagenda was supplemented with <strong>the</strong> issue of economic cooperation, in which <strong>the</strong>Polish government was continuously interested. Polish diplomats began to seeksupport for <strong>the</strong> project in Western countries, especially Belgium <strong>and</strong> France.1.2. Ostpolitik <strong>and</strong> Plans for a European <strong>Conference</strong>In March 1966 <strong>the</strong> FRG proposed that Soviet bloc countries (EastGermany excluded) conclude treaties renouncing <strong>the</strong> use of force. This so-called“peace note” was <strong>the</strong> beginning of a new West German Ostpolitik. For Pol<strong>and</strong>, thisproposition was not satisfactory, as it only called for bilateral treaties renouncing<strong>the</strong> use of force <strong>and</strong> did not include recognition of <strong>the</strong> Oder-Neisse border.Warsaw also expected that Bonn’s political influence would grow <strong>and</strong> that this9 Quoted in: A. D. Rotfeld, From Helsinki...p. 16.10 Ibid.6
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