Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

East–West relations could allow for <strong>the</strong> development of trade with <strong>the</strong> West.Imports from <strong>the</strong> West were especially dependent on détente, as according toregulations set by COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral ExportControls) many products with potential or actual military applications werebanned from export to <strong>the</strong> bloc countries; in many cases this included <strong>the</strong> latest incivilian technologies. In my opinion, Polish work on <strong>the</strong> rules for economiccollaboration within <strong>the</strong> CSCE, which concentrated on rules facilitating inter-bloctrade, were a consequence of Pol<strong>and</strong>’s experience of a worsened internationaleconomic environment in <strong>the</strong> mid-1960s.1.4. The First Phase of Preparatory Talks: Disputes over <strong>the</strong> AgendaIn 1968, Polish internal crises <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Prague Spring pushed <strong>the</strong> idea of aconference into <strong>the</strong> background, both because domestic issues took precedence<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> chill in East-West relations. However, beginning in 1969, <strong>the</strong> idea of aconference on security was revived. For <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, <strong>the</strong> idea of any eventualconference would be a first step in normalizing its relations with <strong>the</strong> West, <strong>and</strong> soMoscow was not interested in dem<strong>and</strong>ing any pre-conditions that could make aconference more difficult to achieve. For Pol<strong>and</strong>, such a conference would present<strong>the</strong> opportunity to obtain more room for maneuver in its international political <strong>and</strong>economic relations as well as an occasion to eliminate <strong>the</strong> danger of Moscow oro<strong>the</strong>r great powers taking advantage of <strong>the</strong> Oder-Neisse border issue. Polishdiplomats treated <strong>the</strong> conference as a Polish idea <strong>and</strong> wanted to be active in itsimplementation <strong>and</strong> also wanted to keep <strong>the</strong>ir eyes on intra-bloc consultationsconcerning <strong>the</strong> conference agenda <strong>and</strong> protocol.In early 1969, experts from <strong>the</strong> Polish foreign ministry began working on<strong>the</strong> agenda for a European security conference, m<strong>and</strong>ated by a decision of <strong>the</strong>Polish United Workers Party’s 5 th Congress held in November 1968. They thoughtthat this would be an appropriate time for a conference, as <strong>the</strong> idea began to bemore popular among <strong>the</strong> smaller Western European countries, which also feared11