Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

Soviet reticence on <strong>the</strong> agenda of a future conference, especially on borderissues, was not <strong>the</strong> only reason for Polish anxiety. In <strong>the</strong> spring of 1969 WestGermany <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> GDR concluded an agreement on economic collaboration, <strong>and</strong>East Germany was successful in blocking a decision on closer collaboration withinCOMECON. 26 Warsaw was not informed of <strong>the</strong> details of Soviet-FRG talks, but itknew that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union was interested in progress which meant a lack ofinterest for preconditions. Warsaw did not want <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union unilaterally todecide questions perceived as being crucial for Polish independence <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>feeling of menace were probably <strong>the</strong> main reason for <strong>the</strong> change in Polish policytowards Germany, announced by Władysław Gomułka in a public election speechof 17 May 1969. 27Gomułka proposed that West Germany <strong>and</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong> start talks on borderrecognition <strong>and</strong> also expressed expectations of a future conference that addressed<strong>the</strong> many problems of European security, including <strong>the</strong> Oder–Neisse line <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>recognition of <strong>the</strong> GDR. Gomułka did not inform Moscow about his plans inadvance. 28 He expected that it would be difficult for Bonn to leave <strong>the</strong> Polishproposal unanswered, but <strong>the</strong> proposal was made at an inopportune time. TheWest German government was preparing for elections (planned for 28 September)<strong>and</strong> was not interested in changing its official position, i.e. that <strong>the</strong> border issueshould be settled during a peace conference with a united Germany. Finally, WestGerman reactions were limited to general recognition of <strong>the</strong> speech <strong>and</strong> did notsound encouraging for Warsaw. 2926 M. Tomala, Patrząc na Niemcy. Od wrogości do porozumienia 1945 – 1991, Polska Fundacja SprawMiedzynarodowych, Warszawa 1997, p.157 f.27 W. Gomułka, Zgodnie z najbardziej żywotnymi interesami narodu polskiego”, Z przemówienia naspotkaniu z wyborcami w Warszawie, wygłoszonego 17 maja 1969, w: O problemie niemieckim. Artykułyi przemówienia, KiW, Warszawa 1984, p. 76 (Gomułka’s speech from 17 th of May).28 W. Jarząbek,“Ulbricht Doktrin oder Gomułka Doktrin ?...”, p.113. The Polish Ambassador to MoscowJan Ptasiński explained <strong>the</strong> reason of <strong>the</strong> lack of earlier consultations in late May.29 D. Bingen, Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od Adenauera do Kohla 1949-1991, Kwadrat,Kraków 1997, p.108 f.15