Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

economic <strong>and</strong> scientific conflicts. 107 The Poles were afraid that due to arbitration<strong>the</strong>re would be an opportunity to impose some decisions on smaller <strong>and</strong> weakercountries.By <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s, <strong>the</strong> international situation had changed yet again. After<strong>the</strong> Stockholm conference on confidence <strong>and</strong> security building measures <strong>and</strong>disarmament in Europe (1984-1986), NATO <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact countriesopened talks on conventional disarmament. Relations between East <strong>and</strong> West hadbecome less hostile, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Polish domestic situation had improved to a certaindegree. Taking advantage of <strong>the</strong> situation, Pol<strong>and</strong> was interested in stressing itsrole in <strong>the</strong> bloc, in being more active in international affairs so as to overcomeinternational isolation following <strong>the</strong> declaration of martial law. This probably ledto <strong>the</strong> so-called Jaruzelski Plan of 1987. Pol<strong>and</strong>’s actions may have been inspiredby o<strong>the</strong>r bloc states which had prepared <strong>the</strong>ir own initiatives, such as Bulgaria <strong>and</strong>Romania, both of which proposed a nuclear <strong>and</strong> chemical weapons free zone in <strong>the</strong>Balkans, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> GDR <strong>and</strong> Czechoslovakia, both of which suggested a nuclear <strong>and</strong>chemical weapons free ‘corridor’ in <strong>the</strong> Central Europe. It is difficult to say towhat extent <strong>the</strong> East bloc countries’ activities were inspired by <strong>the</strong> Soviets. In <strong>the</strong>case of Jaruzelski Plan, no available documents indicate a direct influence, but tooutside observers, Pol<strong>and</strong>’s initiatives may have appeared strikingly similar to <strong>the</strong>Soviet Union’s ideas concerning disarmament current at that time. Polish policymakers realized that in military talks, individual bloc states’ options were verylimited; however <strong>the</strong>re were opportunities for <strong>the</strong>m to participate in <strong>the</strong>discussions. In <strong>the</strong> fall of 1986 experts prepared a note on a new Polish initiativethat was still being developed concerning confidence building <strong>and</strong> arms limitationfirst in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea region <strong>and</strong> later in Central Europe. 108 It was stressed that <strong>the</strong>Polish project should be treated as nei<strong>the</strong>r a simple continuation of <strong>the</strong> RapackiPlan or <strong>the</strong> Gomułka Plan, nor as a proposal concerning only <strong>the</strong> Baltic region.107 AMSZ, DSiP, c.3/88, v.2, Report of <strong>the</strong> Polish delegation, 2 May 1984.108 AMSZ, DSiP, c. 9/90 v. 1, Note on a new Polish initiative, 19 November 1986.52