Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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maximum program, which could be gradually realized during <strong>the</strong> first conference<strong>and</strong> subsequent meetings. Semenov reiterated his previously stated opinion butsaid that a foreign ministers meeting would be organized soon.In evaluating <strong>the</strong> discussion, Wolniak argued that “<strong>the</strong> purpose of <strong>the</strong>conference (as proposed by <strong>the</strong> Soviets) could be reduced to bettering <strong>the</strong> politicalclimate in Europe,” which would be highly inconvenient for Pol<strong>and</strong>, due to itsforeign policy objectives <strong>and</strong> commitment to propagating <strong>the</strong> idea of a muchbroader conference. He <strong>and</strong> Jędrychowski suggested to <strong>the</strong> Politburo that it wouldbe worthwhile to inform Western countries unilaterally of <strong>the</strong> Polish proposal for atreaty on European security <strong>and</strong> cooperation. 33In <strong>the</strong> ensuing weeks, <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff began to preparematerials for negotiations with Moscow, collected <strong>the</strong> announcements of o<strong>the</strong>rbloc countries to compare <strong>and</strong> present <strong>the</strong>m as evidence that <strong>the</strong> Soviet positionwas in fact a step backward <strong>and</strong> that Moscow’s policy, as <strong>the</strong> Soviet proposal for adeclaration on <strong>the</strong> renunciation of force presented to West Germany implied <strong>the</strong>recognition of existing borders. Polish officials underscored that West Germanyhad presented its project of declaration on 3 July 1969 <strong>and</strong> suggested including aformulation that signatory states declare not to use force against <strong>the</strong> “politicalindependence or territorial integrity” of o<strong>the</strong>r countries—which was understood inWarsaw as a willingness to seek compromise. 34 For <strong>the</strong> Polish side it was difficultto imagine that <strong>the</strong> issue of border recognition could <strong>and</strong> should be set aside,especially as Polish diplomats had a different impression of <strong>the</strong> Western attitudetoward this question. For example, in bilateral talks with Irel<strong>and</strong> (this example wasalso mentioned by Semenov, but to prove <strong>the</strong> Soviet attitude), <strong>the</strong> Irish did notdisplay reservations on border recognition; similarly, France did not want torecognize <strong>the</strong> East–West German borderline as an international one, but did nothave any reservations about <strong>the</strong> formula for <strong>the</strong> non-violation of existing borders.note on conversation with Semenov, AAN , KC PZPR XIA/87, p.535f.33 Note on conversation with W. Semenov, by Z. Wolniak, op. cit.19
Between 1-3 October, a Polish Politburo delegation led by Gomułka paid avisit to Moscow. Some formulations used by <strong>the</strong> Soviet leaders in <strong>the</strong> Moscowdiscussions sounded reassuring. During talks on international problems, Brezhnevdeclared: “In Europe, <strong>the</strong> question of finishing <strong>and</strong> resolving <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong>Second World War is placed at <strong>the</strong> center of our interest. It will take a great dealof effort to reach a border recognition – we fight for it toge<strong>the</strong>r with you.” 35 But at<strong>the</strong> working level it was difficult to speak about this same attitude, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Polishdelegation correctly suspected that <strong>the</strong> Soviets still wanted to exclude <strong>the</strong> questionof borders from <strong>the</strong> conference agenda to be proposed by <strong>the</strong> bloc.Disappointed with <strong>the</strong> Soviet position, Warsaw decided to present its ideasin written form. The Polish “Memor<strong>and</strong>um” passed to <strong>the</strong> Soviets stressed interestin consultations with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r bloc countries <strong>and</strong> supported Czechoslovakia’ssuggestion of meeting in Prague to work out a common position. Recalling <strong>the</strong>Budapest Appeal, <strong>the</strong> Poles wanted <strong>the</strong> conference to deal with <strong>the</strong> full scope ofquestions concerning European security. 36 The Poles once more explained <strong>the</strong>irunderst<strong>and</strong>ing of security <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> role played by postwar border issues. Theprinciple of respecting sovereignty as well as a renunciation of <strong>the</strong> use of forcewere to become part of a treaty on security <strong>and</strong> cooperation in Europe, <strong>and</strong>underlined that any agreement on <strong>the</strong> renunciation of force, in which <strong>the</strong> FederalRepublic would participate, without a simultaneous recognition of borders wouldnot represent progress. According to <strong>the</strong> Polish memor<strong>and</strong>um, <strong>the</strong> Soviet proposalfor an agreement on economic cooperation was overly general. It was <strong>the</strong> Polishnote that suggested that some points be added, e.g. <strong>the</strong> realization of Europeancommon projects in <strong>the</strong> field of energy, transport, water systems, financialcollaboration, <strong>and</strong> establishing formal contact between existing economicorganizations in Europe which would “respect European economic unity <strong>and</strong>secure <strong>the</strong> interests of all countries through <strong>the</strong> principle of non-discrimination <strong>and</strong>34 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/ 87, Note on our opinion on conference on security <strong>and</strong> collaboration, p.366.35 Protocol from <strong>the</strong> Polish – Soviet talks in Moscow, 1-3 October 1969 in: Tajne dokumenty..., p. 601.20
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