Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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government had hoped that it would be able to gain support for some of its ideas,but <strong>the</strong> Soviets did not even agree to create a working group on economicproblems. They argued that <strong>the</strong>y were not prepared for discussions <strong>and</strong> that in <strong>the</strong>present situation were not interested in that type of cooperation. The Polishdelegates were astonished, as two weeks earlier in Warsaw <strong>the</strong>y had been told <strong>the</strong>opposite.The Poles also told Semenov that at <strong>the</strong> next deputy ministers meeting <strong>the</strong>ywould like to speak about <strong>the</strong>ir draft <strong>and</strong> planned to put it up for discussion. TheSoviets asked Wolniak not to insist on this point, but he refused.Polish diplomats began to look for support from o<strong>the</strong>r bloc countries,especially from those which <strong>the</strong>y thought would share <strong>the</strong>ir interest in securing <strong>the</strong>borders. On 23 October, Wolniak went to East Berlin for bilateral consultationswith <strong>the</strong> GDR deputy foreign ministers Peter Florin <strong>and</strong> Herman Axen. 41 Wolniakwanted to convince <strong>the</strong> East Germans of <strong>the</strong> Polish position – which was tosupport <strong>the</strong> idea of supplementing <strong>the</strong> Soviet draft declaration on <strong>the</strong> renunciationof <strong>the</strong> use of force by unconditionally respecting <strong>the</strong> sovereignty of all Europeancountries in <strong>the</strong>ir present borders, <strong>and</strong> to support <strong>the</strong> idea of discussing <strong>the</strong> Polishdraft treaty on security <strong>and</strong> cooperation in Europe during <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact meetingin Prague. Perhaps <strong>the</strong> Poles expected that—like during <strong>the</strong> February 1967Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers <strong>Conference</strong>—it would be possible to cooperatewith <strong>the</strong> East Germans against <strong>the</strong> Soviets. 42 But <strong>the</strong> East Germans refused, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>ir answer used arguments similar to Semenov’s. The note on Polish–EastGerman consultations was prepared after <strong>the</strong> Moscow deputy ministers meeting,<strong>and</strong> Wolniak noticed, with certain irony, that this refusal was characteristic of <strong>the</strong>GDR: later, in Moscow, <strong>the</strong> East Germans changed <strong>the</strong>ir views when <strong>the</strong> Sovietsdid so, <strong>and</strong> agreed to support some Polish ideas.40 A habit in <strong>the</strong> Soviet bloc included that announcements ending multilateral meetings were usuallyprepared before <strong>the</strong> end <strong>and</strong> consulted by all <strong>the</strong> participants in bilateral talks. During this stage ofconsultations, it was possible to change <strong>the</strong>m.41 AMSZ, DSiP, c.60/77, v.1, Note on consultation in Berlin, by Z. Wolniak, 25 October 1969.23
The next council of East-bloc deputy ministers ga<strong>the</strong>red in Moscow on 26October. The Polish delegation came a day earlier to meet with Semenov <strong>and</strong> hisstaff <strong>and</strong> once more tried to convince <strong>the</strong>m to accept an alteration concerning <strong>the</strong>borders. As <strong>the</strong> Polish Deputy Minister Winiewicz wrote: “<strong>the</strong> discussion withSemenov was in many parts visibly unpleasant. He presented <strong>the</strong> Soviet positionvery firmly.” 43 But finally retreating to a decision received from <strong>the</strong> leadership,Semenov accepted <strong>the</strong> Polish point of view. When he made <strong>the</strong> reservation that incase of Western resistance <strong>the</strong>y would have to give it up, Winiewicz remarked thatif documents concerning a European conference were accepted by <strong>the</strong> WarsawPact foreign ministers in Prague, it would mean that <strong>the</strong>y ceased to be just Sovietdocuments <strong>and</strong> began to be resolutions of <strong>the</strong> whole bloc, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> bloc had <strong>the</strong>right to decide <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> documents. In <strong>the</strong> discussion with Semenov,Winiewicz also mentioned <strong>the</strong> question of <strong>the</strong> Polish draft for a “Treaty onSecurity <strong>and</strong> Cooperation in Europe”. 44 Semenov was avoiding talks on this issuebut Winiewicz was persistent, returning to this subject repeatedly. When <strong>the</strong>CPSU CC accepted it, Semenov announced during a plenary session that <strong>the</strong>Polish draft for a “Treaty on European Security <strong>and</strong> Cooperation” was compatiblewith <strong>the</strong> declarations from Bucharest (1966), Karlsbad (1967), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> BudapestAppeal (1969), <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union would support <strong>the</strong> proposal if <strong>the</strong> Polishside were to submit it for discussion at <strong>the</strong> conference. 45 The Poles were allowedto pass it on to <strong>the</strong> bloc countries. However, only <strong>the</strong> basic principles of <strong>the</strong> treaty(not all <strong>the</strong> relevant documents) were distributed to <strong>the</strong> participants with requestfor remarks.In unofficial talks among <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact countries, <strong>the</strong> Polish draft wassupported by some o<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>and</strong> as Winiewicz noted: “partly <strong>and</strong> not in a42 W. Jarzabek, ‘‘Ulbricht Doktrin oder Gomulka Doktrin”?..., p. 98f.43 AMSZ, DSiP c.60/77, v.1. Note from <strong>the</strong> meeting of <strong>the</strong> Deputy Foreign Ministers in Prague, by J.Winiewicz, 26 October 1969.44 Polish Proposal for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Conference</strong> on Security <strong>and</strong> Disarmament, in: A Cardboard Castles?..., p.350f.45 AMSZ, DSiP c.60/77, v.1. Note from <strong>the</strong> meeting of <strong>the</strong> Deputy Foreign Ministers in Prague, by J.Winiewicz, 26 October 1969.24
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Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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