Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

eing eliminated from international debate as a consequence of <strong>the</strong> developingdialogue between <strong>the</strong> USA <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. They also estimated that <strong>the</strong>rewas a danger that “<strong>the</strong> West <strong>and</strong> first of all <strong>the</strong> FRG would take <strong>the</strong> leading role inan international discussion concerning European security, which could causeattention to be fixed on topics not comfortable for us.” 19 They were also afraidthat <strong>the</strong> four biggest powers would create a commission of ten countries with <strong>the</strong>participation of both German states, which would place Pol<strong>and</strong> in a secondary rolein terms of conference preparations <strong>and</strong> in effect would limit opportunities forrealizing Polish aims. Describing <strong>the</strong> direction of diplomatic action, expertspointed mostly to <strong>the</strong> Western countries, but Polish ideas were to be presented to<strong>the</strong> Soviets first.Polish foreign ministry experts suggested concentrating on four issues: first,a system of gradual disarmament as a result of <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>and</strong> implementationof a non-proliferation treaty; second, legal <strong>and</strong> political means of détente includinga treaty on <strong>the</strong> renunciation of <strong>the</strong> use of force, which Warsaw expected wouldhave an international character. The experts did not recommend endorsing aprecise form of <strong>the</strong> treaty yet, as <strong>the</strong>y expected that <strong>the</strong> FRG-Soviet talks would berenewed soon <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> means of using this problem in negotiation seemed to beunclear. Economic relations were viewed as <strong>the</strong> third aspect of a futureconference. The Polish side wanted to limit or exclude barriers in internationaltrade <strong>and</strong> to base collaboration on <strong>the</strong> basis of most-favored-nation status (MFN),which would be given to every country participating in <strong>the</strong> conference. As for <strong>the</strong>protocol for <strong>the</strong> preparations, bilateral talks <strong>and</strong> upcoming multilateral dialogbetween East, West <strong>and</strong> neutral countries were suggested as becoming morefavorable. All participating countries were to have equal status in negotiations.In <strong>the</strong> meantime, <strong>the</strong> Soviets began to implement <strong>the</strong>ir plans. In March 1969<strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact countries announced in Budapest <strong>the</strong> “Appeal for a European19 AMSZ, DSiP, c.60/77, v.1, Initial project of our attitude to <strong>the</strong> agenda of <strong>the</strong> conference, 13 February1969.12