Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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leadership. In August 1980, after strikes in many factories across <strong>the</strong> country, anindependent trade union <strong>and</strong> social movement called “Solidarność” (“Solidarity”)was created.At <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> Madrid conference <strong>the</strong> Polish delegation viewedsupport for its proposed conference on military détente as an example ofinternational goodwill attributable to Pol<strong>and</strong>’s decision to refrain from using forceagainst <strong>the</strong> striking workers. Never<strong>the</strong>less, Pol<strong>and</strong> did not want <strong>the</strong> conference inMadrid to deal with <strong>the</strong> implementation of Basket III issues, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore tried tomake it impossible for <strong>the</strong> West to receive information about <strong>the</strong> domesticsituation in Pol<strong>and</strong>. In January 1980, <strong>the</strong> Polish Helsinki Committee was created<strong>and</strong> started to ga<strong>the</strong>r information on human rights violations in Pol<strong>and</strong>. Thecommittee planned to send an opposition member, Zbigniew Romaszewski, toMadrid as a witness who could describe <strong>the</strong> situation in Pol<strong>and</strong>. However, he wasnot allowed to leave Pol<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> his passport was confiscated. In November 1980,however, a report edited by Romaszewski was delivered to <strong>the</strong> conferenceparticipants. 114 Reports on human rights abuses, especially those that occurredafter <strong>the</strong> introduction of martial law, were prepared by <strong>the</strong> Helsinki Committee<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r dissent groups <strong>and</strong> sent to <strong>the</strong> United Nations, foreign parliaments,politicians, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Labor Organization. The persecution of <strong>the</strong>opposition in Pol<strong>and</strong> was presented as a violation of <strong>the</strong> Helsinki Final Act <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Polish government’s o<strong>the</strong>r international obligations.During <strong>the</strong> initial talks in Madrid in November <strong>and</strong> December 1980, Pol<strong>and</strong><strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Soviet bloc countries did not want to agree to <strong>the</strong> creation of aninstitution empowered to judge whe<strong>the</strong>r or not participating countries hadcomplied with <strong>the</strong>ir CSCE obligations. Polish diplomats stressed that <strong>the</strong> Final Actwas not binding under international law <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re was “interdependence114 R. Zuzowski, Political Dissent..., p.184.55
etween <strong>the</strong> development of détente <strong>and</strong> progress in human rights.” 115 This factwas also pointed out in <strong>the</strong> Polish ministerial background notes prepared shortlyafter Helsinki. The first session after <strong>the</strong> introduction of martial law in Pol<strong>and</strong> inDecember 1981, was led by Pol<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Polish delegation attempted to makediscussion of human rights impossible through procedural means. In spite of <strong>the</strong>irdifficulties <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unwelcome international interest in <strong>the</strong> domestic situation inPol<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Polish authorities were interested in continuing <strong>the</strong> CSCE meetingbecause <strong>the</strong> meeting was a way to avoid isolation in <strong>the</strong> international arena. Thedecision to continue negotiations <strong>and</strong> organize fur<strong>the</strong>r experts meetings was seenas a stabilizing factor in East-West relations. 116The next experts meetings <strong>and</strong> CSCE conferences were not easy for <strong>the</strong>Polish participants. At <strong>the</strong> end of martial law many individual freedoms wererestricted. The ranks of <strong>the</strong> political prisoners had swollen, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong>secret police had rapidly increased. In 1988, <strong>the</strong> number of secret policefunctionaries rose to 100,000, easily surpassing <strong>the</strong> figure of 80,000 at <strong>the</strong> heightof <strong>the</strong> Stalinist era in 1953. Freedom of correspondence was routinely violated,<strong>and</strong> it was not even possible to discuss <strong>the</strong> concepts of freedom of speech or <strong>the</strong>press, even though within universities <strong>and</strong> some churches it was relatively easy tobuy so-called “second-circulation publications” or, samizdat in Soviet parlance.The Polish government was generally afraid that during <strong>the</strong> CSCE meetingsit would be criticized in public <strong>and</strong> that Polish émigrés <strong>and</strong> human rightsorganizations would organize demonstrations featuring specific examples ofpersecuted individuals. Demonstrations near Polish diplomatic missions(embassies, consulates, trade representatives) became common in Western cities,especially in <strong>the</strong> United States. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs began tolook for legal options to limit <strong>the</strong>m by resorting to local <strong>and</strong> international law115 AMSZ, Dep.IV, c.45/84, v.11, Note: The problems of CSCE principles during Madrid meeting, byA.D. Rotfeld, 6 December 1981.116 From Helsinki...., p. 47.56
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