Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

planned for December 1969 would serve this aim. 51 The Poles were certain that <strong>the</strong>US attitude would be decisive at that time.From <strong>the</strong> diplomatic talks <strong>and</strong> analysis of <strong>the</strong> international situation, Polishpolicymakers began to realize that <strong>the</strong>re were few chances to start <strong>the</strong> conferencequickly. 52 They were of <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> United States was <strong>the</strong> main “brakingpower,” which wanted <strong>the</strong> conference to be a culminating moment for East–Westtalks on European matters <strong>and</strong> prioritized bilateral talks, first among <strong>the</strong>m talkswith <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Berlin issue. Bilateraltalks with France led to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that at <strong>the</strong> time Paris was mostly afraid thata conference held prematurely could actually deepen East–West divisions. Francetoo preferred to prepare for a conference through bilateral talks, among <strong>the</strong>mbetween East <strong>and</strong> West Germany. The talks also proved that <strong>the</strong> Pragueannouncement <strong>and</strong> agenda proposals were seen as too general <strong>and</strong> failing toaddress critical security questions, especially <strong>the</strong> disarmament problem (which <strong>the</strong>Poles wanted to include, but Moscow did not). Western diplomats also seemed tosuggest that problems in economic collaboration could be solved by <strong>the</strong> EuropeanEconomic Commission of <strong>the</strong> United Nations. Moreover, some formulations of <strong>the</strong>draft declaration on <strong>the</strong> renunciation of <strong>the</strong> use of force were perceived in <strong>the</strong> Westas a Soviet attempt to gain recognition for <strong>the</strong> “Brezhnev Doctrine.” 53 But it alsoappeared that it would be possible to find satisfactory wording for <strong>the</strong> recognitionof <strong>the</strong> European status quo, although this would not mean de jure recognition of<strong>the</strong> GDR. After <strong>the</strong> NATO announcement in December 1969, it became certainthat <strong>the</strong> West expected <strong>the</strong> conference to be better prepared to accept importantresolutions, <strong>and</strong> not just serve as propag<strong>and</strong>a tools. This argument was used by <strong>the</strong>Poles in <strong>the</strong>ir talks within <strong>the</strong> bloc.51 AMSZ, DSiP, c. 60/77, v. 1. Dispatch from Washington, Michałowski to Jędrychowski, 19 November1969.52 Western reaction to <strong>the</strong> conference proposal, op. cit.29