Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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The Helsinki Final ActFollowing <strong>the</strong> conclusion of <strong>the</strong> negotiations, <strong>the</strong> PPR Foreign Ministryprepared a formal interpretation of <strong>the</strong> documents agreed on in Helsinki. 87 Mostcritical from Warsaw’s point of view was describing, elaborating upon, <strong>and</strong>signing <strong>the</strong> ten principles of international relations, especially <strong>the</strong> final portions on<strong>the</strong> principle of sovereign equality, renunciation of <strong>the</strong> use of force, <strong>the</strong>inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity <strong>and</strong> non-intervention in internalaffairs (understood in Pol<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> Eastern bloc, as noninterference).The Polish government took satisfaction in <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Sovietbloc countries had managed to subordinate <strong>the</strong> formula on peaceful change ofboundaries to <strong>the</strong> principle of sovereign equality, as opposed to <strong>the</strong> principle ofinviolability of frontiers. Similarly important to Warsaw was <strong>the</strong> fact that in caseof <strong>the</strong> Final Act, <strong>the</strong> distinction was made between <strong>the</strong> “Declaration of Principles,”which referred to bilateral <strong>and</strong> multilateral treaties as sources of international law(among <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> United Nations Charter), <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r stipulations, which weretreated as declarations of political will.Polish officials were partly satisfied with <strong>the</strong> results of Basket IInegotiations. For example, <strong>the</strong> MFN clause had been formulated in a very generalway, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> reciprocity principle (although also general) had found mention. ThePolish experts noted that it would probably be necessary to change Polish lawconcerning joint ventures <strong>and</strong> money transfers in order to facilitate internationalcooperation.Much attention centered on Principle VII <strong>and</strong> Basket III. As <strong>the</strong> Basket IIIrecommendations, among <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> principle of non-intervention, weresubordinated to <strong>the</strong> ten principles of international relations, <strong>the</strong>y were shown asdependent on <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> also upon <strong>the</strong> “stage of détente.” Polish officials notedwith satisfaction that, “in spite of <strong>the</strong> Western countries’ desires, any formulationswhich could be interpreted as approving of dissident activity were included in <strong>the</strong>43
stipulations.” To justify this assumption, <strong>the</strong>y mentioned that <strong>the</strong> Final Actreferred to <strong>the</strong> United Nations Covenants on Civil <strong>and</strong> Political Rights of 1966,which spoke not only about individual rights, but also about individuals’ duties tosociety; <strong>the</strong> covenants discussed <strong>the</strong> precise conditions for <strong>the</strong> implementation ofrights, as well possibilities for <strong>the</strong>ir limitation because of <strong>the</strong> precedence of <strong>the</strong>societal interest over individual rights.” Experts from <strong>the</strong> Ministry of ForeignAffairs hence recommended urgently examining <strong>the</strong> issue of ratifying bothcovenants. Analyses of <strong>the</strong> covenants credit <strong>the</strong> Polish decision to ratify <strong>the</strong>covenants to Warsaw’s readiness for compromise before <strong>the</strong> 1978 Belgrade CSCE<strong>Conference</strong>, but it appears that it was rooted in <strong>the</strong> Polish authorities’ interest inlimiting <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> Final Act.Warsaw saw <strong>the</strong> mini-preambles to <strong>the</strong> stipulations on <strong>the</strong> flow of ideas,people <strong>and</strong> information <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> formula, which subjected <strong>the</strong> spreading ofinformation (which also meant press <strong>and</strong> radio news) to <strong>the</strong> mutual underst<strong>and</strong>ingof nations <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> aims accepted by <strong>the</strong> CSCE, protecting both Polish <strong>and</strong> blocinterests, <strong>and</strong> specifically as a chance to limit Radio Free Europe’s activity. Thestipulations concerning family reunions were seen as relevant to Polish law.In fact <strong>the</strong> legal stance was not a problem—<strong>the</strong> main issue was <strong>the</strong> political reality.The Polish authorities were not eager to make emigration easy, an attitude typicalfor all communist countries, not just Pol<strong>and</strong>.In sum, <strong>the</strong> conference had been a success, <strong>and</strong> potential dangers wereunderplayed, but does this mean that <strong>the</strong>y were not seen? Most likely some of<strong>the</strong>m were understood, but it was also anticipated, that it would be possible tominimize <strong>the</strong>m using <strong>the</strong> domestic law. And in 1975 <strong>the</strong> gains were perceived asprevailing. The Polish government published <strong>the</strong> Helsinki Final Act along withFirst Secretary Gierek’s introduction, but according to Romuald Spasowski, <strong>the</strong>87 AMSZ, DSiP, c.3/82, v.5, Interpretation of <strong>the</strong> decision of CSCE, 2 August 1975.44
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